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POSTMODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
INTRODUCTION
F or over a generation American constitutional law has been in a
state of crisis challenging the very foundations of American
constitutional government.' It is a crisis that manifests itself in
widespread disagreement over the proper interpretation of the
United States Constitution.2 This crisis ultimately affects every per-
son subject to the laws of the United States, jeopardizing the rights,
liberties, and responsibilities that individuals enjoy in the world's
oldest and most resilient constitutional democracy. It also implicates
the authority of the state and federal governments as well as the
general question of the government's role in solving the nation's so-
cial and economic problems. Since the very idea of constitutional
government is at stake, we must determine whether this crisis in
American constitutionalism can be resolved, or whether instead we
should seek new ways of understanding our most cherished political
text.
The crisis in American constitutionalism reflects a broader cri-
sis in intellectual inquiry. The landscape of intellectual inquiry, once
ensconced securely in modernity,' is now emerging into a postmod-
em era.4 Constitutional theory, traditionally understood as champi-
1. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A
HERMENEUTIC READER 155, 157 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988)
(examining "the malaise that afflicts all contemporary legal analysis, nowhere more se-
verely than in constitutional theory"). I discuss possible responses to this crisis in the
following: Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness:
The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1990)
[hereinafter Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness]; Robert
J. Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism and the Art of Conver-
sation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1991) [hereinafter Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies
and Apes Without Tails]; Robert J. Lipkin, Indeterminacy, Justification and Truth in
Constitutional Theory, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1992) [hereinafter Lipkin, Indetermi-
nacy, Justification and Truth in Constitutional Theory]; and Robert J. Lipkin, Pragma-
tism-The Unfinished Revolution: Doctrinaire and Reflective Pragmatism in Rorty's So-
cial Thought, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1561 (1993) [hereinafter Lipkin, Pragmatism].
2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 2
(1991). Additionally, this crisis involves disagreement over substantive constitutional
values, and the right connection between the Constitution and moral and political values.
3. Consider the divergence of constitutional theories over the last twenty or thirty
years. Although there is much agreement over a host of significant issues, there also ap-
pears to be irreconcilable differences over such issues as abortion, gay and lesbian rights,
free speech, pornography, racism, the role of the government, and poverty, among others.
These differences have been tested and refined through reflection and confrontation, yet
they still remain divisive. This suggests that the modernist ideal of reducing or eliminat-
ing disagreement is implausible.
4. Postmodernity rejects metanarratives, or meta-discourses, that allegedly legiti-
mize or validate primary discourses. Such a meta-discourse, or meta-language, is a sec-
ond-order discourse which takes as its object, not the ordinary objects of first-order dis-
courses such as science, ethics and common sense, but rather, the first-order discourses
1994] 319
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oning objectivity and legitimacy, must now seek new structures in
postmodernity, or continue to founder and abdicate its unique role in
American culture.5 This Article characterizes the crisis of American
constitutionalism as a problem of postmodernity.6 Postmodernity
poses a special problem for constitutionalism as it does for any dis-
cipline that counts legitimacy and truth among its primary virtues.
Part I of this Article sketches the postmodern challenge and con-
tends that pragmatism represents the best postmodern approach to
intellectual inquiry generally and constitutional theory in particu-
lar. Part II, the Article's critical centerpiece, examines Bruce
themselves. This second-order discourse allegedly provides the rational justification of the
primary discourse. For the postmodernist, no such second-order discourses exist, or, what
amounts to the same thing, if they do exist, they serve no legitimizing function. See JEAN-
FRANgOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE at xxiv
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) [hereinafter LYOTARD, THE POST-
MODERN CONDITION] (defining postmodernity "as incredulity toward metanarratives").
Metanarratives "subordinate, organize and account for other narratives; so that
every other local narrative... is given meaning by the way it echoes and confirms the
grand narratives. . . ." STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY 30 (1989) [hereinafter CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST
CULTURE]. Losing faith in metanarratives implies that philosophy, the metanarrative of
metanarratives, can never be the Queen of the sciences. LYOTARD, THE POsTMODERN
CONDITION, supra, at 41 ('Speculative or humanistic philosophy is forced to relinquish its
legitimation duties ... in arrogating such functions and is reduced to the study of sys-
tems of logic or the history of ideas where it has been realistic enough to surrender
them."). We should avoid the temptation to describe the failure of the great narratives as
"the great narrative of the decline of great narratives." Jean-Frangois Lyotard, Universal
History and Cultural Differences, in THE LYOTARD READER 314, 318 (Andrew Benjamin
ed., 1989) [hereinafter Lyotard, Universal History and Cultural Differences]; Instead, we
should abandon our commitment to legitimacy. See SEYLA BENHIABIB, SITUATING THE
SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 224 (1992)
(discussing what philosophy becomes when it ceases aspiring to a metadiscourse of le-
gitimation); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications
for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992) (discussing postmodernity and
its implications for statutory interpretation). In addition to its rejection of
metanarratives, postmodernity also rejects the notion of a true or an essential self.
5. In American democracy, many controversial social issues have a constitutional
dimension and Americans take constitutional criticism seriously. Many Americans be-
lieve that unethical policies are also unconstitutional even though technically, it might be
impossible for that objection to stick due to the absence of state action or some other trig-
gering device.
6. Not everyone is equally enthusiastic about the notion of postmodernity. See, e.g.,
Fred Dallmayr, Postmetaphysics and Democracy, 21 POL. THEORY 101, 101 (1993) ("While
fashionable, the meaning of [postmodernity] is baffling or elusive."). Constitutional schol-
ars in particular may have special reservations about the use of this term in constitu-
tional theory. I am sympathetic to their concerns, but urge these scholars to tolerate my
use of "modern" and "postmodern" for the present. I propose an account of American con-
stitutionalism that can be articulated independently of these exotic postmodernist terms.
However, my account of constitutionalism explains the attractiveness of postmodernity,
because American constitutionalism was paradoxically "postmodern" long before the
dawning of postmodernity.
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Ackerman's theory of dualistic constitutional change. In a nutshell,
Ackerman's theory must be rejected because it suffers from an
identity crisis. Dualism's downfall is its failure to distinguish and
integrate two very different kinds of constitutional theories: modern-
ist constitutional theory and postmodern constitutional theory.
Shorn of its modernist features,' Ackerman's theory exemplifies a
postmodern concern for context, detail and perspective.' In the spirit
of postmodernity, Ackerman creates an interpretive history of
American constitutionalism, but gives insufficient attention to the
problems of adjudication, namely, the problem of how judges decide
cases. What is needed to resolve this problem is an unambiguous
jurisprudential theory of constitutional change and judicial reason-
ing, an account tied to conceptual change and theories of reasoning
in other areas of intellectual inquiry. Part III describes and defends
such a theory, namely, "the theory of constitutional revolutions," a
jurisprudential theory which accurately depicts American constitu-
tional practice and the paradigm of judicial reasoning upon which
this practice depends.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POSTMODERN AGE
A. The Crisis of American Constitutionalism
The crisis of American constitutionalism involves two opposing
approaches to constitutional reasoning. The first approach contends
that judges must use legitimate constitutional methodologies in de-
ciding cases, based on reason, objectivity, and truth. When judges
adopt alternative methods their lawlessness weakens the govern-
ment's constitutional authority over its citizens. According to this
modernist approach, inappropriate constitutional methodologies
threaten the legitimacy of constitutional law. The modernist solu-
tion is to discover the correct constitutional methodology, a method-
ology that is sanctioned by the United States Constitution itself or
7. Ackerman fails to recognize that his theory exhibits both modern and postmodern
characteristics. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
8. Two deeply entrenched modernist presuppositions of Ackerman's dualistic politics
are his concern over the countermajoritarian problem and his insistence that judges inte-
grate the constitutional values of preceding constitutional regimes. See discussion infra
part II. The countermajoritarian problem cannot be a serious problem for the postmodern
constitutionalist for two salient reasons. First, postmodernist theories are anti-perfection-
ist. Just because every feature of American constitutionalism is not itself majoritarian
does not mean that the system taken as a whole suffers from a democratic deficiency.
Second, postmodern constitutionalism permits a wide array of democratic systems, some
having judicial review, some not.
9. Perspectivalism insists that all human beings perceive the world from their own
viewpoint, implying that judging or reasoning from a general perspective is an impossible
modernist myth.
1994] 321
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some authoritative feature of American Constitutional practice.
The second approach makes no claims to legitimacy, nor does it
seek to determine once and forever the appropriate constitutional
methodology. Instead, this postmodern approach sees constitutional
law as a search for appropriate values suitable to contemporary so-
ciety. Rather than first requiring a theoretical justification of consti-
tutional methodology, this approach insists that we leave a priori
questions of legitimacy and methodology aside. The sole criterion for
the acceptability of constitutional methodology is its efficacy in re-
solving constitutional crises, or, failing that, in explaining why reso-
lution is impossible.
The crisis of American constitutionalism implicates broader
values now under siege in American culture. It asks a question as
old as the American Republic, namely: How is it possible for a con-
stitutional democracy to serve two masters: the master of orthodoxy
and the master of progressive change? This question goes to the
heart of constitutionalism and its role in our culture wars. 0 Ques-
tions of this sort seek to determine whether our constitutional de-
mocracy can survive when large scale disagreement about central
values poisons the well of public life. Though this question has roots
in the founding of the nation, it has special importance now that
America is undergoing diverse and radical demographic changes.
Shortly, the majority of Americans will not be white or European.
The problem of how to maintain America's traditions (which tradi-
tions?) in the midst of diversity, thus becomes a critical problem af-
fecting both American culture and American constitutionalism.
The present crisis of American constitutionalism is more than
mere disagreement over constitutional values or constitutional
methodologies. Americans have always been divided over which val-
ues the United States Constitution protects and which methodolo-
gies the Constitution sanctions." The contemporary crisis exists be-
10. See JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 250-
71 (1991) (describing the extent of the culture wars in American society); see also GERALD
GRAFF, BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS 171-96 (1992) (suggesting that by teaching the con-
flicts we can move beyond the culture wars). American constitutionalism is a form of cul-
tural criticism and as such constitutes a process of constitutional and cultural change. See
Robert J. Lipkin, Pragmatism, Cultural Criticism and the Idea of the Postmodern Uni.
versity, in ETHICS AND THE UNIVERSITY: COMMUNITY, DIVERSITY AND MORALITY IN THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY (M.N.S. Sellers ed., forthcoming 1994).
11. Since the text of the Constitution does not specify a prescribed methodology, it is
difficult to see how one could argue that the Constitution sanctions any particular meth-
odology of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the records of the Constitution's ratifi-
cation do not unambiguously reveal the Founders' intentions on this matter. Moreover, it
is not obvious why (or how) these intentions should control, except in the most trivial
sense. Surprisingly, there is a conceptual problem involved here. Even if the Constitution
specified a particular methodology, that provision alone could never be ultimate in requir-
[Vol. 42322
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cause the present disagreement is so fundamental and irresolvable,
pellucidly revealing the great cultural divisions in our nation. No
longer do we take seriously our opponents' point of view. No longer
do we seek bridges between polarized extremes. 2
The crisis of American constitutionalism is also a crisis of
Western civilization and the epistemology and metaphysics Western
civilization defends. The crisis of American constitutionalism there-
fore reflects a broader crisis in intellectual inquiry. Western intellec-
tual inquiry is experiencing a sea change away from grand narra-
tives canonizing and legitimizing primary discourses. This move
away from foundationalist epistemology and metaphysics is an in-
dictment of the Enlightenment and the modernist spirit that created
it. Postmodern antifoundationalism challenges the role of reason in
intellectual inquiry and in foundationalist conceptual schemes as
well as the prominence of the notions of truth and objectivity en-
demic to such schemes. Essentially, this challenge denigrates the vi-
ability of key foundationalist dichotomies such as the objective and
the subjective; the real and the ideal; truth and justification; mind
.and body; altruism and egoism; the public and the private, and so
forth. In the context of constitutional inquiry, this challenge deni-
grates the role of reason, normativity13 and methodology. 4 To meet
ing our allegiance. Such a provision could never be ultimate, because we need an inde-
pendent reason for adopting it, that is, a reason requiring that we follow the Constitu-
tion's text in this matter. If the Constitution's text concerning the proper methodology of
constitutional interpretation controls, then it does so because of'extra-constitutional rea-
sons, that is, it does so because it is not ultimate. And absent such a reason, the provision
would be ultimate, but would not control, because it is circular to say that X is the correct
way of understanding the Constitution, because the Constitution says it is. So either the
provision controls but is not ultimate, or it is ultimate, but does not control.
12. When the Supreme Court "settles" a constitutional controversy by a five-to-four
vote, no one can reasonably conclude, after examining American constitutional history,
that the Court's decision is uniquely correct and principled. If it were, there would be no
way to explain satisfactorily the existence of the dissenting opinion(s). Whether apparent
or not, the Court must decide controversial social issues more contextually and pragmati-
cally than by so-called reasoned, principled, or faithful constitutional arguments.
13. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990)
(challenging the significance of creating normative legal theories). But see Mark V. Tush-
net, The Left Critique of Normativity: A Comment, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2325 (1992)
(criticizing the anti-normativity movement).
14. American constitutionalism, like any field of inquiry, depends on methods for
discovering and validating its claims. These methods are either unique to American con-
stitutionalism or apply equally across several fields of inquiry. American constitutional-
ism depends upon several disparate levels of meaning and, therefore, discoveries in con-
stitutional theory may have unexpected effects. The methods of constitutional reasoning
may be applicable to other fields of law, as well as to other practical domains. Conse-
quently, a theory of American constitutionalism may contribute to a general theory of
human intellectual and practical inquiry, typically conceived of as a modernist enterprise,
but one which can be reborn in postmodernist terms. An interesting conceptual question,
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this challenge we must rethink constitutional law and theory.
The challenge compels us ab initio to engage in comprehensive,
candid investigations of how American constitutionalism actually
works, and resist, if only temporarily, how constitutional theorists
say it should work. We are challenged, in short, to bracket a priori,
normative conceptions of American constitutionalism until we truly
understand in much greater detail the patterns and movements in
constitutional practice. 15
Determining the actual character of American constitutional
law is the first step in reconstructing constitutional law and theory
in the postmodern era. The crisis of American constitutionalism can
then be described as posing the following question: Can American
constitutional law be postmodern? This Article affirmatively an-
swers this question.' The Article's leitmotif insists that theories of
constitutional transformation and adjudication precede interpretive
histories of American constitutionalism. Historical evidence, of
course, is relevant to both these inquiries. However, an interpretive
history shows the substantive character of American constitutional-
ism, while a theory of constitutional transformation and adjudica-
tion discovers how courts transform constitutional law and how
judges decide cases irrespective of the interpretive histories of
American constitutionalism to which the judges are committed. It is
this dual problem of transformation and adjudication that this Arti-
cle addresses.
For the postmodern constitutionalist, the discussion of the
problem of transformation and adjudication must necessarily begin
with a discussion of the crisis of postmodernity. The characterization
I offer is not intended as a complete account of the postmodern
condition; nor do I think that such a characterization is possible.18
now having special contemporary relevance, is the relationship of American constitu-
tionalism to other emerging conceptions of constitutionalism. Are there many irreconcil-
ably different forms of constitutionalism, or does constitutionalism signify in nontrivial
terms a common conceptual structure?
15. I do not mean to suggest that we should seek a neutral, value free perspective in
order to understand constitutional practice. No such perspective exists. But some per-
spectives are intrusively value-laden, while others embody values we accept without
question. I do, however, believe in authenticity in investigating social practices. Investi-
gations are authentic when they produce a more comprehensive account of the practice
than other investigations. Consequently, what I urge here is to seek an authentic depic-
tion of constitutional law and theory.
16. This article is part of a longer work on the possibility of postmodern, pragmatic
American constitutionalism.
17. Postmodernity represents a diverse tapestry of intellectual, artistic, and practi-
cal perspectives. See generally CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE, supra note 4. Post-
modem intellectual inquiry might not have the same meaning as postmodern art or other
postmodern social practices. Further, regarding postmodernity as a description of an his-
torical era will not always work, because some contend (ironically?) that postmodernity
324 [Vol. 42
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Instead, I offer an account of postmodernity that is designed to
identify the crisis of American constitutionalism in Anglo-American
terms. The crisis of postmodernity is typically described in terms of
poststructuralism, 9 but the former is broader than the latter.2" The
crisis of American constitutionalism is hn American crisis created,
in part, by the philosophical temperament in American intellectual
inquiry. The crisis' resolution, therefore, might require conspicu-
ously American remedies. Accordingly, it will be helpful to restrict
this discussion of postmodernity to the crisis of postmodernity in the
American philosophical, or more generally, American intellectual
tradition.21 Consequently, I am restricting the discussion of post-
modernity to the postmodern intellectual condition in American
culture. The lessons learned from the American constitutional con-
precedes modernity. See Stan Smith, The origins of 'postmodernism' (letter to editor),
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (London), Feb. 5, 1993, at 15 ("It now appears that
'postmodernism' might well predate 'modernism'...."). There are hints of this in Lyo-
tard. See LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, supra note 4, at 79. Moreover, in one
sense, the postmodern temperament surely precedes the modern era. Premodernity,
modernity and postmodernity are all deep psychological attitudes that exist in people to
varying degrees from the time a person is able to engage in the sophisticated use of lan-
guage. But the modern age antedates the postmodern age, and so understanding post-
modernity historically helps to define and refine postmodernity as a deep psychological
attitude.
18. Postmodern inquiries typically "criticize the ideals of representation, truth, ra-
tionality, system, foundation, certainty and coherence typical of much modern theory, as
well as the concepts of the subject, meaning, and causality." STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS
KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL INTERROGATIONS 256 (1991). Despite this
common core of objections, postmodern inquiries "can be deployed for quite different theo-
retical and political ends." Id. And, indeed, two general approaches to postmodernity ex-
ist: a radical approach and a reconstructive approach. Id. at 257. The radical approach
seeks an abrupt break with modernity and modern theories, while the reconstructive ap-
proach uses both modern and postmodern elements in their attempt to reconstruct criti-
cal social theory. Id.
19. Postructuralism is, inter alia, a rejection of modern philosophy's commitment to
foundationalism. Id. at 21. As a form of postmodernism, the poststructuralist critique of
modernity derives, though not exclusively, from the works of such French theorists as
Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and Barthes. See id. at 16, 20.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Interestingly, the American philosophical tradition, as practiced in the graduate
departments of America's great universities, scarcely appreciates the crisis of postmod-
ernity. Indeed, philosophers trained in the Anglo-American, analytic tradition-of which I
am one-appear to be oblivious to postmodernity as a cultural issue. Instead, these phi-
losophers are still trying to flesh out the philosophical promise of modernity without
identifying their project in these terms. There is nothing wrong with doing so; however,
these modernist, mainstream philosophers seemingly want to silence analytic philoso-
phers having an interest in the postmodernity problem. Since most mainstream analytic
philosophers categorically reject the great skeptical moments that, in part, mark the
seeds of postmodernity in Western philosophy, seeds that can be found from Plato to Witt-
genstein, they are opposed to the idea that the concept of postmodernity could be
worthwhile.
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text, in turn, might be applicable in understanding postmodernity
generally. However, nothing in the postmodern mind either requires
or eschews the general application of the concept of postmodernity.
B. The Evolution From Premodernity to Modernity
Postmodernity is a response to the failure of modernity.22 Post-
modernity challenges intellectual inquiry to recognize the failure of
western metaphysics and epistemology. It rejects the modernist no-
tions of realism, objectivity, and truth. Modernity, in turn, was a re-
sponse to an earlier era in which institutionalized authority reigned
over intellectual and social life. During this "pre-modern" era, hu-
man intellectual development tied the authority of knowledge to
tradition and social role. One had the right to proclaim knowledge
only when one's position in society so permitted. The word of the
Pope or King, or their representatives was law. Everyone else was
condemned to silence or worse. Mere citizenship in the human com-
munity did not itself afford the right to proclaim knowledge anymore
than it afforded any political or social rights. In fact, the notion of
"mere" citizenship in the human community was empty rhetoric
since one's epistemic and moral status derived from one's member-
ship in particular groups, such as the church, the crown, the aristoc-
racy, guilds, and other associations.
During the pre-modern era, reason did not control a person's
beliefs and values. Individualistic intellectual inquiry had not yet
emerged as a cultural given, as something an unencumbered self
could use to understand the world. With the dawning of modernity,
the epistemic values of traditional society were called into question.
Western culture no longer appeared to be sanctioned simply by God
and the King, or, at least, society was much less certain that this
could be demonstrated. Something deeper than theological or secu-
lar authority seemed necessary to validate claims to knowledge and
value.
Modernity promised that reason would provide a permanent
process for understanding the world.23 Rationality and science
"promised freedom from scarcity, want, and the arbitrariness of
22. Postmodernity is neither necessarily continuous with modernity, nor is
modernity continuous with feudal society. Indeed, "[t]he modern world is born out of dis-
continuity with what went before rather than continuity with it." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONsTrTUTION OF SOCIETY 239 (1984).
23. See generally ALBRECHT WELLMER, THE PERSISTENCE OF MODERNITY (1991)
(arguing that postmodernity is nothing more than a modernistic critique of modernity).
This is modernity's ultimate hubris that the modern age is ubiquitous and permanent,
and perhaps even that foundational reason is a necessary feature of future intellectual
inquiry.
326 [Vol. 42
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natural calamity."24 With the rise of modernity, reason became en-
sconced as a cultural given, a neutral vision of criticism and valida-
tion.25 Reason provided an ahistorical standard for understanding
the world, a vantage point operating on the world, but ultimately
not one of the world .2 This intellectual scheme created a founda-
tional framework within which beliefs and values could be
grounded. Foundationalism-the view that reason can conclusively
validate beliefs and values-promises principles of truth and justifi-
cation which can be brought to bear in critically examining and re-
vising our current social practices.
The glorification of reason and the need for foundationalism are
both products of the modern spirit. Modernity is the intoxicating-
perhaps arrogant-view that reasoning human beings can create
and order their lives and the life of society. Modernity is also con-
cerned with the question of legitimacy. Human inquiry has always
been concerned with solving problems. As civilization evolved, how-
ever, it also became concerned with solving problems about solving
problems. Although this second-order practice was rooted in antiq-
uity, it matured during the modern age. Modernity announced once
and for all that even when two disciplines arrive at the same answer
to a question, both disciplines may not be equally valid. The modern
view, of course, denied that both disciplines, one legitimate and the
other not, would systematically arrive at the same correct answers.
But the issue here was not what substantive answer a discipline
generated, as much as the what method of inquiry it deployed. Only
those methods which conformed to the requirements of reason were
acceptable to the modern mind. Counterfeit methodologies, such as
astrology or alchemy were mere frauds.27
The hallmark of the modern age was the commitment to rea-
son, science, ethics, and, more generally, the conviction that these
24. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 12 (1989).
25. The modernist conception of reason as a neutral arbiter becomes a concern over
neutral discourse for philosophers taking the linguistic turn. Such philosophers seek a
neutral discourse through which to evaluate all non-neutral discourse.
26. In divorcing itself from concrete circumstances and in denigrating actual situ-
ations, reason sows the seeds of its own demise. The crisis of reason is "the danger
menacing reason and meaning under the rubric of objectivism, of the forgetting of origins,
of the blanketing of origins by the rationalist and transcendental unveiling itself. Danger
as the movement of reason menaced by its own security, etc." JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING
AND DIFFERENCE 62 (Alan Bass trans., 1978) (1967).
27. The authority of knowledge and value has been threatened simultaneously by a
failure of foundationalism and by an evolving culture which has produced disparate, even
sometimes incompatible, values. Rather than having stable models to carry out one's in-
vestigations, various fields of inquiry must establish that they are legitimate in the first
place. In an elementary sense, this instability can be characterized as a salient feature of
postmodernity.
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disciplines reflected the existence of an independent reality. The
more these intellectual disciplines develop, the closer society comes
to ultimate truth. The story of human knowledge and value is a
story of human progress, of science and ethics coming closer to ulti-
mate reality. This progressive conception of human knowledge and
value typifies the modem age. The progressive view promises one
day to reveal the complete truth about physical and moral reality.
Reason and science are, therefore, vehicles in this quest to under-
stand the nature of reality. When the present view of this reality
falters and it is replaced with a new, more correct perspective, what
was true in the old perspective is incorporated into the new one. Sci-
entific and ethical change, therefore, must be understood as increas-
ing the store of human intellectual and practical truths.
The progressive view of knowledge and value typically includes
a realist conception of intellectual inquiry. Physical and moral real-
ity provide a foundation for our conceptual scheme because such a
scheme reflects an independent objective reality. The progressive
view of knowledge and value embraces foundationalist metaphysics
and epistemology. Mainstream skeptics accept this foundationalist
framework since they believe that foundationalists ask all the right
questions, but give all the wrong answers. Both foundationalists and
skeptics endorse the same presupposition, namely: for knowledge
and value to be authoritative, something like the progressive view
must be true. Foundationalists believe that the progressive view is
true, while skeptics demur. Thus, a foundationalist conceptual
scheme is any framework that makes the authority of knowledge
and value depend upon the progressive view. Consequently, since
both realism and skepticism accept the progressive view, they are
both committed to the foundationalist conceptual scheme. 2 How-
ever, if this scheme itself is not necessary, the realism/skepticism
controversy can be rejected.
Surprisingly, in attempting to determine the scope of the foun-
dationalist conceptual scheme, reason turned on itself with the same
blinding fury with which it confronted premodernity. 29 Reason's con-
28. The foundationalist conceptual scheme defines the modern era throughout
Western culture. All the important conceptual and practical conflicts in Western cultural
inquiry are defined through this scheme. The foundationalist framework is designed to
answer two general questions about knowledge and value: one metaphysical and the
other epistemic. The metaphysical question deals with the nature of existence or reality,
while the epistemic question deals with how we come to know this reality. All other is-
sues pertaining to the authority of the foundationalist framework revolve around these
questions. Both realism and skepticism about knowledge and value assumes the intelli-
gibility of these basic metaphysical and epistemic questions in the foundationalist concep-
tual scheme. We must have either foundational knowledge or we must embrace skepti-
cism. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
29. DERRIDA, supra note 26, at 62.
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frontation with itself, through skepticism became the dawning of a
new historical era. Postmodernity was born and with it a multitude
of voices in areas as diverse as philosophy, art, law, architecture,
and engineering.3 0
C. The Problem of Postmodernity
The problem of postmodernity consists of a negative and posi-
tive thesis. The negative thesis rejects foundationalism, the notion
that rationally compelling premises entail epistemically impeccable
conclusions in science and values.3 Postmodernity challenges the
possibility of grounding reason in anything other than actual social
practices.3 2 It refuses "enlightenment reason a privileged status in
the definition of the eternal and immutable essence of human na-
ture."33 Instead, postmodernity regards the Enlightenment as "a
failed rationalist project which has run its course but which contin-
ues to encumber contemporary thought with illusions of a rational
route to knowledge."34 Postmodernity is committed to "anti-founda-
tionalism, immanence, historicity, and epistemic political strug-
gle."35 Consequently, postmodernity poses a problem for modernity's
grand program of rational inquiry.
Postmodernity challenges the authority of reason and reason's
30. This proliferation of new voices represents a challenge to both the modern and
postmodern mind. If one is a modernist it is difficult to make sense of this diversity. If one
has a postmodern temperament, one may not desire to make sense of it.
31. The rejection of the foundationalist framework is the first step toward embrac-
ing postmodernity. The rejection occurs because the foundationalist framework is experi-
entially and practically unworkable. We no more know how to live as foundationalists
than we do as skeptics. Neither position depicts a viable mode of living in the world. At
most, we can say that foundationalists accept some propositions wholeheartedly, while
skeptics reserve some doubt about all propositions. No one wholeheartedly embraces
every proposition she claims to know; and no one doubts all propositions completely. Yet,
we can still distinguish the foundationalist and the antifoundationalist on pragmatic
grounds. The foundationalist believes that foundationalist discourse has better results
pragmatically than antifoundationalist discourse. Essentially, the entire debate about
foundationalism can be replicated in pragmatic discourse by distinguishing between
doctrinaire and reflective pragmatism. Lipkin, Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 1576-82.
32. This entails that no uniquely right answers exist for most theoretical and practi-
cal questions. I say "most," because at least this question, "Are there uniquely right an-
swers for most theoretical and practical questions?" has a uniquely right answer, namely:
"No!" This is inconsistent only if one's need for simplicity and uniformity belies a modern-
ist temperament.
33. HARVEY, supra note 24, at 18. Nietzsche had a special role in this process by
"placing aesthetics above science." Id.
34. Alan Hunt, The Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodernism, 35 MCGILL L.J. 507,
515 (1990).
35. Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelnan, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Criti-
cal Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1024 n.30 (1991).
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philosophical expression in foundationalist conceptual schemes. The
problem of postmodernity arises when faith in reason wanes, and
dissensus over the most important questions of human existence
appear ineradicable. 6 Postmodernists find it impossible to ignore
the perennial and irreconcilable disagreement endemic to philoso-
phy, ethics, law, politics, and social science. Indeed, postmodernity
insists that one source of this disagreement is the indeterminacy of
the very language with which we conduct inquiry. Postmodern in-
quiry stresses the "heterogeneity, multiplicity, and difference[s]" in
cultural and intellectual icons, and therefore welcomes indetermi-
nacy.38
One possible reply is that history shows only that these contro-
versial questions have not been settled, not that they cannot be set-
tled. This argument scoffs at the view that disagreement implies the
inefficacy or limits of reason. But, the argument from dissensus
contends that disagreement exists even in circumstances that are
most epistemically favorable to achieving consensus, such as cir-
cumstances in which opponents exhibit good faith, confront each
other's best argument, are in the right frame of mind, and so forth.
Further, the argument from dissensus provides an explanation of
disagreement over a host of controversial questions such as abortion,
affirmative action, capital punishment, and gay and lesbian rights.
This explanation states that people arrive at different conclusions in
circumstances epistemically favorable to agreement because their
perspectives are different. In short, people's perspectives are infused
with different values, or the same values ranked differently. Since it
is never possible to evaluate all one's values at the same time, some
values will always be beyond the realm of argument. Unless these
values are the same, people are likely to reach different conclusions
even in circumstances epistemically favorable to agreement. 9
Foundationalists are fond of admonishing us to look to the fu-
ture for the solution to our conceptual and practical controversies.
36. Postmodernity often denigrates the importance of consensus. See LYOTARD, THE
POSTMODERN CONDITION, supra note 4, at 60-61.
37. Although the failure to resolve theoretical or practical conflicts does not preclude
a solution, this perennial failure, however, should give us pause. The non-skeptic must
explain why the best minds of Western civilization have failed to achieve consensus on a
host of controversial issues. Further, the non-skeptic must describe possible circum-
stances in which these conflicts can be rationally eliminated. If not, her position is
tautological and therefore uninteresting.
38. JANE FLAX, THEKIG FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM AND POST-
MODERNISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WEST 188 (1990); see also LINDA HUTCHEON, THE
POLrrIcs OF POSTMODERNISM 1 (1989) ("Postmodernism's distinctive character lies in...
[a] kind of wholesale 'nudging' commitment to doubleness, or duplicity.").
39. Proponents of the dissensus argument also point out that what counts as "the
same value" is itself indeterminate and therefore is subject to disagreement.
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Some genius or new intellectual movement will certainly show us
the light. If you are not certain what this "light" can possibly be; if
you believe, instead, that the Enlightenment's aspiration to pro-
gress, unification, and rationality fundamentally distort human ex-
perience, you may be a skeptic. If your skepticism is meliorated by
liberation from foundationalism, you might be entering the post-
modem age.
In fact, skepticism concerning truth and justification can be the
stepping stone to postmodernity. Postmodernists lack faith in the
possibility of giving general answers to certain questions about
knowledge and values. Three conspicuously important problems
arise in the context of values: (1) identifying ultimate values; (2)
ranking these values; and (3) determining the value's scope.40 The
problem of ultimate values contends that no one has ever accurately
devised a process for determining ultimate values. Assuming values
can be identified, one must rank those values and determine what
the ranking actually means. For example, one must consider if the
highest-ranked value always prevails or if it only prevails in a cer-
tain kind of case. Further, the value's scope or degree of generality
must be determined. If, for example, one chooses "equality" as a
value, it must be determined if the value applies to racial, ethnic, or
gender equality.
If one believes that these problems have a right answer that in
principle can be found, one is a metaphysical and epistemic foun-
dationalist. If one believes that these problems have a right answer,
but one that will not in principle be found, one is a metaphysical
foundationalist and an epistemic skeptic. If one believes that in
principle these problems have no right answers, one is both a
metaphysical and an epistemic skeptic. A person has a choice to re-
main a skeptic or to take the postmodern turn by abandoning the
framework in which skepticism flourishes. Mainstream theorists
deny the possibility of making this choice. In their view, the founda-
tionalism/skepticism framework is at the center of human intellec-
tion. However, their view is plausible only if they show that this
framework is indispensable to coherent thought.
Postmodernity, as understood here, is both a conceptual atti-
tude and a stage in historical human development. 41 One might as-
sert that postmodernity is the conceptual attitude most appropriate
to the contemporary age. But such a judgment is a contingent judg-
40. Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness, supra note
1, at 825-26.
41. This also applies to modernity and pre-modernity. Lyotard elaborates:
"Modernity is not an era in thought, but rather a mode ... of thought, of utterances, of
sensibility." Lyotard, Universal History and Cultural Differences, supra note 4, at 314.
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ment. Nothing about the present age necessarily makes it conducive
to the postmodern attitude. The present age is contingently re-
garded by many as the age of postmodernity. But the postmodern
attitude is one that has existed from the inception of intellectual in-
quiry. And the present age need not be understood exclusively in
terms of the postmodern conceptual attitude. Despite being inde-
pendent of any particular historical epoch, the postmodern concep-
tual attitude flourishes best in an age conducive to postmodernism,
and the postmodern age will realize its full potential only when the
postmodern conceptual attitude is the dominant cultural attitude of
the age.
D. Antifoundationalist Responses to the Problem of Postmodernity
The postmodernist vision rejects both foundationalism and the
progressive view of knowledge and value. Postmodernism denies
that something legitimizes our social practices beyond other social
practices. The postmodernist vision gives up the quest for the grand
narrative that was the hope of foundationalism.42
In addition to its negative thesis, postmodernity has a positive
thesis, although there is little agreement as to just what this posi-
tive thesis is. Generally, the positive thesis insists that if solutions
to social conflicts are possible, they must be found in the context of
human society. We must look to ourselves to solve our problems;
seeking answers beyond human society is illusory. The following are
possible articulations of postmodernity's positive thesis.
1. Nihilism. Rejecting modernity, and the foundationalism to
which it aspires, nihilism embraces the view that the world is bereft
of metaphysical, epistemic or moral significance, and therefore, no
constraints exist on human reasoning and inquiry.43 The nihilist
salvages the mantle of skepticism from the ashes of foundational-
42. This should not be cause for alarm; abandoning grand narratives does not entail
disaster. Consider Lyotard's remarks: "Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost
narrative. It in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity. What saves them from
it is their knowledge that legitimation can only spring from their own linguistic practice
and communicational interaction." LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, supra note 4,
at 41.
43. The nihilist contends that we cannot attach any univocal metaphysical sense to
our claims to knowledge and value. Moreover, the nihilist maintains that even if knowl-
edge and value had such meaning, we can never determine what that meaning is. Finally,
the nihilist insists that without metaphysical and epistemic meaning, moral conceptions
have no meaning either. We are left without any structures for settling epistemic or
moral conflicts. The nihilists thesis is critically destructive, insisting that political deci-
sions are merely epiphenomenal entities reflecting nothing real or important about the
world or about our lives.
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ism. She then contends that our beliefs and values have no inde-
pendent significance; nor is it obvious that they have any signifi-
cance at all. Even if they do have meaning, we will never know it.
According to nihilism, we are truly alone in the world with nothing
greater than ourselves to guarantee meaning in our lives.44
The nihilist's position can be construed in two different ways.
The first way contends that although life requires meaning to be liv-
able, it denies that anything can give it meaning. Call this
"meaning-dependent nihilism." There also exists a "meaning-inde-
pendent" form of nihilism which insists that nothing can give life
meaning, but denies that life needs meaning to be livable. Instead,
meaning-independent nihilism washes its hands of the tenor of mind
that seeks meaning or worries about its absence or loss.
Meaning-dependent nihilism contends that even if founda-
tionalism were true and even if there exists an external guarantor of
our beliefs and values, one must conclude that human inquiry, in-
deed human life itself, is meaningless.45 This type of nihilism differs
from skepticism in denying that foundationalism, even if it were
true, matters in the first place. These nihilists deny that the truth of
foundationalism could possibly dispel nihilism or obviate the need
for its invention. The nihilist chides the skeptic for wanting an ex-
ternal guarantor of our beliefs and values. Neither foundationalism
nor skepticism explains how such guarantees are possible. Even dis-
covering an omniscient person or deity shouting guarantees, no
more validates beliefs and values, or gives life meaning, than
shouting such guarantees ourselves.
Reason's empire promises an Archimedean perspective from
which to understand the world, but instead leaves one with the re-
alization that no such perspective is possible. Every perspective
from which we view the world is a view from somewhere. Hence, it
44. Nihilism need not bring despair; it can also bring about carefree liberation from
the burdens of morality. Consider the architect Philip Johnson's remarks concerning mo-
rality: "It's feudal and futile. I think it is much better to be nihilistic and forget it all. I
mean, I know I'm attacked by my moral friends... but really don't they shake them-
selves up over nothing?" CHARLES JENCKS, MODERN MOVEMENTS IN ARcHITECTURE 209
(1973) (quoting Philip Johnson).
45. External guarantors are supposed to confer meaning on human existence. If
your beliefs and values derive from reason or God, so the story goes, they are meaningful.
But what confers meaning on reason or God? In this context, reason is supposed to be in-
dependent of human inquiry and social practices, for only then can it confer meaning on
them. But what is the source of reason's meaning? Either reason gets its meaning from
elsewhere or from itself. If the former, how do we stop the regress? If the latter, why can't
ordinary human activities similarly have meaning in themselves? We must conclude,
therefore, that either reason is impossible or it is superfluous.
46. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (arguing that the subjec-
tive and objective perspectives are mutually irreducible).
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makes no sense to speculate about a perspective-from which to
evaluate other perspectives-that is not itself just another perspec-
tive. It makes no sense to look outside for the meaning of human
existence because human existence has no independent meaning. In
fact, it has no meaning at all. Thus, nihilism leaves one in a state of
incomprehension concerning meaning, knowledge and value.
Nihilism cannot be refuted. However, we know that no one ad-
vocating nihilism is in fact a nihilist, because she cannot explain the
point of her proselytizing. If human existence is indeed meaningless,
the proselytizing "nihilist" is the last person on earth to know it.
47
Fortunately, nihilism is not the only articulation of postmodernity's
positive thesis.
2. Anarchic Pluralism. Postmodernist anarchic pluralism
shares with nihilism the rejection of the independent significance of
our beliefs and values, as well as the independent significance of our
convictions.48 For the anarchic pluralist, this means that individuals
are free to give their life meaning because each person is free to
create her own values. Ironically, it is foundationalism that should
cause us to despair because it constrains the human spirit by insist-
ing that the only authority for human decisions comes from reason.
Anarchic pluralism celebrates the demise of modernity and founda-
tionalism as the liberation of the human spirit. This postmodernist
view valorizes the imagination and the creation of a plurality of hu-
man values. According to this view, human life and society are so
intrinsically rich that liberation (from foundationalism) brings forth
a multiplicity of new and potentially gratifying values. Human
flourishing is not restricted to a priori conceptions of value; instead,
each individual must go abroad in the world and find her own
authenticity, her own sense of self, her own language of self-de-
47. The proselytizing "nihilist" might respond that nihilism entails no reasons for
doing anything or for not doing anything. So, if one "finds" oneself proselytizing, there are
equally good reasons for continuing as well as for not continuing to proselytize. Neverthe-
less, the nihilists rejection of reasons for action cannot be sustained, not even by the ni-
hilist herself.
48. Anarchic pluralism differs from pragmatic pluralism in that there are no con-
straints on anarchic pluralism. Pragmatic pluralism, on the other hand, depends on the
collective natural and cultural history of the species. Anarchic pluralism places no limits
on choice, because the anarchic pluralist believes any such constraints are indefensible.
The pragmatist, on the other hand, believes that the appropriate constraints are those
imposed by the relevant linguistic community, and that these constraints are alvays
subject to reevaluation. According to the anarchic pluralist, "anything goes" as long as
you're "doing your own thing." The pragmatic pluralist looks to our collective cultural his-
tory to determine which constraints to adopt, if only temporarily. Many such constraints
are uncontroversial and provide the context for inter-subjective agreement and disagree-
ment.
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scription, her own values.49
Anarchic pluralism, however, fails to explain why individuals
tend to criticize their own values as well as the values of others. We
do not just find ourselves with a set of values that we embrace with-
out scrutiny, evaluation, and criticism. Nor do we respond to the val-
ues of others with natural or automatic credulity. A defender of an-
archic pluralism cannot respond that the only criterion of criticism
is whether a value or set of values turns you on. Since the notion of
something "turning you on" must have critical meaning, it is impos-
sible to sustain anarchic pluralism. Moreover, if this criterion has
critical meaning, it still fails to explain the experience we have of
our own values and the values of others. This experience includes
the critical scrutiny of accepting and rejecting values as well as
ranking them and arguing about their scope. These facts of human
experience suggest that anarchic pluralism is too impoverished a
criterion to account for the creation of human values.
3. Postmodern Pragmatism. A third postmodern response to the
demise of foundationalism is the turn toward pragmatism. Pragma-
tism, as understood here, is an anti-foundationalist conception of
human inquiry. It eschews the big philosophical controversies over
realism or antirealism, the objective versus the subjective, reason
versus desire and so forth. Pragmatism exhorts us to seek new ways
to understand human life and society, and new ways to reinterpret
the old and integrate it with the new.51 Postmodern pragmatism re-
49. CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AuTHENTICITY 40 (1992) (arguing that while
the pursuit of authenticity is to be praised, "doing one's own thing" will not get you there
since authenticity is possible only against a background of self-transcendent values).
50. Pragmatism rejects realism, but not by endorsing antirealism. One must be
careful not to conflate a rejection of the foundationalist framework with taking sides
within this framework. Pragmatists might use skeptical arguments against realism, but
this does not entail that they are skeptics. You use skeptical arguments either because
you are a skeptic or because you want to show the futility of certain presuppositions and
frameworks of thought. Michael Moore fails to appreciate the significance of this
distinction. Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 903 (1989) (arguing against Rorty that "[olne hardly shows
the senselessness of some debate.., by participating in one well-defined side of it"). But
see Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness, supra note 1, at
856-59 (arguing that Moore's criticism of Rorty is "off the mark"). Professor Daniel Chow
also fails to appreciate the distinction between taking a stand within a conceptual
framework and advocating a rejection of the framework itself. Daniel C.K. Chow,
Trashing Nihilism, 65 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1990) (criticizing Singer and other critical legal
theorists for taking sides in a controversy they think is pointless). Moore's and Chow's
objection is persuasive only if it can be shown that the foundationalist framework is in-
dispensable.
51. One way of achieving these new ways of understanding and re-interpretation is
to scrutinize the postmodern intellectual landscape for failed modernist conceptions of
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jects nihilism and anarchic pluralism. It rejects nihilism for two rea-
sons. The first reason has to do with nihilism's impracticability. No
one is ever a nihilist, at least not in practice. Meaning-dependent
nihilism, if taken seriously, is a recipe for disaster, or at least, for
mental illness and thus has nothing to be said in its favor. Postmod-
em pragmatism spurns the notion that our final general view of life
can recommend insanity. The second reason for rejecting nihilism is
that meaning-independent nihilism is an incomplete version of some
other unnamed view. Because the meaning-independent nihilist
doesn't counsel despair or inaction, she must decide how to conduct
her life like anyone else. She must decide how and when to act. Do-
ing so means that she faces all the same choices open to non-nihil-
ists. Only by dying do we obviate the necessity of choosing. Pragma-
tism rejects anarchic pluralism because anarchic pluralism rejects
the wisdom of the ages, including, of course, what this wisdom tells
us about unspeakable evil. Consequently, anarchic pluralism fails to
take seriously humanity's collective natural and cultural history,
and how this history informs present choices. Postmodern pragma-
tism, in one way or another, embraces this history. It devises new
ways of understanding ourselves and the world we inhabit against a
background of our common history and sees whether we can derive
conceptions of inquiry and justification to help resolve the problems
of humanity.2
Pragmatism accepts the condition of postmodernity, that no
metanarratives exist to legitimize our local practices. Even if coher-
ent metanarratives exist, their force, if not their substance, becomes
operative only after culture embraces them. Embracing a metadis-
course, the experiential commitment to follow a grand narrative,
cannot be controlled by an even grander narrative. What controls
this commitment, if anything, are the pragmatic benefits of living
one's life accordingly. Taken in its own terms, foundationalism is
unrealizable; but we need not understand foundationalism in its
own terms. Instead, we can embrace (or not embrace) foundational-
ism for its pragmatic benefits. When pragmatists argue against
foundationalism, their point is that foundationalism is pragmati-
cally deficient. This, however, is an empirical question that must be
taken seriously; foundationalism should not be rejected a priori or in
general terms. Understanding that foundationalism is simply a
certain type of postmodern pragmatic practice is to appreciate foun-
dationalism's significance pragmatically.5 3
justification that can be revivified in postmodern terms.
52. These new conceptions may reflect practices that are already deeply embedded
in contemporary life.
53. See generally Lipkin, Pragmatism, supra note 1.
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Postmodern pragmatism tells us that we can avoid both foun-
dationalism and skepticism by rejecting the foundationalist frame-
work. The pragmatist gladly concedes that although we have only
our culture through which to justify narratives or language games,
this does not mean that justification is impossible.5 4 After all, cul-
ture does not provide a homogeneous standard. Rather, since
"cultures and traditions are more like competing sets of narratives
and incoherent tapestries of meaning,... the social critic must her-
self construct out of these conflictual and incoherent accounts the
set of criteria in the name of which she speaks."55 Postmodern prag-
matism rises from the ashes of modernity and devises narrative
judgments that are more like aesthetic judgments than rational ap-
prehensions of the truth. These edifices, these systems, these
pictures are coherent attempts to understand the culture in which
they inhere, or to reform this culture and make it more attractive.
Ultimately, the choice of perspective is a pragmatic-aesthetic choice.
It says look at our common culture my way, or this way. Let's say
everything we can in defense of this perspective and everything
against it. And then decide which values to embrace. That is all
postmoder pragmatism can offer: a way to view the world coher-
ently, a way that you offer as a candidate for inter-subjective con-
sensus. But you cannot rationally compel anyone to embrace your
values, or even the "correct" values. This pragmatic characterization
of contemporary intellectual-political life will trouble critics for
permitting the normative dimension to drop out. Without a strong
normative component, so the argument goes, pragmatism has little
to offer. However, it is these critics who have abandoned
normativity. The postmodern pragmatist contends that once you
select the appropriate justificatory strategy from your cultural
legacy, once you apply that strategy to your substantive views, once
you critically compare the results with other such strategies, you
have done all you can descriptively and normatively to justify your
perspective or make it attractive. Reason provides no further
justification or vindication of your perspective.
Pragmatism is pluralistic in both its methodology and sub-
stantive values. It considers language the repository of human cul-
ture, and critically scrutinizes language so that language may help
to formulate and to satisfy our desires and aspirations. At times this
takes the form of severely denigrating the language of modernity or
foundationalism for failing to honor its promise. But such denigra-
tion need not entail the abandonment of such languages entirely.
54. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 265 (1988) (arguing that pragmatism
"leave[s] the notion of... justified moral belief intact").
65. BENHABIB, supra note 4, at 228.
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Indeed, a reflective pragmatist may seek to retain all such lan-
guages, giving some a much less prominent role in cultural inquiry.
6
Indeed, reflective pragmatism can demonstrate its anti-essentialist,
anti-foundationalist commitment by allowing the possibility that
modernity might someday, however unlikely, vindicate itself."
Pragmatism approaches a field, such as constitutional law,
without the presuppositions of modernity or the blinders associated
with many of the present models of constitutional interpretation.
Instead, it reflects on constitutional practice in a candid, fresh at-
tempt to understand how it actually works, knowing that no one
conception is necessary or certain.58 Pragmatism endeavors to help
us understand how constitutional transformation and judicial rea-
soning actually occur.
E. Constitutionalism as a Modernist Enterprise
Like postmodernism generally, the meaning of postmodernist
constitutionalism varies from scholar to scholar. 9 My focus will be
56. See generally Lipkin, Pragmatism, supra note 1.
57. Consider these musings:
Sometimes I imagine a new Kant, come out of Kanigsberg, spirited through the
Iron Curtain. In his hand he holds the "fourth critique," which he calls The Cri-
tique of Practical Judgement. It is a masterwork, resolving all the contradictions
of theory and praxis, ethics and aesthetics, metaphysical reason and historical
life. I reach for the sublime treatise; the illustrious ghost disappears. Sadly, I
turn to my bookshelf and pick out Williams James's The Will to Believe.
IHAB HASSAN, THE POSTMODERN TURN: ESSAYS IN POSTMODERN THEORY AND CULTURE
180 (1987).
58. Postmodernity requires consideration of what is left once modernity and foun-
dationalism are rejected. First, one can embrace nihilism and despair of coming up with
any interesting reflective or theoretical accounts of American constitutionalism or of any
other area of intellectual inquiry. Some critical legal scholars take this route. Second, we
can try to make good modernity's promise by trying to create a new postmodern concep-
tion of foundationalism. In legal theory, contemporary conventionalist, natural law, and
coherentist theorists take this approach. Third, one can embrace a skeptical approach,
showing how traditional legal theory fails to achieve the goals it sets for itself. Some criti-
cal legal theorists endorse this approach. Fourth, we can devise new models for constitu-
tional adjudication that are designed to include traditionally excluded groups and, by do-
ing so, revise our conception of constitutional theory. Critical feminist and critical race
theorists endorse this perspective. Finally, we can take the pragmatic turn, seeking to de-
termine if we can recombine some traditional approaches to exemplify both the pragmatic
and postmodern spirit.
59. Most legal scholars treat postmodernity primarily as a metaphysical and epis-
temic conception. According to these scholars postmodernity is antifoundationalist, anti-
theoretical, contextual, and perspectivalist. As such, it is a position most relevant to the
interpretive dimension of legal reasoning. J.M. Balkin rejects the notion that postmodern
constitutionalism is primarily involved with the problem of interpreting the Constitution:
A postmodern constitutionalism ... must ask how postmodern culture and
technology have affected law as an institution: the way that the courts, Con-
gress, and the executive interact with each other, and the way that law is un-
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on postmodern pragmatism. I view pragmatism as a postmodern re-
sponse to the decline of modernity. Alternatively stated, in my esti-
mation, pragmatism is the best response to the demise of founda-
tionalism. It is better than "new foundationalism," 0 skepticism, or
nihilism. Since American constitutionalism is so heavily laden with
modernistic and foundationalist elements, postmodern pragmatic
constitutionalism is a rejection of both modernity and foundational-
ism: seeking new ways to reconceive constitutional transformation
and judicial reasoning. The cynic might argue that this constitutes a
rejection of constitutionalism altogether. Although, I take such
cynicism seriously, my goal is to show why we need not embrace it.
1. Modernism and Legitimacy. Constitutional theory is typi-
cally concerned with the problem of legitimacy.61 Legitimacy is a
general problem in political theory, especially in democratic political
theory. Any society committed to liberty and independence as fun-
damental values must regard coercion as presumptively invalid.
Consequently, democratic political theory must explain how state
coercion is justified. In the judicial context, the problem of legiti-
macy focuses on the Court's authority to strike down legislative acts
by the majoritarian branches of government.62 What justifies the
derstood, promulgated, argued about, experienced, and assimilated. How is in-*
formation about constitutional rights distributed and spread? What changes
have occurred in the ways in which politics is organized,*and in the ways in
which laws are debated publicly or within government institutions? How have
advances in technology changed the possible forms of power, control, and sur-
veillance? What effect has mediations wrought on the practice of American de-
mocracy? These are the key questions for a postmodern constitutionalist.
J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1978
(1992). But see Francis J. Mootz III, Postmodern Constitutionalism as Materialism, 91
MICH. L. REV. 515, 524 n.26 (1992) (arguing that "Balkin's postmodern constitutionalism
fails because it presumes that we can stand back and describe our condition as a prelude
to formulating normative commitments, when in fact our descriptions are always symp-
tomatic of normative commitments").
60. New foundationalism is my term for mainstream legal theorists who argue that
the traditional foundationalist scheme fails to delineate a third possibility or middle road
between foundationalism and skepticism This middle road, while not achieving certainty,
nevertheless contains sufficient metaphysical and epistemic strength, to make good rea-
son's promise. I crtically examine the possibility of a middle road in Lipkin, Beyond Skep-
ticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness, supra note 1, at 826-49.
61. Additionally, constitutional theory must be concerned with the question of com-
petence. How do constitutional conventions generate answers to constitutional questions?
The question of competence is conceptually prior to the question of legitimacy. We must
know how to generate constitutional conclusions before addressing the question of
whether these conclusions are legitimate. See id. at 834-36. It is this question of compe-
tence that survives the demise of modernity's foundationalist hold on constitutionalism.
62. But see ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 9 (1992) (arguing that
the question of legitimacy in constitutional contexts is spurious).
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Court in creating constitutional rights and principles not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution? Whether courts should creatively
interpret the Constitution or whether should they merely apply the
Constitution to concrete situations is a question at the heart of the
contemporary controversy over constitutional legitimacy. The ques-
tion of legitimacy compels us to address the problem of adjudication,
namely, how should judges decide cases?
The answer is not obvious. Any worthwhile theory of constitu-
tional interpretation, however, should maintain that correct judicial
decisions must reflect favorably on the practice of which it is a
part.' In deciding what past practice entails for a given case, the
answer should be the best possible one that practice offers. Of
course, there is no doubt that "best" will depend upon the in-
terpretive values-judicial and moral-the judge embraces. Hence,
it is quixotic to assume that all judges will interpret the same case
in the same way, using the same interpretive values, the same
methods of judging and the same moral values. This does not
commit us to radical skepticism if judges usually agree in easy
cases, and, if, in hard cases, most possible answers are ruled out for
each judge, and each judge's values enable her to endorse one
answer as the best.
We can now understand better the confusion on the part of
Dworkin and his critics in the controversy over the one right answer
thesis.64 This thesis maintains that each judge will conclude her rea-
soning with one right answer. So most answers are ruled out on each
judge's list. Dworkin may correctly insist that one right answer al-
ways exists even in hard cases, if that means that no judge will be
unable to embrace one right answer. Typically, no judge will say
"any answer you give is correct." On the other hand, Dworkin's crit-
ics are correct to argue that when we inspect the conclusions of sev-
eral judges, each judge thinking her answer is best, there will re-
main different answers and no way to adjudicate between them.
Hence, in these circumstances, there will be more than one "right"
answer in that the answers of equally qualified judges, after consid-
63. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EmPIRE (1987) (arguing that explanatory
and justificatory factors represent different levels of constitutional interpretation). Such
an interpretation must allow a hypothetical judge, unfamiliar with the cases, to replicate
the decisions actually made sight unseen. What counts as "favorably" is a knotty question
that must be explicated for this position to be plausible. Of course, one could argue that
the principle of charity entails showing the decision in the most favorable light unless
sufficient reason exists to do otherwise. See David Hoy, Is Legal Originalism Compatible
with Philosophical Pragmatism?, in PRAGMiATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 343 (Michael Brint
& William Weaver eds., 1991).
64. See Lipkin, Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 1625-28.
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ering all the evidence, will not be the same.65 This reflective dissen-
sus should in honest, non-dogmatic observers suggest that, despite
the individual judge's phenomenological sense that only her answer
is correct, no uniquely right answer exists. I am perfectly willing to
concede that the one right answer thesis is only selectively true. In
substantive legal controversies I believe that the uniquely right an-
swer thesis is false because there are no such answers. But whether
there is a uniquely right answer about the uniquely right answer thesis,
the answer is yes; there is such an answer, and I have just given it.
2. The Problem of Constitutional Change. Appreciating judicial
reasoning in this manner illuminates the problem of constitutional
change: How is it possible for constitutional practice to be bound by
the Constitution, yet still change significantly over the course of
American history? Can we detect any systematic trends or struc-
tural phases of constitutional change that contributes to our under-
standing of this problem? In my estimation, there exists such an ac-
count that focuses on constitutional revolutions.66
Most constitutional theorists attempt to answer the question of
constitutional change by first determining what constitutional law
is, and then determining how it becomes something else. 67 This effort
is misguided, because constitutional law never just is. Instead,
constitutional law is a process by which constitutional practitio-
ners-judges, lawyers, and citizens-express the constitutional
65. This is paradigmatic of denying the existence epistemically of one right answer.
If qualified observers, after considering all the evidence, and confronting the arguments
of their opponents, disagree, it makes no sense to say that we can know one and only one
right answer. Taking the pragmatic turn, epistemic disagreement means that for practi-
cal purposes, no one right answer exists. Lipkin, Indeterminacy, Justification and Truth
in Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 599-619.
66. My goal is to provide a theory whose centerpiece is constitutional change. In or-
der to accomplish this, we must stress actual practice. We must avoid ideological com-
mitments to a priori conceptions of constitutional interpretation such as textualism,
originalism, structuralism or essentialism. Instead, we must take a good hard look at ac-
tual constitutional practice. We may put this point in the following way. Learn what the
nature of adjudication is before practicing it. And the best way to learn the nature of ad-
judication is by attempting to see it from an engaged but uncommitted perspective.
Should there be an interesting conception of constitutional adjudication from that per-
spective, it just might be helpful to you, Ms. Justice, when you confront a constitutional
crisis which your court must resolve. Finally, in trying to understand the nature of consti-
tutional adjudication, concentrating on the question of constitutional change is indispen-
sable. It is only by appreciating the interrelationships between and among the different
levels of change that one can draw an informed opinion concerning what American consti-
tutional practice entails in a given case.
67. This standard view contends that the Equal Protection Clause, for example,
applies only to race, but through judicial interpretation can be extended to gender and
other classifications. Instead, constitutional meaning is going through a metamorphosis
at this very moment in a myriad of moral, cultural, and political decisions occurring daily.
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meaning implicit in the great conflicts of the day.6 American consti-
tutional life has three interrelated levels of meaning: legal, cultural,
and ethical. The legal level is most closely related to the Constitu-
tion and judicial decisions. The cultural level involves broader cul-
tural contexts upon which our cultural wars are fought. 9 The ethical
level reflects abstract moral and political considerations and their
implications for both cultural and legal meaning 3° Ignoring these
levels of meaning dooms us to having only a skewed conception of
constitutional law.
3. The Fallacy of Unitary Constitutional Adjudication. Most
conceptions of constitutional change are committed to what I call
"the fallacy of unitary constitutional adjudication" or "the unitaristic
fallacy" for short.7' One commits the unitaristic fallacy when one
maintains that either conventionalism, pragmatism, naturalism or
coherentism alone is the paradigm through which we explain and
justify constitutional change. This fallacy results from a commit-
ment to modernity and its hallmark, foundationalism. Modernity
worships simplicity and elegance as meta-theoretical values; the
more complex an explanation, the less reason for relying on it to un-
derstand the world.
The unitaristic fallacy insists that any acceptable theory of
constitutional meaning must be unitary. Its account of change must
rely on only one type of jurisprudential theory. This modernistic
conception of constitutional interpretation eschews dualism, because
dualism always risks a commensurability problem. If an explanatory
theory consists of several irreducible factors, one must determine
which factor is dominant. Moreover, how do we understand the in-
terdependence of these factors? These issues are exactly the type
that the modem mind seeks to avoid.
4. Metaphysical Realism and Modern Constitutionalism. The
unitaristic fallacy also derives from a second modernist assumption
68. Constitutional meaning is continually being created through social and cultural
interaction. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983).
69. See generally HUNTER, supra note 10; GRAFF, supra note 10.
70. In my view, all three levels of meaning are levels of constitutional meaning, but
for expository reasons I will call the first, legal meaning, the second, cultural meaning,
and the third, abstract moral and political meaning. Robert J. Lipkin, The Anatomy of
Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REV. 701, 720-23 (1989) [hereinafter Lipkin, The
Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions].
71. See id.; Robert J. Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism and Constitutional
Revolutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1988) [hereinafter Lipkin, Conventionalism,
Pragmatism and Constitutional Revolutions]; Lipkin, Indeterminacy, Justification and
Truth in Constitutional Theory, supra note 1.
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that reality-in this case-constitutional transformative reality, is a
single, uniform phenomenon. If a non-unitaristic theory of constitu-
tional transformation is acceptable, then the phenomena involved
might be multifaceted. For the modern constitutionalist, such a
complex reality presents enormous metaphysical and epistemologi-
cal problems. How do we identify and individuate different instances
of the phenomena? How do we recognize whether the dominant form
of the phenomena is X or Y, or some combination of X and Y? Al-
though this modernist assumption does not reject non-unitaristic
conceptions outright, it seeks to avoid them as much as possible. In
my opinion, the unitaristic fallacy precludes our understanding
constitutional change. What is needed, consequently, is some dual-
istic conception of the evolution of constitutional law and theory. But
what type of dualist account is appropriate?
F. The Priority of Jurisprudence Over History
The appropriate type of constitutional dualism requires the
priority of the jurisprudential over the historical. No purely histori-
cal characterization of American constitutional reality is possible
without a jurisprudential account of how judges reason. Whereas an
historical account seeks to identify critical historical trends that can
provide explanations of different constitutional moments, a juris-
prudential account of constitutional change focuses on the manner
in which judges translate unstructured, constitutional meaning into
formal constitutional law. The jurisprudential account focuses on
how courts transform constitutional doctrine and how judges adjudi-
cate constitutional cases. Without the jurisprudential account, his-
torical explanation remains radically incomplete. Thus, the problem
of adjudication is the central jurisprudential question upon which
an historical account depends. In addition to an historical concep-
tion of American constitutionalism, one needs a theory explaining
how judges translate history and culture into constitutional law.
History might have priority over the jurisprudential only if translat-
ing history and culture into constitutional law were relative to one's
particular historical conception. Making jurisprudence relative to
historical accounts of American constitutionalism, however, has
devastating implications. For example, making jurisprudence rela-
tive in this manner, one has no way to compare and integrate the
different jurisprudential conceptions in different epochs. Moreover,
how do judges translate the jurisprudential questions of one epoch
into another? Additionally, the question of how judges transform
history and culture into constitutional structures as an independent
problem would effectively drop out of the picture. Whatever the
historical account of the translation process, no matter how
19941 343
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
impoverished or insignificant the judicial role, that account prevails;
there is no independent conception of adjudication. In this regard,
jurisprudence must have priority over history for it to be significant
at all.
Part II of this Article explores Ackerman's ingenious interpre-
tive history of constitutional change. The final part of this Article
describes the kind of jurisprudential theory that I believe to be at
the heart of American constitutional change.
II. ACKERMAN'S DUALIST POLITICS
A. Ackerman's Postmodern Pragmatism
Although Ackerman never publicly endorses pragmatism, 2 his
theory of constitutional moments exhibits features that are arguably
pragmatic and postmodern. Ackerman's pragmatism concentrates
on the actual social practices upon which American constitutional-
ism depends. Interpreting these historical social practices depends
on interpreting the concrete features of a particular historical period
or periods; it rejects, as pragmatism should, descriptive or normative
theories which have insufficient currency in the American experi-
ence. For the pragmatist, the correct theory of constitutional mo-
ments and judicial reasoning is one that reflects actual constitu-
tional practice.73 Constitutional pragmatism eschews "big picture"
theories of American constitutional transformation and, in their
place, seeks the details of change. Ackerman's depiction of the tri-
partite division of the New Deal resting on the Reconstruction and
Founding is an almost visual portrayal of our constitutional history.
As a postmodernist, Ackerman attempts to stretch the limits of
our constitutional imagination. In Ackerman's view, American
constitutional practice incorporates three distinct constitutional re-
gimes.74 The multiplication of constitutional regimes suggests a con-
72. Although Ackerman places his political theory of neutral dialogue in the
pragmatist camp in at least one place, I do not mean to suggest that Ackerman is a self-
described pragmatist. Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 10 (1989)
(answering the question of how different groups can reasonably achieve mutual coexis-
tence as "the supreme pragmatic imperative").
73. I ignore whether pragmatism needs or is permitted to have a theory. Since for-
malism and rationalism have been largely abandoned in legal theory, the question of
whether to retain the term theory no longer occupies a central place in jurisprudential
disputes. Theory-talk is a social practice that must be evaluated pragmatically. Were we
to do so, I believe we would find some types of formalistic or rationalistic theories to be
unacceptable while pragmatic theories would turn out to be acceptable. Let's characterize
the former as "white collar" theories and the latter as "blue collar" theories. Blue collar
theories are social practices that reflect and organize other social practices.
74. ACKEIiAN, supra note 7. One problem that Ackerman recognizes only dimly is
the problem of identity. If American constitutional practice consists of three different re-
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cern for context and perspective. A postmodern constitutional theo-
rist will be more daring and adventuresome than her modernist
counterpart. A postmodern constitutional theorist seeks novel con-
stitutional stories to explain our constitutional practice.
B. Interpretive History and the Countermajoritarian Problem
Unfortunately, Ackerman's postmodern pragmatism is limited
by his modernistic constitutional commitments. 5 These commit-
ments, the countermajoritarian problem and the role of consent in
American constitutionalism, structure Ackerman's entire approach
to dualistic politics.7 6 Moreover, his belief in the legitimacy of dualist
constitutionalism will be difficult for modernists to accept.7 Surely,
Ackerman aims to convince the modern constitutional mind. In-
stead, Ackerman should aim to convince modernists to abandon
their foundationalism and embrace postmodern pragmatist consti-
tutionalism, which, as a result of abandoning the concern with le-
gitimacy, will be more susceptible to Ackerman's interpretive his-
gimes in what sense are these regimes part of the same constitutional system? Indeed,
they may be three incommensurate regimes. If not, what is the appropriate method for
integrating these regimes?
75. Ackerman fails to recognize that his theory exhibits both modern and
postmodern features existing in an uneasy tension with one another. Shorn of its
modernist features, Ackerman's theory exemplifies a postmodern concern for context,
detail and perspective. Ackerman's postmodern proclivities generate an interpretive
history of American constitutionalism that emphasizes perspectivalism. Perspectivalism
insists on taking seriously the obvious fact that all human beings perceive the world from
their own perspectives, implying that judging or reasoning from a general perspective is
an impossible modernist ideal. Ackerman must decide whether he intends his theory to
be modern or postmodern, foundationalist or antifoundationalist. Combining features of
each unwittingly leads Ackerman to embrace several untenable positions.
76. We must await the third volume of this multi-volume work for Ackerman to un-
veil his theory of constitutional interpretation, since nothing in his chapter The Possibil-
ity of Interpretation reveals such a theory. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 131. If Acker-
man's theory of interpretation is originalist it is difficult to see how he can succeed in
overcoming the majoritarian problem without a theory of interpretation that clearly re-
veals the intent of the mobilized citizenry. No originalist theory has ever succeeded in
achieving this, and nothing in the present volume suggests that it can be done. The
problem is that Ackerman's postmodernist aspirations outstrip his modernist constraints.
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments seems much more closely tied to nonorigi-
nalist theories of constitutional interpretation than originalist ones.
77. How can a founding and a civil war be paradigmatic of higher constitutional
politics? At best, the modern constitutional mind will regard these events as atypical just
because they were so cataclysmic. Great paradigms of constitutional politics cannot be
modeled after periods of radical instability and war. For example, the Civil War was a
great test of the nation's power of survival. Nothing should be made of this event, except
the constitutional text which was indeed revolutionary and monumentally important.
Should we follow Ackerman's lead in looking to factors other than text? We have abso-
lutely no parameters to guide us here. Hence, we have no way to answer this question.
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tory. Therefore, by classifying Ackerman's theory, one can see that
its strengths are postmodernist, while its weaknesses are modernist.
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments contains an in-
triguing interpretive history of constitutional change."8 Like most
modernist theorists, Ackerman is concerned with the legitimacy of
judicial review. Hence, Ackerman's theory is designed to resolve or
dissolve the "countermajoritarian problem." 9 Since Supreme Court
Justices are unelected and have life tenure, their authority to strike
down acts of the elected branches of government demands justifica-
tion. 0 How can a democratic polity permit the judiciary to trump the
will of the majority?"' In short, how is judicial review possible in a
78. I call Ackerman's dualism an "interpretive history" because it is an historical
account of American constitutional transformation which is designed to reflect favorably
on American constitutionalism. It is, so to speak, a committed history dedicated to show-
ing the positive political character of American constitutionalism. It does not follow that
such an interpretive theory answers every normative question concerning American
constitutionalism.
79. Alexander Bickel is credited with formulating the countermajoritarian difficulty
in contemporary scholarship:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system.... [When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative
act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of the representa-
tives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf
of the prevailing majority, but against it.
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962).
80. The label "countermajoritarian problem" might be a misnomer. If taken seri-
ously, the label suggests an easy solution to the problem of judicial review, namely, call
for the election of federal judges, including the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. If you
are not satisfied by that solution, your concern over the countermajoritarianism might
have nothing to do with democracy. Instead, it might reveal an epistemic skepticism
about ethics. You might believe that no one, elected or unelected, can know what rights
and liberties we have. Or it might express a cynicism about trusting others, elected or
not, to decide matters of political morality. But the countermajoritarian difficulty, as
Bickel expresses it, is neither a skeptical issue nor a cynical complaint. Can it be that-in
following Bickel-we have gotten this problem wrong for all these years?
81. How is it justifiable for a prior majority to control all subsequent majorities? The
obvious answer is that the subsequent majorities can change the Constitution through
Article V, and thereby free themselves of the prior majority control. Given the difficulty in
formally amending the Constitution through Article V, however, this answer appears to
be disingenuous. Arguably, the very nature of law--especially democratic law-entails
the possibility of prior majorities controlling subsequent ones. Indeed, the very idea of
democratic constitutionalism requires it. See ROBERT H. BORE, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLIrICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 170-71 (1989). Accordingly, one way for
prior majorities to control subsequent ones is through judicial review. Consequently, ju-
dicial review is not countermajoritarian regarding prior majorities. But having a consti-
tution or any written law in the first place is countermajoritarian with respect to present
majorities. Thus, countermajoritarianism is an ineluctable feature of democratic consti-
tutionalism. A corollary of this conclusion is that it is misleading to think that the Consti-
tution reflects the will of the people tout court. Instead, it reflects, at best, the will of cer-
tain people in the past. Indeed, the notion of "the people" or "the will of the people" is a
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democracy? 2
The standard theories of constitutional interpretation, 3 are
attempts at resolving the countermajoritarian problem." Picking the
right theory of interpretation enables justices to correctly interpret
the Constitution. Thus, the correct constitutional methodology must
be consistent with democratic values if the countermajoritarian
problem is to be overcome. The Court's legitimacy is challenged
whenever its opinion cannot be explained democratically, and the
modem mind is compelled to seek legitimacy.
Ackerman's overarching aim is to dissolve the countermajori-
tarian problem without embracing the standard versions of original-
ism or any of the other traditional constitutional theories. According
to Ackerman's interpretive history, American constitutionalism
rests on a unique form of dualistic politics which effectively dissolves
the countermajoritarian problem. Once we appreciate how American
constitutionalism actually works, the countermajoritarian problem
no longer threatens the legitimacy of judicial review. In short,
Ackerman promises that American constitutional practice, once un-
derstood as the dualistic system it is, shorn of formalistic, a priori
metaphor. In fact, such locutions refer to different, sometimes fractionated, groups of
people. See Edward S. Morgan, The Fiction of 'The People" N.Y. REV. BooKs, Apr. 23,
1992, at 46-48 (stating that the instances of constitutional politics Ackerman stresses may
not have come by the will of the people).
Along different lines, Akhil Reed Amar makes the interesting observation that the
notion of popular sovereignty precludes a prior majority from abrogating the present ma-
jority's right to amend the Constitution even outside of Article V. See Akhil R. Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1043 (1988). Amar, like Ackerman, endorses the possibility of amending the Constitution
outside the constraints of Article V. Id.
82. The skeptical argument insists that since no one has any rights or liberties, or
since no one knows what rights and liberties we have, the legislature should decide. But
this is question begging in the extreme. If we have no rights and liberties, or no one
knows what our rights and liberties are, why should the legislature decide this? How can
their decision be superior to anyone else's? Of course the skeptic might reply that in the
context of a democratic society, when in doubt let the legislature decide. But this assumes
a particular conception of "democracy" which is precisely the issue in dispute. Alterna-
tively, the pro-legislature point might have nothing to do with the existence or knowledge
of rights and liberties. Instead, it might simply mean that since we cannot agree in ad-
vance on what these rights and liberties are it is fairer to have the legislature decide than
the courts. But if we cannot agree about these rights and liberties, how is it that we can
agree on the appropriate notion of "fairness" required to make this last argument work?
83. The main players in this game are textualism, originalism or intentionalism,
structuralism, passivism, and essentialism. See Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional
Revolutions, supra note 70, at 703-05 nn.3-7.
84. On the contrary, David Dow argues that the countermajoritarian problem is not
resolvable. Instead, we must learn to accept the competing values of majoritarianism and
the judicial protection of minorities. These conflicting values are both important political
values. We do not desire to renounce either one. David Dow, When Words Mean What We
Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 (1990).
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conceptions of constitutional change, has no greater a counterma-
joritarian problem than democratic law has generally, and, there-
fore, is no less legitimate.85
C. Monism and Rights Foundationalism in Constitutional Theory
Constitutional democracies can be monistic or rights founda-
tionalist. A monist democracy "requires the grant of plenary law-
making authority to the winners of the last general election-so
long, at least, as the election was conducted under free and fair
ground rules, and the winners don't try to prevent the next sched-
uled round of electoral challenges."86 The British parliamentary
system is an example of a monist democracy. American monists such
as Robert Bork insist that in a democracy the majority has the right
to rule simply because it is the majority.87 Consequently, "when the
Supreme Court, or anybody else, invalidates a statute, it suffers
from a 'countermajoritarian difficulty' which must be overcome be-
fore a good democrat can profess satisfaction with this extraordinary
action."8 Ackerman argues that, in the American context, monistic
constitutionalism contrasts with rights foundationalism since rights
foundationalists contend that rights trump majority decisions.89
Rights foundationalist believe the Constitution's authority is
grounded in human rights, while monists believe its authority de-
rives from the will of the people."
Monists are suspicious of judicial intervention. By contrast,
rights foundationalists see a more expansive role for the Constitu-
tion and the courts. In their view, the Constitution protects, among
other things, fundamental rights.91 Though rights foundationalists
85. No theorist attempts to demonstrate the constitutional authority of her favored
constitutional methodology. Wherein does the authority of constitutional methodology
reside? The constitutional authority cannot come from the Constitution directly, since the
document contains no obvious provisions on methodology. In this formal sense, every con-
stitutional methodology is non-originalist, since their authority necessarily depends on
constitutionally extrinsic factors.
86. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 8.
87. BORK, supra note 81, at 139. But see Dow, supra note 84, at 15-16 ("[Dlespite our
general commitment to majority rule, we also believe, we believe passionately, that mere
majorities may not do whatever they want simply because they are majorities."). Even
Bork concedes that this majoritarian perogative is constrained by rights set out in the
text of the Constitution. Therefore, no one can accept the United States Constitution as it
is written and be a monist in Ackerman's sense of the term.
88. ACKEPMAN, supra note 7, at 8 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id. at 10-11.
91. A rights foundationalist may adopt substantive rights, such as the right to relig-
ious freedom, as well as processual rights, such as the right to self-government. See infra
note 128.
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differ concerning which rights are fundamental, all agree that
"[wihatever rights are Right,... the American constitution is con-
cerned, first and foremost, with their protection. Indeed, the whole
point of having rights is to trump decisions rendered by democratic
institutions that may otherwise legislate for the collective welfare."92
For the rights foundationalist, the countermajoritarian nature of
judicial review is not the great obstacle it is for the monist.
When a majority violates a favored right, the rights founda-
tionalist has no reluctance to exhort the Court to remedy the viola-
tion. More strongly, "[w]hen such violations occur, the foundational-
ist demands judicial intervention despite the breach of democratic
principle."" For rights foundationalists, "[r]ights trump democracy-
provided, of course, that they're the Right rights."94 Majoritarian
rule is acceptable, according to rights foundationalists, only when
the majority is constrained by the preferred rights.
Ackerman contends that neither monism nor rights founda-
tionalism adequately explains American constitutionalism. Monism
cannot explain those abrupt constitutional transformations that
mark our constitutional tradition. If monism is correct, then the
Founding, the Reconstruction and the New Deal have no constitu-
tional legitimacy. 5 If rights foundationalism is correct, then these
constitutional moments may be legitimate-because the
transformations may be justified by foundationalist rights-but then
our constitutional system is fundamentally countermajoritarian.
Either choice yields an undesirable account of American
constitutionalism. Either our constitutional system is legitimate, but
not democratic, or it is democratic, but illegitimate. Is there a way
out of this dilemma?
D. Dualism in Constitutional Theory
1. Normal Politics and Constitutional Politics. In response to
this dilemma, Ackerman notes that our democracy is dualist,
combining the best of monism and rights foundationalism. A dualist
democracy is driven by two different types of politics. The first,
"normal politics," consists of the ordinary self-interested haggling
and interest group pluralism which politicians engage in routinely.
Normal politics, in the American context, is government by the
politicians. The private citizen need not pay more than casual
92. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 11.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Id.
95. More seriously, these critical constitutional moments are inexplicable. Monism
provides no insight into how American citizens create these seminal episodes in our con-
stitutional history.
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attention to the vicissitudes of normal politics. There are, however,
higher lawmaking moments when the private citizen must band
together with other concerned citizens as well as with political and
social leaders to change the course of American constitutional law.
This extraordinary involvement on the part of the citizenry in
constitutional politics is, according to Ackerman, what determines
the structure of American constitutionalism. The result is
constitutional dualism, the two track system of normal and
constitutional politics.
Ackerman's grand integration of monism and rights founda-
tionalism has several benefits. Monism contributes the majori-
tarianism of normal politics which is necessary to the ordinary
operation of a complex liberal democracy, while rights founda-
tionalism contributes the higher lawmaking of constitutional poli-
tics."8 Ackerman's dualism tries to integrate monism and rights
foundationalism into one comprehensive conception of democracy by
"offering a framework which allows both sides to accommodate
some-if not all--of their concerns."97 According to Ackerman, "[the
basic mediating device is the dualist's two-track system of demo-
cratic lawmaking.""' This two track system "allows an important
place for the foundationalists view of 'rights as trumps' without
violating the monist's deeper commitment to the primacy of democ-
racy."99
96. Ackerman endorses liberalism, the principle that people are rational,
autonomous and morally independent individuals, who have rights that government
should protect. He also endorses republicanism, however, the view that people are
essentially political creatures capable of the inherently valuable activity of deliberating
about the common good. Ackerman's dualism promises to achieve both liberal and
republican visions. First, normal politics allows people freely to pursue independent ends,
while constitutional politics permits dualists to engage the higher lawmaking that is at
the heart of our constitutional democracy. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 31. More
importantly, Ackerman's liberalism
insists that the foundation of personal liberty is a certain kind of political life-
one requiring the ongoing exertions of a special kind of citizenry. Rather than
grounding personal freedom on some putatively prepolitical "state of nature,"
this kind of liberalism makes the cultivation of liberal citizenship central to its
enterprise. Since this is the view of people like John Stuart Mill and John
Dewey and John Rawls, it seems odd to define liberalism in a way that makes
the very possibility of liberal republicanism seem a contradiction in terms.
Id. at 30 (footnote omitted). But see Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment
on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 332 (1992) (arguing against
conflating liberalism and republicanism).
97. AcKEIAN, supra note 7, at 12.
98. Id.
99. Id. This does not render dualism conceptually equivalent to either monism or
rights foundationalism. The dualist is a democrat, though only a majoritarian democrat,
during normal politics. Dualism embraces two different kinds of democratic values which
sometimes conflict. Consequently, when dualists and monists each embrace normal poll-
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Constitutional politics or higher lawmaking is genuinely gov-
ernment by the people. The nation's founding was just one sort of
constitutional moment. If the Founding is understood in terms of
monism, its legitimacy is questionable because no existing law
sanctioned the creation of a new charter. In fact, the Constitution
amended the Articles of Confederation. But while the Articles of
Confederation required a unanimous vote to amend it, the Consti-
tution requires only a three-fourths vote of the states for ratification.
In reality then, the Constitution never amended the Articles of Con-
federation, and, therefore, the Constitution is illegal. 0 For monists,
the question is how did we ever legally get from the Articles of Con-
federation to the Constitution? If politics were only normal politics,
there is no way to make the transition.
Rights foundationalism explains the adoption of the Constitu-
tion as the failure to recognize certain rights. When a regime fails to
protect such fundamental rights as the right to private property, or
free speech, or the free exercise of religion, then a new constitutional
order is warranted. Yet, the rights foundationalist cannot explain
such a transition when no foundational rights are implicated as was
surely the case in the transition from the Articles of Confederation
to the Constitution.' 10 In this instance, the rights foundationalist
must appeal to a general right of the people to abolish existing law
and create law anew. But what justifies such a right? Does this right
permit revolution now? And is such a right an individual right? Or a
collective right? If it is an individual right of revolution, it poten-
tially subverts the right of the majority to make and enforce law. If
it is a collective right, how can we make such a right intelligible?
And what can possibly justify it?
More importantly, if constitutional politics were driven by
tics, the convergence is an extensional, not a conceptual, equivalence. The conceptual dif-
ference remains because monism, in Ackerman's conception, countenances only normal
politics, while the dualist countenances monism and higher lawmaking. Similarly, the
dualist embraces "rights as trumps" when doing so protects prior higher lawmaking.
When no such democratic processes exist, the dualist cannot embrace rights unless they
can be explicated in terms of democratic values. She cannot, in short, embrace rights for
the sake of justice alone. A rights foundationalist, on the other hand, can embrace such
rights, and therefore the convergence of dualism and rights foundationalism in embracing
"rights as trumps" is similarly an extensional equivalence.
100. This suggests that we must look at the Constitution, in some sense, as continu-
ous with the Articles of Confederation. The more appropriate view, however, would be
that the Constitution was a fresh start.
101. Like the original United States Constitution, the Articles of Confederation con-
tained no Bill of Rights. However, the absence of a Bill of Rights was not the raison d'etre
of the Founding. The Articles of Confederation failed primarily because the fledgling na-
tion had no effective central control over commerce. Rights foundationalism cannot ex-
plain or justify such a transition.
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rights foundationalism, then it is difficult to explain the primary
role of the people in determining the character of the American gov-
ernment. What happens when majority values conflict with individ-
ual rights? According to rights foundationalism, rights trump ma-
jority will. It is then difficult to appreciate the democratic character
associated with our nation's founding.
If politics were exclusively normal politics, the legality of the
Civil War Amendments is also questionable. In these circumstances,
the process of amending the Constitution set out in Article V was
abrogated. The southern states were permitted to reenter the Union
only if they first ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently,
the Framers forged a new conception of amending the Constitu-
tion.1 2 Article V is an essentially state driven process, whereas the
Civil War Amendments were proposed and ratified by an essentially
congressionally driven process. Finally, the New Deal Revolution,
which changed the constitutionality of government regulations over
the economy, also occurred outside of Article V and therefore was
illegal. 03 Neither monism nor rights foundationalism explain any of
these transitions.
Only by positing the existence of a two track system of normal
and higher lawmaking can we understand these constitutional
revolutions and both the substantive and procedural changes they
created. At the time of the Founding, a critical economic crisis over
commerce struck the fledgling nation. Instead of a natural, legal
transition from the Articles of Confederation, the Founding was an
instance of abrupt higher law making that ignored legal formalities.
Moreover, the Founders meant to indicate their approval of mobiliz-
ing We the People for revolutionary changes through constitutional
politics.
This higher lawmaking capacity similarly enabled the Recon-
struction Congress to procure the ratification of constitutional
amendments outside the usual process of Article V. Again, the
Framers looked to extra-constitutional means of altering the Consti-
tution in critical circumstances.0 4 Perhaps, more radically, the New
102. It is unclear why a simpler explanation is inappropriate here. Why not say that
the aftermath of the Civil War marked an extraordinary period in which legal formalities
could not apply? Thus, though the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in an atypical
manner, it would be foolish to canonize this event by making it an exemplar of future in-
formal amendments. Nothing should follow from these extraordinary circumstances, cer-
tainly not a change in the procedure for Amending the Constitution.
103. In one sense, the New Deal is the least problematic, since its constitutional
implications are due to a judicial reinterpretation of the Constitution. There is nothing
illegal or unusual about that. In another sense, the New Deal is the most problematic
since its judicial decisions amended the Constitution without the benefit of new constitu-
tional text.
104. An alternative view is that Reconstruction did not represent an alternative pro-
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Deal revolutionaries thought it unnecessary for a new constitutional
text to be an integral feature of constitutional politics."0 5 Instead,
New Deal legislation was declared constitutional after a series of
events, including a presidential election and a court packing chal-
lenge, which ultimately forced the Court to reverse its hostility to-
ward the New Deal. This "switch in time," according to Ackerman,
was the functional equivalent of a formal constitutional amend-
ment. 
0 6
The general argument for these extraordinary changes goes
like this: In extraordinary moments, we need not be tied to business
as usual, the orderly, strictly legal, method of constitutional trans-
formation. Rather, American government needs an alternative
method to express the deliberative will of the people in creating new
constitutional structures for the benefit of the American democracy.
Constitutional politics is an example of higher lawmaking in order
to adapt our government to emergency circumstances that the
Founders could not have foreseen. 07
2. The Role of the Supreme Court in Dualist Law Making. Dual-
istic constitutionalism requires a reconceptualization of the role of
the Supreme Court. In contrast to the traditional view that the Su-
preme Court is, at times, forward-looking, Ackerman depicts the
Court as preservationist, protecting the higher lawmaking processes
from erosion during normal politics. 08 If normal politics could over-
turn the results of higher lawmaking, there would be no incentive
for the people to engage in the onerous process of higher lawmak-
cedure for amending the Constitution outside Article V. Rather, the Guaranty Clause en-
abled Congress to make ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment a condition of reenter-
ing the Union, not for the purpose of ratifying the amendment, but for making certain
that the secessionists did not seize permanent control of the state government. Richard
Aynes generously suggested this alternative explanation in correspondence. See also
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW
OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMtENTS 136 (1993).
105. The constitutional moments associated with the Founding and the Reconstruc-
tion created new constitutional text. Thus, even one sympathetic to Ackerman's theory
might be reluctant to embrace the New Deal as an instance of higher lawmaking because
new constitutional text is required for constitutional politics. In this view, the New Deal
might simply be an especially dramatic instance of normal politics.
106. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 120.
107. But even conceding this, it still does not follow that we should institutionalize
constitutional politics in this manner. Instead, it might be more prudent to restrict these
forays into informal constitutional politics to only these circumstances. Historically, many
more instances of higher lawmaking outside of Article V are required before we can begin
to claim that this informal process of amending the Constitution is even remotely legiti-
mate.
108. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 86.
1994] 353
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ing. 09 In order "[tlo maintain the integrity of higher lawmaking, all
dualist constitutions must provide for one or more institutions to
discharge a preservationist function."110 Dualist democracy explains
the role of the Supreme Court in ways unavailable to democratic
monism. Similarly, although rights foundationalism can more read-
ily embrace judicial intervention in a democracy when rights are
violated, it cannot justify judicial review by appealing to democratic
factors. The dualist, however, can embrace judicial review because it
is needed to protect the democratic results of constitutional politics
from the intrusion of normal politics.
Monists always regard the Supreme Court suspiciously as a
potential threat to democracy, while "the dualist sees the discharge
of the preservationist function by the courts as an essential part of a
well-ordered democratic regime.""' Without some institution per-
forming this potent preservationist role, the hard fought gains of
constitutional politics could be lost through normal politics. Acker-
man argues that the monist is wrong to presume that the Court's
invalidation of normal statutes is antidemocratic. The Court's
"ongoing judicial effort to look backward and interpret the meaning
of the great achievements of the past is an indispensable part of the
larger project of distinguishing the will of We the People from the
acts of We the Politicians."2
Ackerman's dualism concentrates on the role of We the People
and the three branches of the federal government in both normal
and constitutional politics. Unlike recent constitutional jurispru-
dence, Ackerman intends a relatively minor role for the judiciary. In
Ackerman's view, judges are not truly lawmakers. Instead, Acker-
man insists:
The critical higher lawmaking precedents were established during mom-
ents of crisis by leaders like Madison, Lincoln, and Roosevelt-who, in
complex interaction with other institutions and the people at large, finally
109. Id. at 9.
110. Id. at 9-10.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. Ackerman's railroad train metaphor is the culprit here. Ackerman views the
Supreme Court as the caboose of a train, engineered by the executive and legislative
branches. The majoritarian branches determine the train's direction, while the Court
tries to understand where the train has been.
No interpretive methodology exists, however, that focuses exclusively on past events.
To interpret the past, one must interpret it in terms of the present and the future. Fail-
ure to do so results in a totally skewed vision of history. Consequently, Ackerman's train
better allow the justices to see what's coming down the track. The train analogy is in-
tended to show that justices do not function in a leadership capacity by driving the train.
Instead, the engineers must be the president and congress. But insofar as Supreme Court
interpretations constrain normal politics, the Court constrains the train's engineers, and
in that sense it helps drive the train.
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gain democratic authority to make fundamental changes in our higher
law. While courts play a secondary role in the evolving higher lawmaking
process, we cannot narrowly focus on judges if we hope to describe, and
reflect upon, the constitutional practice of popular sovereignty in Ameri-
can history."
11 3
If Ackerman is right, the internecine struggles within the judiciary
and the academy are pointless. One need not decide whether tex-
tualism, originalism, or the other standard methodologies should
prevail. A dualist judge should simply look to the last constitutional
moment, synthesize it with other moments, and decide the case be-
fore her. In short, Ackerman implies that the traditional interpre-
tive questions"' disappear within the dualist, tripartite regime. 1 5
Yet he never explains how this occurs.
The critical undermining of an activist constitutionalism is
brought about by rejecting the Court's prophetic role.16 Once great
constitutional moments occur, the Court's role "is [to] preserve the
achievements of popular sovereignty during the long periods of our
public existence when the citizenry is not mobilized for great consti-
tutional achievements.""7 Doubtlessly, it "sometimes happens that a
preservationist Court may help spark a new forward-looking move-
ment."1 8 However, this "top-down" constitutional transformation is
atypical and undesirable since courts are ill-equipped to lead the
people to better constitutional values. American constitutionalism,
according to Ackerman, derives its power and authority from the
people, and "although judges are in a unique position to preserve the
past constitutional achievements of the American people, many
other citizens are in better positions to lead the People onward to a
better constitutional future.""9
E. The Perils of Dualism
The importance of Ackerman's dualism is its comprehensive-
ness and originality; it integrates two important constitutional vi-
113. Id. at 22.
114. These questions include, but are not limited to, the following: Should a judge
interpret law or just apply it? Must a judge be faithful to the text of the Constitution?
What is the role of the Framers' intentions in constructing the Constitution? Must a
judge's opinion be stated in terms of general and neutral principles? Is there a significant
difference between legislating and adjudicating? What is the role of ethics and politics in
constitutional interpretation? Is judicial supremacy countermajoritarian?
115. Ackerman's project aims at making traditional questions of constitutional
methodology superfluous. Yet the traditional questions are replicated in the regime approach.
116. ACKEIRAN, supra note 7, at 139.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 139-40.
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sions: monism and rights foundationalism. There are, however, a
number of perils associated with dualistic constitutionalism which
might be dispositive grounds for rejecting it.
1. The Mischaracterization of Monism and Rights Founda-
tionalism. One serious problem with Ackerman's characterization of
monistic democracy is that no American constitutionalist can em-
brace it. 120 American constitutionalism, of course, creates and sus-
tains a dualistic democracy. 121 The Constitution itself sets out the
distinction between normal politics, laws passed by the elected
branches of government, and constitutional or supernormal politics
as specified by the amendment process in Article V.122 Ackerman's
point should not be that constitutional monism is inadequate. Of
course monism is inadequate, because it is inadequate to the explicit
text. Rather, Ackerman's point should be that there is a third track
of constitutional lawmaking which permits amending the Constitu-
tion outside the constraints of Article V.123 It is this third track of
constitutional politics which we must address. The distinction be-
tween constitutional monism and dualism obscures this issue.
Ackerman's conception of monism is also flawed because no
American constitutionalist believes that the winners of the last
election have plenary law making power. Everyone believes that the
Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, constrains their power.
Ackerman rejects this criticism. Instead, Ackerman distinguishes
between the symbolic Constitution and the effective Constitution. 12 4
While no one is a constitutional monist regarding the symbolic
Constitution, several important scholars such as Alexander Bickel,
John Ely, Jesse Choper, and Robert Bork are indeed monists regard-
120. See Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 924
n.19 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKEMiAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)) ("Does anyone really
believe... that '[diemocracy requires the grant of plenary lawmaking authority to the
winners of the last general election'... ?"). Since even monists concede that the Consti-
tution constrains majority will, Ackerman's conception of constitutional monism is radi-
cally distorted. Ackerman should concede that calling American constitutionalism
"monistic" is hyperbole. Instead, he should simply say that American constitutional mo-
nism insists on majoritarian supremacy in all cases not proscribed by contextual text,
True monism, as in England, is not so qualified, "because the Parliament of the United
Kingdom is truly a continuously functioning constitutional convention." J. Noel Ryan, The
Central Fallacy of Canadian Constitutional Law, 22 McGILL L.J. 40, 42 (1976).
121. Sherry, supra note 120, at 923.
122. Id. at 927.
123. Ackerman's position should be that monism and the Article V amendment proc-
ess fail to explain constitutional change. Instead, such an explanation needs Ackerman's
informal amendment process outside of the confines of Article V.
124. Ackerman made these remarks specifically in reply to my criticism at the As-
sociation of American Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, June 13, 1993.
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ing the effective Constitution.25 This distinction permits Ackerman
to discount textual evidence from these writers, demonstrating that
they are far from monists. 12' But this distinction itself is specifically
125. Ackerman also mentions Woodrow Wilson, James Thayer, Charles Beard, Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes, and Robert Jackson as "monistic democrats." ACKERMAN, supra
note 7, at 7. Ackerman's evidence must be scrutinized. For example, it is unclear in
Woodrow Wilson's case that the label "monist" applies. In contrasting our constitutional
system with the British, Wilson maintains that the English courts do not restrict Parlia-
ment, but in the United States "[t]he powers of our law-making bodies are, on the con-
trary, very definitely defined and circumscribed in documents which are themselves part
of the body of our law, and the decisions of the courts interpreting those documents set
those law-making bodies their limits." WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (Columbia University Press 1961) (1907). Consequently, it is
difficult to see how Wilson advocates plenary power for the majoritarian branches of gov-
ernment in normal politics.
126. The textual evidence is plentiful, but limitations on space prevent an exhaus-
tive demonstration. Ackerman's case is best supported by John Hart Ely. JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105 (1980). One way to demonstrate that a theorist is commit-
ted to monism is to show that he avoids interpreting the Constitution as containing sub-
stantive, as opposed to procedural, values. Ely argues that "[tihe general strategy [of the
constitutional design] has... not been to root in the document a set of substantive rights
entitled to permanent protection." Id. at 100. Ely, however, does recognize "a few provi-
sions that do not comfortably conform to this pattern." Id. at 101.
But they're an odd assortment, the understandable products of particular his-
torical circumstances--guns, religion, contract, and so on-and in any event
they are few and far between. To represent them as a dominant theme of our
constitutional document one would have to concentrate quite single-mindedly on
hopping from stone to stone and averting one's eyes from the mainstream.
Id. Interestingly, Ely ends this observation with the above metaphor. The obvious rejoin-
der is, given the origination of the American Republic, who sees the stones for the stream.
In short, even if Ely is a monist, he ought not to be one.
Another way to prove the charge of monism is to show that a theorist embraces the
present majority as the final authority over constitutional interpretation. However, no
one embraces this, certainly not Ely. Even Ely argues that present majoritarian decisions
should be thwarted when restricting democratic values such as free speech and the right
to vote.
Similarly, Ackerman's inclusion of Jesse Choper as a paradigmatic monist is unwar-
ranted. While Choper concerns himself with antimajoritarian elements of the Supreme
Court, he is concerned equally with antimajoritarian elements of Congress and even the
Presidency. JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). Choper,
though a parliamentarian, is no monist. Rather, Choper insists that "the essential role of
judicial review in our society is to guard against certain constitutional transgressions
which popular majorities specifically seek to impose." Id. at 59. Choper insists that "[t]he
great task.., for the Court... is how best to reject majority will when it must .... Id.
Finally, Choper suggests that "if judicial review were nonexistent for popularly frustrated
minorities, the fight, already lost in the legislative halls, would have only one remaining
battleground-the streets." Id. at 128. He concluded that without judicial review,
"violence and decadence" are the only viable alternatives. Id.
The case of Robert H. Jackson is ambiguous at best. While Jackson wants courts to
defer unless the law is clearly wrong, he also believes that "[t]he Supreme Court is... the
voice of the Constitution in vindicating the rights of the individual under the federal
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designed to assist Ackerman's topology, and thus is question begging
in the extreme. Ackerman's monist cannot truly be a monist if she
concedes that the symbolic Constitution is committed to the judicial
protection of rights in normal politics, and the supermajoritarian
process of amendment through Article V. Ackerman's argument
should then be recast to emphasize that this limited conception of
dualism fails to fit constitutional practice or is unacceptable on nor-
mative grounds. He should not embrace a dichotomy between mo-
nism and dualism giving the impression that we are concerned with
qualitative differences. Instead, he should point out that limited
dualism is inadequate. Ackerman's reluctance to embrace this con-
clusion is understandable. His argument becomes much less inter-
esting cast in terms of a stronger and weaker dualism in contradis-
tinction to dualism and something qualitatively different.'27
Similarly, Ackerman's characterization of rights foundational-
ism is radically distorted. In his view, rights foundationalism ap-
pears antithetical to democratic rights. Most American rights foun-
dationalists, however, hold no such view. For most rights founda-
tionalists, the importance of rights plays a substantial part in
Constitution against both the national and state governments." ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMvACY 22, 323 (1941). Consequently, Ackerman needs to
provide additional evidence that Jackson was a monist.
Robert Bork's The Tempting ofAmerica is replete with references to the legitimacy of
judicial review understood as review committed to the original understanding of the
Constitution. For example in his introduction, Bork writes:
The judiciary's greatest office is to preserve the constitutional design. It does
this not only by confining Congress and the President to the powers granted
them by the Constitution and seeing that the powers granted are not used to in-
vade the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, but also, and equally impor-
tant, by ensuring that the democratic authority of the people is maintained in
the full scope given by the Constitution.
BORK, supra note 81, at 4. Moreover, according to Bork, "we retain the institution ofjudi-
cial review because we have found that it does much good." Id. at 11. It is true that Bork
contends that the first principle of a Madisonian system is the principle of self-govern-
ment, "which means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish,
simply because they are majorities." Id. at 139. But the second principle of the Madi-
sonian system "is that there are nonetheless some things majorities must not do to mi-
norities, some areas of life in which the individual must be free of majority rule." Id. Fur-
ther, the Bill of Rights "directly addresses the specific liberties minorities are to have." Id.
Moreover, even Bork the majoritarian believes that "there should be a presumption that
individuals are free, and to justify coercion by [the majority] a case must be made that
overcomes that presumption." Id. at 79-80.
127. Perhaps the limited dualist, or Ackerman's monist, should be characterized as
a constitutional parliamentarian. A constitutional parliamentarian contends that political
change is generally indistinguishable from constitutional change, and that political
change should occur through a majoritarian process. But even parliamentarians believe
that there are some things the majority cannot do. They further believe that higher law-
making or constitutional politics occurs through Article V of the Constitution.
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satisfying the requirements of a truly effective democracy. 12 8 In
order for democracy to flourish people must have certain rights, such
as freedom of speech, to protect against distorted majorities as well
as overreaching minorities. Consequently, Ackerman's description of
monism and rights foundationalism triggers the response that nei-
ther position has ever been held by any American constitutionalist.
If that charge can be sustained, the foundation of Ackerman's argu-
ment is flawed.
2. Judicial Conservativism. A second objection to Ackerman's
theory concerns the role of the Supreme Court. One might wonder
why the Court should always try to preserve the higher lawmaking
of past generations from all attempts-normal or otherwise-to re-
verse it. It seems that Ackerman's dualism compels the Court to
take a conservative position in the face of incipient mass mobiliza-
tion. Since the Court's role is to preserve, the Court was right to
forestall New Deal legislation. But then whenever a court perceives
an attempt at constitutional politics it should do everything it can to
quash it.129 Isn't this an anomalous result?
This preservationist function, however, is rife with internal
tension. The Court must simultaneously try to preserve yesterday's
constitutional moment and prevent tomorrow's constitutional mo-
ment.3 ° In short, until the people speak through constitutional poli-
128. Ackerman fails to consider the rights foundationalist who believes that the
right to self-government is the principle right the Constitution protects. In that event, no
conflict exists between monism and rights foundationalism. Concerning rights of this
kind, the countermajoritarian problem cannot even arise. If judicial review is predicated
on protecting rights of self-government, the Court acts democratically when it exercises
judicial review. Similarly, Cass Sunstein writes:
[T]he much-vaunted opposition between constitutionalism and democracy, or
between rights and democracy, tends... to dissolve entirely. Many rights are
indispensable to democracy and to democratic deliberation. If we protect such
rights through the Constitution, we do not compromise self-governments at all.
On the contrary, self-government depends for its existence on firmly protected
democratic rights. Constitutionalism can thus guarantee the preconditions for
democracy by limiting the power of majorities to eliminate those preconditions.
Moreover, rights-based constraints on the political process are necessary
for a well-functioning democracy;, they are not antithetical to it. Unchecked
majoritarianism should not be identified with democracy. A system in which
majorities are allowed to repress the views of those who disagree could hardly
be described as democratic.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTIUTION 142 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
129. Curiously, Ackerman embraces substantively liberal positions in contemporary
constitutional law. However, this should not quiet the charge of conservativism. Acker-
man's theory is much more conservative than his substantive views suggest, and, indeed,
it is not clear that these views follow from his theory.
130. Conservative constitutionalists argue that the Court should not alter the past
constitutional moment in the absence of a constitutional amendment. But, in this in-
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tics, today's constitutional moment is sacrosanct and tomorrow's
constitutional moment is blasphemous. The Court must be hostile to
what eventually might become a remarkable constitutional revolu-
tion in American society, creating more rights and liberties that re-
sult in a better expression of American democracy than the consti-
tutional law that the Court preserves. In other words, in Ackerman's
conception, the Supreme Court should never make an independent
judgment in terms of democratic factors concerning a budding
movement of constitutional politics that ultimately achieves better
democratic results than the present system. There should be a more
flexible means of responding to mass movements. Mustn't the
Court's role be more forward-looking than this? Moreover, should
the Court reverse itself even when the present mass mobilization
has antidemocratic implications?
Ackerman's position is troubling, inter alia, because it assumes
that judges can readily identify the precise moment when the people
have spoken. Moreover, it assumes that the Court can easily distin-
guish between a normal political attempt to reverse the past consti-
tutional moment from a normal political attempt to articulate more
fully, through legislation, the content of the past constitutional para-
digm. Under this theory, it is difficult for a judge to know when a
piece of normal legislation is anathema to the most recent constitu-
tional moment, or when it more fully expresses the new constitu-
tional paradigm.
3. The Validity of the Distinction Between Normal and Consti-
tutional Politics. Ackerman might respond that the preservationist
role applies only to normal politics, not to constitutional politics. 131
But this response presupposes that the Court can identify when an
attempt to overturn a prior constitutional moment is a normal po-
litical attempt, or when it is the inchoate beginnings of a new move-
ment of constitutional politics. In Ackerman's conception, there cer-
stance, the Court does nothing to prevent the majoritarian forces from formally amending
the Constitution. In Ackerman's theoretical universe, the Court should prevent the very
movement which is the future constitutional moment. This is a deeply anomalous result.
131. Suzanna Sherry argues that Ackerman fails to show that judges have any
incentive to preserve the higher lawmaking processes. Sherry, supra note 120, at 927.
But surely Ackerman's theory provides incentives for judges to resist "acquiescing to
popular passions." Id. The judiciary should be the primary preservationist branch because
it is the only fully non-majoritarian branch of government. If all governmental officials
accept Ackerman's story, then they all might have reason to support the dualist democ-
racy in the appropriate circumstances, but judges are the only officials who have an obli-
gation to engage in systemic defense of higher law making. For it is judges alone, whose
very raison d'etre is to protect constitutional politics. Nevertheless, it is true that Acker-
man's "identification of the judiciary as the primary preservationist branch still does not
take us beyond simple judicial review to a dualist Constitution." Id.
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tainly must come a time when the Court should capitulate. Here
Ackerman tells us that the time for capitulation comes when,
[i]n the light of the sustained popular support for President and Congress,
a majority of the Justices have concluded that it would be counterproduc-
tive to continue the constitutional crisis until the new movement ratifies
formal constitutional amendments. Instead, they uphold the last wave of
transformative statutes in a series of landmark opinions, which inaugu-
rate the radical revision of pre-existing doctrine.
32
These comments are truly remarkable. 133 Can it be that Justice
Roberts' New Deal "switch in time" is the foundation of this third
constitutional moment? What if Justice Roberts had no views on the
counterproductiveness of persistent conflict, but feared Court-pack-
ing or Congressional control over the Court's appellate jurisdiction?
When a single player is the basis of a constitutional re-conceptuali-
zation there is a need to know more about his motivation. Future
justices need to be able to identify when resistance is counterpro-
ductive. Is it conceivable that Ackerman can base a theory of consti-
tutional change on so slender a basis? Nothing in Ackerman's theory
provides future justices with a reliable guide for knowing when
higher lawmaking occurs." Indeed, there are two problems here:
one conceptual and the other epistemic. The conceptual problem
questions the meaning of normal politics as contrasted with consti-
tutional politics: What truth conditions must exist for politics to be
normal or constitutional? Given Ackerman's description of the road
from normal to constitutional politics, 3 5 it is never clear exactly
what "constitutional politics" means.
132. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 289.
133. What if the Court genuinely agreed with the new higher law making? The term
"counterproductive" suggests that the Justices do not really believe that the change is
constitutional or good for the country, but that they should defer to the majoritarian
branches. But this means that Ackerman's judges are always monists. Rights founda-
tionalists would never defer in this manner.
134. Ackerman fails to delineate the parameters of internal dualist debate. How are
two dualists to resolve a conflict over the dualist process? Suppose one dualist, following
Ackerman, contends that a presidential election must be a part of a new constitutional
moment, while another dualist says it does not. How does dualist theory resolve this
conflict? Because Ackerman's theory appears so ad hoc, it is difficult to perceive parame-
ters of internal dualist debate.
135. According to Ackerman, the transition from normal politics to higher lawmak-
ing includes the processes of signaling, proposing, deliberating, and codifying. ACKERMAN,
supra note 7, at 266-68. For a detailed elaboration of these processes, see id. at 266-94.
Additionally, the support for a movement must have "depth, breadth and decisiveness."
Id. at 272.
136. If the Court self-consciously acts dualistically, it should always be on the side of
the last constitutional moment to the very end of the present higher lawmaking process.
If the Court is initially on the side of the contemporary proponents of constitutional poli-
tics, then the Court has not acted dualistically, it has not preserved the past constitu-
1994]
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Even if we can specify the truth conditions of higher lawmak-
ing, there is still an epistemic problem. The epistemic question
challenges us to explain how we know when such conditions occur.
One is hard pressed to know when a movement sincerely appeals to
constitutional politics, or when it does so merely to win a normal
political gain. How does one know when the movement or its adver-
saries are deliberating in good faith? Abstractly, even if one can
draw a semantic distinction between normal and constitutional
politics, it may still be practically impossible to detect when this
distinction applies to concrete circumstances.
Although Ackerman is aware of these difficulties, he appears
not to take them very seriously.137 Instead, he believes that these
skeptical concerns "are quite healthy if they are kept within reason-
able bounds."'38 But what constitutes reasonable bounds? Ackerman
insists that
[tihere is simply no escaping the fact that the fate of the Constitution is in
our hands-as voters, representatives, justices. If we allow ourselves to
abuse the tradition of higher lawmaking, the very idea that the Constitu-
tion can be viewed as the culminating expression of a mobilized citizenry
will disintegrate. 3 9
This assertion misses the point. Certainly, nothing guarantees suc-
cessful higher lawmaking. But with regard to the Court's role in
higher lawmaking, the formal process in Article V eliminates any
conceptual or epistemic problems in determining when the People
intend to engage in higher law making. Finally, Ackerman's use of
We the People suffers from the same conceptual and epistemic prob-
lems. How does the Court identify when a movement has the poten-
tial of speaking for We the People, as opposed to We the Political
Faction?"
4. The Functional Equivalence Argument. Ackerman contends
that "transformative opinions" such as Carolene Products'4' are
functionally equivalent to such textual guarantees as free speech
and equal protection. This functional equivalent argument is one of
Ackerman's strongest points. 4 2 If a judicial decision has the same
tional moment, but abandoned it for its own non-dualistic reasons.
137. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 291.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Ackerman fails to explore whether We the People of the Founding were genu-
inely We the People. Failing to establish this point entails that the American dualist de-
mocracy might be based not on We the People, but instead is based on We the Elite, or We
the Special Interest.
141. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
142. ACKERIAN, supra note 7, at 120.
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consequences as a formal amendment, then it is a formal
amendment except in name only. However, upon closer inspection
this argument fails for two important reasons. If functional
equivalence is sufficient to effectively amend the Constitution, then
all the Court's revolutionary decisions are amendments to the
Constitution. Therefore, the decision in Brown 4' is the functional
equivalence of a formal amendment desegregating the schools. In
other words, the functional equivalence argument can be deployed to
show that informally amending the Constitution is an integral
feature of all judicial decision making, and not just a product of
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments. Consequently, the
Court amends the Constitution in three types of circumstances: the
formal amendment process as specified in Article V, Ackerman's
informal process, and judicial decisions generally. 144
Ackerman would reply that Brown is not a constitutional revo-
lution, or, at least, it is only a derivative constitutional revolution,
since it follows from integrating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause with the New Deal revolution. Leaving aside the
question of how a judge is to know this, there is a greater problem
with the functional equivalence argument. If the Carolene Products
reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is the functional
equivalence of constitutional text, it would seem to follow that
nothing can amend this reinterpretation other than formal amend-
ment, or Ackerman's process of informally amending the Constitu-
tion. Normal politics is definitely prohibited from producing a func-
tionally equivalent amendment of the Constitution.
However consider the following hypothetical. Suppose in 1984,
Ronald Reagan had pledged, if reelected, to revamp New Deal legis-
lation and to appoint only judges who are sympathetic to this revi-
sion. The Republicans capture both houses of Congress and Richard
Epstein is nominated and confirmed as an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. As a result, President Reagan radi-
cally reduces the government's role in regulating the economy, re-
versing much of the New Deal. Suppose further that Congress
passes and President Reagan signs into law a Lochner-like145 con-
ception of the role of government in the economy. 4 6 Justice Epstein
then persuades the Court to reject a challenge to this law. In effect,
this process of normal politics amends the Constitution by support-
ing legislation that is the functional equivalence of both formal and
143. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. The jurisprudential problem takes precedence because ultimately a theory of
adjudication must undergird Ackerman's process of constitutional transformation.
145. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Such a conception advocates a lais-
sez-faire system of government.
146. In this hypothetical all three branches of government favor change.
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informal amendments rejecting the New Deal. This constitutional
change, it should be noted, came about without formal amendment
and without invoking Ackerman's informal amendment process, but
by normal politics alone. 47
Ackerman might reply that in the above circumstances, the
Court errs by failing to appreciate the implications of dualism in
these circumstances. 48 According to dualism, the Court should
147. To make this hypothetical stronger, suppose this particular presidential
election, due to increased media technology and public interest, frames the central issues
in the most reflective, clear, and relevant manner conceivable. Even suppose seventy-five
to ninety (one hundred?) percent of eligible voters vote for Reagan. In short, suppose, by
anyone's standard, this election exemplified the highest form of mobilization, reflection,
and deliberation ever engaged in by an American electorate. In Ackerman's view, the
Court acts illegitimately because a dualist Court should preserve the New Deal revolution
against the Lochner-like statute. But why isn't this an example of constitutional politics?
148. The presence of only one presidential election is one reason for insisting that
this scenario is not an instance of constitutional politics. While Article V focuses on as-
sembly-driven constitutional politics, the modem form of amending the Constitution fo-
cuses on presidentially-driven informal amendment processes. Consider Ackerman's rea-
soning here:
While the Article's narrow focus blinds us to the importance modem Americans
attach to presidential elections as a forum in which we debate our constitutional
future, it would be a mistake to go to the opposite extreme and suppose that
every presidential election has catalyzed an effort by the victor to use the ap-
pointment power to make a decisive break with the constitutional achievements
of the past generation. Instead, transformative nominations have been seriously
considered only after a President has won decisive reelection on the basis of a
political program advocating fundamental change in reigning constitutional
principle.
Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1172-73 (1988).
Presumably, two elections are required because Ackerman believes that the will of the
people is determined and known only after mobilization, reflection and deliberation. But
why are these virtues wedded to the two-elections requirement? Isn't it likely that other
constitutional moments will require more than two elections in order to ensure the ap-
propriate level of mobilization, reflection and deliberation? If so, mobilizations, reflection
and deliberation cannot be equated with two elections. Ackerman himself proposes an
amendment to Article V that requires a total of three presidential elections including a
referendum on the second and third ballots requiring a supermajority for ratification. Id.
at 1182. Consequently, how can he suggest that a less severe process-the New Deal
revolution-already exists as an informal method of amending the Constitution?
Ackerman contends that "a decisive majority of Americans had voted for the New
Deal with their eyes open to the practical and constitutional implications of their collective
decision." Id. at 1175 (emphasis added). But what exactly does this mean? Skeptics might
challenge the claim that this majority clearly saw the practical implications of their deci-
sion. Yet, even granting that they did, it cannot be seriously argued that the majority un-
derstood the constitutional implications of their decision. More importantly, even if we
can attribute meaning to this contention, how do we ever know that a majority under-
stands a decision's constitutional implications? Finally, even if we overlook the difficulty
in assigning truth conditions to this claim, and even if we overlook the difficulty in ever
knowing that these conditions obtain, Ackerman cannot seriously contend that this col-
lective majority intended that Brown and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
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strike down the new Lochner legislation. If the Court strikes down
the legislation in order to preserve the constitutional politics of the
New Deal, we are left with the astonishing conclusion that the Su-
preme Court may overturn the overwhelming wishes of the majori-
tarian branches of government, even absent a formal amendment,
without specific constitutional language requiring them to do so. 49
Why not say that the next presidential election is required to ratify
the Lochner amendments? This will enable the people to ratify
Reagan's Lochner revolution. History certainly supports the claim
that judicial appointments are designed to affect the philosophy of
the Supreme Court. Ackerman is not, however, similarly enamoured
with the idea of transformative appointments serving as the princi-
pal means of constitutional politics. Given the role the New Deal
plays in Ackerman's dualism, it is difficult to understand why.
The critical point here is that a conservative constitutionalist
can argue as persuasively as does Ackerman that, in the above cir-
cumstances, the party favoring constitutional change has function-
ally met the conditions of Ackerman's informal amendment process.
Hence, Ackerman's criteria for constitutional politics can exist coex-
tensively with normal politics. Alternatively, a conservative consti-
tutionalist can argue that in the above hypothetical, normal politics
is constitutional politics. The conservative contends that when there
is overwhelming popular and governmental support for change,
normal politics becomes constitutional politics. And, in essence, that
is the genius of American constitutionalism. In short, the conserva-
tive has a different criterion for distinguishing between normal and
constitutional politics. In order to decide between two competing
sets of criteria, Ackerman's theory must limit the multiplication of
informal conceptions of constitutional amendments ad nauseam. It
is difficult to imagine a non-arbitrary way to do so.
In this case, it might be argued that the functional difference
follow from the New Deal. Ackerman fails to describe how his theory overcomes these
conceptual and epistemic problems.
Ackerman further contends that [i]f ever there was a time that the People could be
said to have endorsed a sharp break with their constitutional past, it was when Roosevelt
and the Senate self-consciously began to make transformative Supreme Court appoint-
ments." Id. Does this mean the appointments were evidence of the sharp break, or that
the sharp break occurs when the appointments took place? If it is the former, how does
Ackerman know this? And if it is the latter, the argument is circular. The President is
warranted, according to dualistic politics, in making such appointments only when he
knows the people intend such a break. Therefore, making the appointments cannot be the
truth conditions of the intent.
149. Recognizing that courts do this all the time suggests that what is more funda-
mental than Ackerman's conception of constitutional moments is a jurisprudential theory
explaining transformative judicial decisions and the type of reasoning upon which these
transformative decisions depend.
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between new constitutional text and Ackerman's informal process of
amending the Constitution is that the former requires a formal
amendment to transform it, while the latter can be performed
through constitutional politics or even perhaps through normal
politics alone. Consequently, there is an important functional
difference between overturning the results of actual constitutional
text, and Ackerman's informal amendment of the Constitution. 15
The former requires constitutional politics, while the latter requires
only normal politics.' 5 ' In short, functional equivalence involves not
merely how a judicial interpretation becomes part of the
constitutional text, but also how such an interpretation is
overturned. If a "functionally equivalent" amendment can be
overturned in a manner different from an Article V amendment,
then it is not truly a functional equivalent after all.
If the Court, in the hypothetical, upholds the anti-New Deal
legislation, then one must conclude that in the face of an overwhelm-
ing majority seeking to overturn the results of past constitutional
politics through normal politics, the Court should relinquish its pre-
servationist duties and join the present majority. Ackerman's theory
fails to explain this instance of constitutional change. Further, what
happened to the Court's preservationist function? We must then
conclude that constitutional change can occur independently of
Ackerman's informal procedures for amending the Constitution as
well as outside the purview of Article V.
Similarly, what should a judge do when she detects the begin-
nings of a movement which she predicts will succeed as the genuine
expression of the will of We the People? In Ackerman's view, the
judge should still preserve the will of a past We the People.' But
why shouldn't the judge, instead, encourage the implementation of
the present majority's will? Ackerman's model seems to suggest that
the judiciary should preserve only the past instance of higher law
making without explaining why. Perhaps the judge should join the
ranks of the new higher law making movement against the past, if
on substantive grounds it is superior. 5 3 Although doing so may even
150. In the above hypothetical the Court is right to reject the New Deal revolution
expressed in footnote four of Carolene Products. United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938). However, it would not be justified had the Court formally
amended the Constitution, thereby constitutionalizing the footnote.
151. The meaning of a particular provision of the Constitution may be changed
through judicial reinterpretation. This just emphasizes that there is an underlying juris-
prudential process of amending the Constitution that has nothing to do with Article V or
with Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments. And that this jurisprudential process
occurs during both normal politics and higher law making. Identifying this process is
critical, because such a process is likely to exist in any constitutional setting.
152. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 139.
153. An even stronger counterexample can be framed. What if everyone agreed on
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be necessary for the new movement's success, it abandons Acker-
man's process of informal amendment outside of Article V. More-
over, in these circumstances preserving the will of the past flies in
the face of common sense. More importantly perhaps, preservation
of past higher law making at the expense of present and future
higher law making is extremely countermajoritarian. At best, one
protects three moments of higher law making against an infinite
number of higher law making possibilities. The judiciary should not
systematically permit past higher law making to trump subsequent
expressions of We the People.
5. Dualism and Originalism. The crux of Ackerman's problem
is his assumption that originalism is self-evident. Isn't this assump-
tion question-begging? In fact, Ackerman seems to create a type of
originalism never before contemplated, namely, once the people
create a new paradigm, its scope and content is pellucid.TM A justice
simply needs to apply the new paradigm without any need to ex-
plain how this originalism works. What is so surprising about this
assumption is that Ackerman nowhere defends originalism against
other theories of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, Ackerman
expects dualist judges to draw conceptually complex conclusions
from the new constitutional paradigm; for example, that Brown and
Griswold follow from the New Deal together with the remains of the
Reconstruction and the Founding respectively. How then can we
avoid setting out his theory of interpretation in the present vol-
ume?15 5 Since, Ackerman takes the regime as the basic unit of con-
stitutional analysis,'56 he must explain how his originalism operates
in such a constitutional universe.
57
the propriety of a particular constitutional change? Suppose tomorrow everyone awakes
agreeing that the Fourteenth Amendment requires affirmative action, or prohibits abor-
tion. Why should an Ackermanian Court prevent the people from making the constitu-
tional change through judicial interpretation? Moreover, why must we describe this situ-
ation as normal politics? The problem here is that the distinction between normal and
constitutional politics does not explain the myriad ways the constitution is altered.
154. Ackerman fails to show that the meaning of new constitutional paradigms do
not require traditional interpretation, and, therefore, requires a thorough examination of
the traditional theories of constitutional interpretation. Hopefully, volume three of
Ackerman's trilogy will address this issue.
155. All the problems that plague judicial reasoning presently are replicated in
Ackerman's dualistic account of American constitutionalism. Unless we can identifr,
through a theory of interpretation, who speaks for the people and how we determine what
the people say, a judge's preservationist role is impossible.
156. ACKERIAN, supra note 7, at 59.
157. Ackerman need not contend that the Framers intended constitutional amend-
ment outside the purview of Article V if dualist democracy is the best explanatory and
justificatory account of what they did, despite their intentions. However, Ackerman
seems to think that he must ground dualism on the Framers' intentions. Is there histori-
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Ackerman's originalism fails to explain the regime conception
of constitutional change. Assuming it could, one is left to wonder if
the Framers intended the three regimes Ackerman describes. Fur-
ther, what is the relationship between the Framers of the different
regimes in a dualist democracy? Must each set of Framers intend
the same series of regimes? If the most we can say about the Fram-
ers' intentions is that they intended Americans to engage in non-
Article V higher lawmaking during the founding, it is a non sequitur
to assume this authorizes the particular set of regimes Ackerman
describes. Moreover, what did the different sets of Framers intend
concerning the problem of multigenerational synthesis?5 ' Acker-
man's theory must address these issues before it can be assessed
fairly. 59
cal evidence to support this contention? Further, are conscious (or unconscious) intentions
the appropriate evidentiary base upon which to support originalism? What does it mean
to say that the Framers intended X or that the new constitutional paradigm means X?
And further how do we know what the Framers intended or what the new constitutional
paradigm means? Ackerman's problem is akin to those who look to the Constitution's text
or to the Framers intentions as a relatively automatic process for discovering a univocal
determinate constitutional meaning. See Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy, A
Review of Ackerman's WE THE PEOPLE, 9 CONST. COAM. 309, 324 (1992) (book review)
("[In attempting to codify [the meaning of constitutional moments], Ackerman falls into
the same error as those who seek to fix the meaning of the written Constitution by the
way it was understood at the time of its adoption."); Sherry, supra note 120, at 923
(characterizing Ackerman's theory as a type of originalist theory). But see Sandalow,
supra, at 315 ("Ackerman's thesis is certain to be rejected out of hand by 'originalists' of
every stripe."). For important discussions of the inadequacies of originalism, see Ronald
Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
158. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 88.
159. According to Suzanna Sherry: "[Ackerman's] argument that we are absolutely
bound by the popular intent underlying constitutional moments of the past suffers from
all the problems that beset originalists generally." Sherry, supra note 120, at 923. One
such general objection is that originalists fail to justify originalism. What justifies origi-
nalism as the uniquely correct constitutional methodology? The Constitution is silent on
this issue. If originalism contends that it is the correct methodology because the Framers
intended it to be, the argument is circular. It amounts to nothing more than an unsup-
ported assertion. If there exists a further nontextual reason why the Framers' intentions
should control, then it is necessarily a nonoriginalist one. Hence, the originalist's argu-
ment is either circular or nonoriginalist. Either way, originalism fails as a normative the-
ory of constitutional interpretation.
Even if the Constitution included a provision stating that the Framers' intent should
control in matters of constitutional interpretation, it ultimately would be inconclusive
concerning the originalism/nonorigianlism controversy. This provision would itself be
subject to either an originalist or nonoriginalist interpretation. Deciding between these
interpretations necessarily requires an additional, nontextual argument in terms of the
correct political theory. Originalism is correct only when the correct political theory ex-
plains why the Framers' intentions should control. See Amar, supra note 81, at 1072.
Consequently, originalism, like any other constitutional methodology, must appeal to a
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Ackerman's view fails to acknowledge that most judicial deci-
sions occur during normal politics, and these decisions must be, in
part, forward-looking. Often these decisions do produce interpreta-
tions of the Constitution that are fmnctionally equivalent to formal
amendments. Moreover, the normal branches of government, though
primarily concerned with normal politics, also must be prepared to
preserve higher lawmaking. Although the distinction between nor-
mal and higher lawmaking might survive, there is no evidence that
the judiciary is the only preservationist institution.16 Questions
concerning the Court's role abound in this context. What is the
Court's responsibility when a relevant constitutional issue arises in
normal politics that was never addressed by the most recent consti-
tutional moment? Should the Court abstain? Should it defer? What
if the constitutional issue involved is neither constitutionally pre-
scribed nor prohibited by the most recent regime, but was prescribed
or prohibited by a prior regime? How does the synthesis work in
these circumstances?
Ackerman's basic problem is his desire to combine originalism
and majoritarianism, on the one hand, with progressive change, on
the other. Thus, Ackerman attempts to show the legitimacy of
Brown and Griswold by appealing to the Founding, the Reconstruc-
tion and the New Deal. 161 Although Ackerman grounds these deci-
nonoriginalist reason for its justification. If nonoriginalism is required to justify a consti-
tutional methodology, it cannot be excluded from defining the substantive values such a
methodology discovers.
160. It could be argued that the Congress and the President never established a
tradition of passing on the constitutionality of proposed legislation. Instead, these
branches defend their positions in terms of what they believe is best for the nation. In-
deed, it would seem disingenuous if they started appealing to the Constitution in support
of legislation. Even when acting in good faith, these branches typically have purely politi-
cal (in the best sense of the term) reasons for supporting legislation. Thus, reasons may
exist for considering the courts as the main constitutional player. Ackerman's dualism
appears to reject this possibility in advance.
Courts are specifically called upon to determine the constitutionality of legislation,
and they are supposed to ignore their political commitments (in the best sense of the
term). No doubt constitutional choices are in some important sense political, but they are
not political in the sense that proposing new policy is political. The political choices courts
make are concerned with more permanent political features of our constitutional democ-
racy. They are political to be sure, but political in the sense of political theory, not in the
sense of political dealing.
161. Ackerman argues that the Court in Plessy decided the case on the ground that
the stigma accompanying segregation was part of social reality, not legal or constitutional
reality, and therefore the government could do nothing about it. In Brown, however, that
argument was no longer available because the New Deal definitively established that the
government had a role in creating social reality. Consequently, the government could act
on the stigma in Brown as a result of the New Deal. I think this argument is ingenious
but implausible. Justice Brown did not say that the stigma in segregation was part of
social reality, but the government could do nothing about it. His opinion was more
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sions in instances of higher lawmaking, he permits wide latitude in
judicial interpretations reflecting changing social and cultural cir-
cumstances. In Ackerman's view, Brown and Griswold are not them-
selves constitutional revolutions, but rather follow in part from the
New Deal.
Although assigning the courts a preservationist function di-
minishes the role of the Court in Ackerman's dualistic democracy,
nevertheless "the Court continues in its starring role." 62 Ultimately,
"responsibility for determining the shape and direction of constitu-
tional law does not rest with the people-and surely not with
the.., people and their elected representatives but with the jus-
tices."163 Indeed, justices must find a way to infer constitutional
norms from the new constitutional paradigms. In fact, according to
Ackerman's theory, normal politics depicts a time when "the Court is
the only player on the constitutional stage."" The Court must
evaluate the constitutionality of legislation throughout normal and
constitutional politics. The Court has no way of knowing, however,
whether a particular decision is part of normal or constitutional
politics. 65
6. The Jurisprudential Problem. The fundamental weakness in
Ackerman's theory is jurisprudential. Assuming he is correct in as-
signing the regime as the basic unit of constitutional analysis, all
the problems of constitutional adjudication remain. Whether the
Court should go beyond the Constitution's text, the Framers' inten-
tions, the structure, logic, or history of the Constitution, remain un-
answered. These issues are merely transposed, substituting the re-
gime's paradigm for the Constitution's. The question of which judi-
cial strategy should be used applies now to the constitutional regime
not the Constitution. Ackerman implies that by requiring the Court
cynical. He said that
[wle consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (emphasis added). Consequently, in Plessy,
the stigma resided in the victim's mind and was not part of an objective social reality at
all. Thus, the blame for feeling stigmatized was laid upon the victims.
162. Sandalow, supra note 157, at 331.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Ackerman's theory needs to address other areas of constitutional law more
comprehensively, such as the religion clause of the First Amendment. For example, how
do we evaluate Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith according to Ackerman's theory of
constitutional change? See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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to preserve the results of constitutional politics, these questions be-
come superfluous. They do not. We must still ask which strategy
better preserves the higher lawmaking of the most recent constitu-
tional moment. What precisely does "preserve" mean? Does it mean
preserve intact? Perhaps, it means preserve in the context of
changed circumstances. The conflict between judicial activism and
restraint replicates itself within Ackerman's notion of a constitu-
tional regime. Moreover, these different styles of judicial reasons
complicate the controversy further. Must the same interpretive
strategy be used in each of the three regimes? Or can each regime
have its own method of interpretation? If so, how do we synthesize
the substantive results of the three constitutional regimes when dif-
ferent jurisprudential methodologies are employed to achieve these
results?
These same questions must now be reformulated as to whether
the Court should go beyond the regime's paradigm. Ackerman's the-
ory tells us nothing about what following the paradigm entails, or
even how to recognize the paradigm, its scope and content.166 Jus-
tices adhering to their preservationist function will give varying an-
swers to these questions. Indeed, Ackerman's use of Brown and
Griswold as articulations of a synthesis of the Founding, the Recon-
struction, and the New Deal show these decisions to be only permis-
sible under the New Deal, not required. If so, presumably other de-
cisions are possible.167 How does a justice know which decision to
adopt or what the content and scope of the revolutionary paradigm
are?168 Moreover, what explains and justifies intergenerational syn-
thesis in the first place? Ackerman's regime analysis is not likely to
avoid the contestability of Supreme Court decisions. 169 This failing in
his analysis highlights the need for a theory of adjudication to ex-
plain constitutional change.
166. The question of whether judges should make law or only apply law, as well as
the countermajoritarian problem, are not resolved by Ackerman's theory. Judges need to
determine how far they can go in interpreting the new constitutional paradigm. If a judge
merely interprets the latest constitutional moment, she may still act contrary to the pre-
sent majority. If she adheres to the wishes of the present majority, she acts contrary to
the past majority.
167. William Fischer III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 955, 971 (1992)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKEIMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
168. Knowing that a constitutional moment has occurred does not establish the con-
tent of the revolutionary paradigm. See Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Consti-
tutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44
STAN. L. REV. 759, 770 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
169. Id. at 771. For example, the Reagan Democrats generally supported the eco-
nomic expansion of the New Deal, but rejected later civil rights legislation. This poses a
critical problem for Ackerman, since he contends that Brown was an articulation of the
New Deal.
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Thus, Ackerman's conception of a preservationist Court begs
the question against what he calls the prophetic conception of the
judiciary. No one has ever specified a methodology that sufficiently
defines the scope and content of a constitutional paradigm. Simi-
larly, the distinction between creating and preserving is less than
obvious. Sometimes it is necessary to create in order to preserve.
Sometimes preserving means encouraging present constitutional
politics. Should the Court preserve the new constitutional paradigm
intact? Suppose the new pradigm has a significant, though not fatal,
flaw. Should the Court extirpate this flaw without consulting the
people? Are individual liberties sufficiently protected without ex-
tensive protection of privacy? If so, was privacy contained some-
where in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights as Justice Douglas pro-
claimed, or did privacy become inseparable from individual liberty
only after the New Deal?
Ackerman answers this last question in the affirmative. Pri-
vacy became especially important after the New Deal because the
New Deal denigrated the Founders' conception of property.10
Something must take the place of property in protecting individual
rights. But why privacy? Why not religion? Why not collective or
communitarian rights? The privacy associated with Griswold is
merely one type of privacy among many. It is not obvious that the
type of privacy in Griswold is the most effective means to ensure
individual rights.' 7'
The key to Ackerman's dualism is the concept of intergenera-
tional synthesis. According to Ackerman's conception of interpreta-
tion, a Reconstruction justice or a New Deal justice must integrate
the results of the latest constitutional moment with the preserved
results of the earlier regimes. The problem with Ackerman's argu-
ment here is similar to the problem of interpretation discussed ear-
lier. How does a justice know how to synthesize? Ackerman does not
explain why a New Deal justice should replace property and contract
rights with anything at all. Or if she should replace property and
contract with something why it should be privacy. Ackerman
assumes that individual rights or governmental powers contain a
formal component and substantive value. The substantive value can
be changed, while the formal component remains. But why should
this be the case? How does a justice distinguish between changing
the contents of the right, and getting rid of the right entirely?
Ackerman needs a meta-theoretical construct to explain this.
1 2
170. ACKERMAN supra note 7, at 159 (citations omitted).
171. An alternative explanation of Griswold and its progeny simply appeals to the
changes in personal and sexual morality during that period in American history.
172. In another context, Ackerman tries to prove this point by appealing to abstrac-
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Ackerman also needs a meta-theoretical construct for ranking
or integrating the paradigms of two different constitutional regimes.
Suppose the Founding paradigm includes individual rights, and the
New Deal paradigm includes a strong majoritarian control over the
economy. Which should be ranked higher? Notice that the way this
question is resolved has enormous implications because if the
Founding is ranked first, the New Deal might be effectively over-
turned or modified drastically, and so with ranking the New Deal
first.'73
The problem of intergenerational synthesis, therefore, is a
problem of interpretation that Ackerman needs to explain in much
greater detail. Ackerman may assert that the later paradigm must
be ranked first on the grounds that the more recent mobilization of
We the People entails that the people self-consciously changed the
earlier paradigm. But how do we know this? And is this necessarily
the case?
It is then the preservationist justice's job to reflect on several
possibilities of constitutional change, and choose the one she thinks
best fulfills the intergenerational synthesis of the Founding moment
and the New Deal. Her choice cannot be explained by appealing only
to factors intrinsic to the Constitution and to the current constitu-
tional regime. A justice must appeal to factors extrinsic to the con-
stitutional regime, and by doing so will be creating constitutional
revolutions within the context of the regime. 174 Consequently,
tion. He suggests that both property and privacy are instances of liberty or non-interfer-
ence.
The core of both "privacy" and "property" involves the same abstract right: the
right to exclude unwanted interference by third parties. The only real difference
between the two concepts is the kind of relationship that is protected from inter-
ference-"property" principally protects market relationships while "privacy"
protects more spiritual ones. Yet surely this fact should not prevent recognition
of "privacy" as a dimension of constitutional "property in its widest sense."
Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 347 (1993). But what
constitutionally permits us to replace property with privacy? Perhaps, the appropriate
conclusion to draw regarding the New Deal is that we read constitutional rights narrowly
consistent with the revolution in federal governmental power brought about by the New
Deal. Thus, the governmental activism of the New Deal does not extirpate "property"
from the Constitution; it merely restricts it content and scope. And why not say privacy
and other individual rights are similarly restricted?
173. In fact, a proper reading of Carolene Products,, footnote four obviates the ne-
cessity to answer this question. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938). But it also disallows Ackerman's solution through abstraction.
174. Disagreement will doubtlessly occur over the meaning of the constitutional
paradigm, over what the voice of the people says. But why should one particular
interpretation win out as the people's voice just because one justice, the deciding vote in a
five-to-four decision, thinks this is what the people intend. See Jeremy Waldron, Book
Review, 90 J. PHIL. 149, 153 (1993) (reviewing BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
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Ackerman must explain why these constitutional revolutions occur
independently of his dualistic interpretation of constitutional
change. 175
This point is fatal to Ackerman's attempt to define the demo-
cratic foundations of constitutional change. Even if we accept the
utility of Ackerman's three regime conception of constitutional
change, the countermajoritarian question is not resolved by appeal-
ing to the preservationist function of the Court. As long as more
than one answer is possible to the question of what the paradigm
means, the countermajoritarian problem is in no way resolved or
dissolved, but instead, it is replicated within the regime system.
Ackerman's conception of constitutional change, though an interest-
ing and illuminating conception of some of the principal elements in
our constitutional culture, fails to come to terms with the counter-
majoritarian problem anymore than it ultimately explains how
constitutional change occurs. The explanation of these failures is the
same in both cases. Since Ackerman fails to provide an unambigu-
ous answer to the problem of adjudication, the countermajoritarian
problem persists unabated, and constitutional change, as a modern-
istic phenomenon, remains as illusory as ever. Moreover, Acker-
man's theory provides little guidance to judges trying to interpret
the Constitution fairly and honestly. For such guidance, judges must
turn elsewhere.
7. Dualism and the Is/Ought Problem. Before leaving Acker-
man's conception of constitutional moments, let me defend one fea-
ture of his project. Ackerman's theory is designed to depict the dis-
tinctively American features of constitutional theory. Ackerman ex-
horts us to appreciate American constitutional law as it actually is,
not as seen through the lens of European political theories. 17 But
Ackerman gives little reason for this restriction. Why not borrow
from European thinkers in examining and defining our constitu-
tional norms? If constitutional theory is normative and European
normative theory is superior to our own, it is irrational not to borrow
normative concepts from them.
However, if Ackerman's point is that constitutional theory is
175. If these intra-regime constitutional revolutions are inevitable, as I insist they
are in Part III of this Article, it is then possible to combine Ackerman's theory of consti-
tutional moments with the theory of constitutional revolutions. The theory of constitu-
tional revolutions pertains to the interpretive method of constitutional reasoning or deci-
sion making, while Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments provides the substan-
tive content of the seminal constitutional revolutions. Ackerman's theory of constitutional
moments requires the theory of constitutional revolutions, but revolutionary adjudication
occurs independently of Ackerman's theory.
176. ACKEIMAN, supra note 7, at 3-5.
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not normative, but interpretive,7 7 he speaks against generations of
scholars who insist that "is" does not imply "ought,"178 or, alterna-
tively, descriptive statements cannot entail normative ones.'79 But
there is no reason why an interpretive history of American constitu-
tionalism, one that fits and reflects favorably on constitutional
practice, fails to constitute a normative reason in favor of that prac-
tice unless, of course, a sufficient reason exists to alter that practice.
In other words, an adequate interpretive history of actual
constitutional change is itself a normative argument in favor of that
process. A true interpretive history shows the practice to be norma-
tively attractive and, at least, shifts the burden to those opposing
the normative attractiveness of the practice. Given the validity of
the interpretive history, we can normatively endorse the practice
barring reasons indicating otherwise.
The move from is to ought ultimately requires a political theory
justifying the interpretive history. But even absent such a theory, if
the interpretive history satisfies our theoretical and political goals,
then it might be sufficient to establish its normative force at least
for the present. Thus, if Ackerman is correct in his interpretive ac-
count of constitutional practice, 80 the normative burden is partially
lifted. Unless normative reasons exist against this practice, it is ir-
rational to give it up. An interpretive history which accurately de-
picts our constitutional universe, absent normative reasons against
it, is normatively valuable just because it describes and explains our
practice.' 8 -
177. Although Ackerman insists that dualism accurately depicts American constitu-
tional practice, it is not clear how he conceives the relationship between normative and
descriptive discourse. While depicting actual practice goes a long way in discovering the
appropriate constitutional methodology, we are never bound normatively by what history
tells us. Id. at 296. I interpret Ackerman's conception pragmatically. If dualism accu-
rately depicts American constitutional transformations, then baring reasons otherwise,
why is it unworthy of being the theory of American constitutionalism?
178. Frederick Schauer trenchantly states this objection: "Even apart from whether
[Ackerman] gives us good history or not,... he certainly does not give us an account of
why our history and our traditions should be the normative starting point for how we now
see our Constitution." Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About Deliberation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1187, 1201 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
179. This, of course, is logically correct, since descriptive statements and normative
statements are different logical types. The real world, however, is more complex than
logic. The dichotomy between descriptive and normative statements is the subject of this
dispute. Moreover, whether a statement is descriptive or normative depends on context as
well as our purpose in uttering the statement.
180. See generally Kiarman, supra note 168, at 771 (arguing that Ackerman's his-
torical account is erroneous).
181. This perspective is no more conservative than it should be. Moral arguments
must start somewhere and it is better to describe accurately this starting point than not.
This does not mean that one cannot be critical of one's culture; it merely means that the
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This defense of Ackerman's theory applies equally to the theory
of constitutional revolutions. 82 If the theory accurately depicts
constitutional practice, then absent reasons to the contrary, consti-
tutional practice is normatively acceptable. 183 In the final section,
this Article presents the theory of constitutional revolutions, a the-
ory that contributes to a systematic understanding of how judges
transform constitutional law. Postmodern pragmatic constitutional-
ism finds value in the actual social practice of constitutional change,
because this practice is the vantage point from which we begin our
political evaluations. Since pragmatism counsels us to begin, though
not necessarily to end, our evaluations from our perspective in his-
tory, actual social practices identify the character of that perspec-
tive, and help one to begin the fallibilist process of reasoning which
typifies pragmatic constitutionalism.
I. THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS
The theory of constitutional revolutions condemns all normati-
ve constitutional theories-prescribing one exclusive method of
constitutional interpretation-as unfaithful to actual constitutional
practice. If the theory of constitutional revolutions is correct, all
other theories of constitutional interpretation are wrong. However,
the theory does not reject a role for textualism, originalism, struc-
turalism, or non-originalism, or any other middle-level theoretical
device. In fact, it integrates these devices while explaining their ap-
propriate place in constitutional change. The theory rejects the no-
tion that any one of these paradigms alone can provide an accurate
theoretical account of American constitutional practice.
Like any other constitutional jurisprudence, the theory of con-
stitutional revolutions addresses the process of deciding constitu-
tional cases, the constraints American constitutionalism places on
judges, and the degree of discretion judges have in resolving impor-
tant political controversies. It is a theory of what judges and courts
actually do, not what judges say they do, nor what academic lawyers
say the judges should do.
The theory of constitutional revolutions is a theory of judicial
revolutions. This does not mean, however, that the theory is uncon-
cerned with revolutions that occur in the legislative or executive
only way to begin this criticism is through our present cultural values. Indeed, I would
argue that many deeply entrenched social practices in our society are morally bankrupt,
and that compelling normative reasons exist for abandoning them. What we cannot do is
abandon all social practices at once.
182. See infra part III.
183. This argument is spelled out in greater detail infra notes 248-60 and accompa-
nying text.
376 [Vol. 42
POSTMODERU CONSTITUTIONALISM
branches of government.'8 On the contrary, as Ackerman suggests,
fundamental legislative and executive changes as well as political,
societal, 'and moral changes often have implications for constitu-
tional jurisprudence"' Although these implications can someitimes
define a constitutional problem for judges, they cannot resolve the
problem. Judges must have a conception of constitutional methodol-
ogy that translates the revolutionary politics of society into workable
judicial paradigms. Consequently, one must ascertain whether
constitutional history suggests a uniquely American form of prag-
matic constitutionalism. The theory of constitutional revolutions is
just such a theory.
A. Normal and Revolutionary Adjudication as the Theory's
Constructive Centerpiece
The theory of constitutional revolutions integrates external and
internal constitutional perspectives. Viewed from an external per-
spective, the theory of constitutional revolutions is a theory of con-
stitutional moments, an interpretation of how courts transform
American constitutional law. Viewed from the internal perspective,
the theory is a theory of judicial reasoning, delineating the actual
processes judges use when deciding the cases. This section ad-
dresses the theory of constitutional moments, leaving the discussion
of the theory of judicial reasoning to section B below.
The theory of constitutional revolutions rejects the conventional
wisdom concerning constitutional change. According to the conven-
tional view, constitutional law is evolutionary, each stage of devel-
opment adds to the preceding stage. Some versions of the conven-
tional wisdom regard constitutional law as a coherent representa-
tion of an ideal constitutional democracy, which though unattaii-
able, guides our constitutional development.186 The conventional
view regards constitutional change as continuous and incremental;
abrupt discontinuous change is almost certain to be a mistake. Ac-
cordingly, constitutional change is evolutionary, just like modernist
conceptions of history and knowledge generally. The story of
American constitutionalism is "one of continuous and..: upward
growth," a growth that is "only occasionally interrupted by plateaus
184. This does not mean that the interpretive methodology that produces constitu-
tional revolutions is the same irrespective of the interpreter. See generally Frederick
Schauer, The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 729 (1992).
185. See generally ACKER AN, supra note 7.
186. Similarly, Ernest Gellner characterizes this evolutionary conception of history
as a "[w]orld-growth [s]tory." ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 12-14 (1964). In-
stead, human history is marked by abrupt transformations.
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or even retrogressions.'5 7 In rejecting evolutionary change, the
theory of constitutional revolutions is not abandoning theory.
Rather, it embraces a postmodern conception of theory as a form of
rhetoric, a social practice, that produces pragmatic benefits.
1. Normal Adjudication. The theory of constitutional revolu-
tions distinguishes between two kinds of constitutional adjudication:
normal and revolutionary adjudication.' 88 Normal adjudication oc-
curs when an area of constitutional law contains a well-defined
constitutional paradigm,'89 a set of instructions for settling particu-
lar kinds of constitutional conflicts. In these situations, judicial ac-
tors appeal to the paradigm to resolve the conflict.190 Two types of
normal adjudication exist: normal adjudication proper and routine
adjudication. Normal adjudication proper occurs when a court, by
closing a gap inexisting law, resolves a minor question of law.19' In
normal adjudication proper, closing the gap does not alter the para-
digm's basic character.1 92 Routine adjudication addresses questions
of relatively mechanical applications of the Constitution.1 93 Often in
routine adjudication, the dispute never gets litigated or, if it does, is
treated summarily by the Court."
2. Constitutional Crises. When a constitutional paradigm fails
to resolve the problems or conflicts it was designed to resolve, nor-
mal adjudication breaks down. In these circumstances, judges and
practitioners face a crisis. 95 At such times, a judge should consider
revolutionary adjudication. 96 When a crisis occurs in constitutional
187. Id. at 12 (characterizing Western history).
188. See supra notes 208-22 and accompanying text.
189. Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 70, at 739-40.
190. The term "judicial actors" includes citizens, attorneys, and judges, anyone hav-
ing a stake in the outcome of a constitutional question.
191. The distinction between a minor question of law and a major question of law
cannot be drawn mechanically.
192. If it does alter the paradigm, the alteration is relatively trivial.
193. For example, such examples include deciding not to run for political office, be-
cause one is too young, or claiming the right to a jury trial in a criminal case. Schauer,
supra note 184, at 739. And, following Schauer, I believe that these decisions qualify as
interpretations of the Constitution.
194. Adjudication, or litigation, starts at the time of the injury and continues
through selecting a lawyer and going to court. Thus, when a lawyer convinces her client
that the client has no case, the lawyer and the client are engaged in normal adjudication.
195. A constitutional crisis is a paradigm's conceptual or practical inability to re-
solve social and political problems when those problems implicate constitutional rights,
liberties and powers.
196. I do not suggest that a crisis always announces itself in terms everyone under-
stands. But you can bet a crisis exists when one judge thinks an important decision
should go one way, while another judge thinks it should not. Reflective, perennial dis-
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law, the first thing courts try to do is to defuse it. 19 7 This reflects a
perfectly natural prudence not to alter the present course unless it is
necessary. In constitutional law, this prudence sometimes succumbs
to the necessity of dealing with a crisis when the crisis cannot be
defused.
Crises occur for several reasons. First, constitutional crises
typically occur during the formative stages of a constitutional prac-
tice. 198 Such inevitable crises force the Court to construct the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision for the first time. Typically, forma-
tive decisions force the Court to engage in revolutionary adjudica-
tion.199 In these circumstances, courts cannot engage in normal ad-
judication until the constitutional paradigm is specified in greater
detail than the actual document states. American constitutionalism
clearly rejects the possibility of constructing a constitution with "the
prolixity of a legal code."200 If it did, the Constitution "could scarcely
be embraced by the human mind."20' Instead, American constitu-
tionalism "requires that only [the Constitution's] great outlines [be]
marked."20 2 One could argue that the very idea of American consti-
tutionalism makes revolutionary adjudication necessary.
Second, and more typically, a constitutional paradigm fails
when social and cultural forces combine to render its resolution of
some human conflict no longer palatable. Sometimes the paradigm
is found in the document, but altered by case law. In these circum-
stances, a change in paradigm involves the reversal of a prior consti-
tutional decision. A surprising example of this situation concerned
the clause regulating the admission of new states.2 0 The Founders
did not choose to bind future congresses by requiring states to be
admitted on an equal basis with the original states. Yet years later,
the Court interpreted the clause in precisely this manner. The
Court's decision directly conflicted with the Founders' intent.0 Such
a decision is an example of what has been called "contraconsti-
agreement between and among competent judges is evidence that a crisis exists and may
further indicate that the modernist goal of univocally correct answers will remain unat-
tainable.
197. See infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text for a further discussion of crises.
198. In some cases, constitutional revolutions arise only after the occurrence of
precursors to these revolutions. Precursors to revolutions can be described as occurring
during pre-revolutionary adjudication. See Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revo-
lutions, supra note 70, at 743-44.
199. Ackerman's notion of intergenerational synthesis also creates a constitutional
crisis.
200. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 3, cl. 2.
204. See CHARLES P. CURTIS, JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 4-7 (1947).
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tutional" interpretation, interpreting a constitutional provision in a
way contrary to its original understanding."5 Third, a paradigm can
fail because it conflicts with another paradigm, and thus a choice
between or integration of two paradigms is required.0 6 Fourth, a
crisis occurs when no paradigm exists governing a particular area of
constitutional law.207
In a crisis, normal adjudication-which appeals to ordinary
constitutional conventions, such as the constitutional text, the in-
tent of the Framers, and the Constitution's structure, logic, and his-
tory-fails to resolve the conflict. In these circumstances, the area of
law involved cannot be normalized. When these standard conven-
tions fall, courts begin to contemplate revolutionary adjudication.
3. Revolutionary Adjudication. Revolutionary constitutional
decisions are judicial decisions composed of extraconstitutional,
sometimes contraconstitutional, factors. Revolutionary decisions are
the result of adjudication where the judge is acting like a legislator,
though a legislator of a unique kind.
Revolutionary adjudication consists of three phases: pre-revo-
lutionary, revolutionary proper and post-revolutionary adjudication.
Pre-revolutionary adjudication occurs when some member of the
constitutional community becomes disenchanted with the current
constitutional paradigm. This disenchantment may express itself
through a social movement or the efforts of independent judges try-
ing to normalize or keep normal a particular area of constitutional
law. Often, in these circumstances, precursors to revolutionary ad-
judication occur that try to repair the defect in the current paradigm
by delicately altering its structure.0 8 Sometimes the precursors re-
solve the crisis and normal adjudication can be revived. Other times,
only revolutionary adjudication proper can resolve the crisis." 9
Revolutionary adjudication proper involves decisions that can-
205. Contraconstitutional interpretation contrasts with extraconstitutional interpre-
tation which permits the Court to breathe new (but not conflicting) life into a constitu-
tional provision. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of"This Constitution", 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1265 (1987); see also MICHAEL
J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (1982).
206. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
207. A case of first impression illustrates this type of crisis. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
208. For example, several precursors to Brown attempted to repair the paradigm in
Plessy. See Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 70, at 742
n.172, 743-44.
209. This process is not always forward-looking. Sometimes precursors can be iden-
tified only after the revolution. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), was a
precursor to Brown, but it was also revolutionary in its own right.
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not be explained by reference to ordinary constitutional conventions,
such as constitutional text, structure, logic, and history, or by the in-
tentions of the Framers. Rather, through revolutionary adjudication,
political meaning and value that develop in the wider community are
given constitutional significance by the Court. American constitu-
tionalism has always relied upon revolutionary adjudication in in-
terpreting the Constitution.1 ° The formative revolutions, Marbury v.
Madison,"' Martin's v. Hunter's Lessee,1 2 McCulloch v. Maryland,213
and Gibbons v. Ogden214 gave content to the structure of the Ameri-
can government. 21 The New Deal revolution transformed the con-
tent of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses as applied to economic regulations; it also continued to
centralize power and authority in the federal government. The Civil
Rights revolution similarly reversed the apartheid conception of
equal protection enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson .2 " The privacy
cases subsequently recognized additional fundamental rights as well
as revolutionized our conception of constitutional methodology.2 7
After revolutionary adjudication proper, a post-revolutionary
stage occurs with the task of refining, perfecting, and stabilizing the
new constitutional paradigm in order to permit normal adjudication
210. Revolutionary decisions have been a critical feature of every stage of American
constitutional change. Aside from the formative cases, discussed infra, some notable
revolutionary decisions are: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873); and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), is an especially interesting case. Here the Court read an
"equal protection component" into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This sug-
gests that the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection clause is redundant. Such a
revolutionary decision might embarrass even some ardent supporters of revolutionary
adjudication. On the other hand, it could be argued that a right against discrimination by
a state implies a similar right against the federal government unless a compelling reason
indicates otherwise. See MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONsTITUTION IN THE COURT: LAW OR
PoLITIcs 147 (1993) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment warrants the right in Boling).
211. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
212. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
213. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
214. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
215. A potentially significant individual rights revolution was quelled in Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the federal Bill of Rights do not apply
to the states).
216. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
217. For a discussion of these revolutions, see Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitu-
tional Revolutions, supra note 70, at 777-80.
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in that area of law. The privacy cases following Griswold218 clearly
exemplify the post-revolutionary phase of constitutional adjudica-
tion.219 Post-revolutionary adjudication compels courts to determine
the new paradigm's content and scope. In this phase, the Court inte-
grates the newly minted paradigm with contemporary cultural val-
ues to explicate the paradigm fully. Of course, this does not mean
that Griswold was rightly decided. Indeed, an argument against
Griswold, according to the theory of constitutional revolutions,
might be that the privacy paradigm is so amorphous as to be of little
use in post-revolutionary adjudication. The paradigm, therefore,
threatens the possibility of normal adjudication in this area. When
the paradigm is inadequate in this way, refining, perfecting, and
stabilizing the paradigm in order to achieve normal adjudication is
thwarted. But this argument is different from the originalist argu-
ment invoking considerations of legitimacy.220
American constitutionalism looks to revolutionary adjudication
to extend or retract the Constitution's reach.22 ' Constitutional law
also seeks normal adjudication because the daily operation of courts
require explicit paradigms for resolving conflicts. It is doubtful,
however, that any legal system could operate with only normal ad-
judication; but American constitutionalism certainly could not.
Pragmatic constitutionalism permits use of an explicit paradigm
just until the paradigm can no longer resolve the problems it was
designed to resolve.222
4. Constitutional Paradigms. A constitutional paradigm is an
analytic structure exhibiting several features. First, it states those
facts under which a law triggers adjudication. Second, it states the
appropriate standard for reviewing the law. Third, it shows how the
218. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
219. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The
precursors to Griswold are an interesting line of cases. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). One could argue that this area of law was never stabilized. The con-
servative position is that the notion of privacy does not lend itself to stabilization. On
pragmatic grounds, it is not obvious that we can know this in advance.
220. This originalist argument, however, is outweighed by the political and moral
value in constitutionalizing the substantive right of privacy.
221. McCulloch v. Maryland, 14 U.S. (Wheat) 304 (1816).
222. The different phases of constitutional adjudication are interrelated and are
driven by a single principle: democratic pragmatism. The ultimate goal of a democratic,
pragmatic system of adjudication is that justices have the power and prerogative to
correct mistakes in constitutional practice. Although correcting the mistake sometimes
requires formal amendment, most often it requires the informal amending power that is
an integral part of textual interpretation. The Court's corrective role enables democratic
pragmatism to operate more efficiently than majoritarianism.
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standard applies to the law under review. Fourth, the paradigm de-
termines the available remedies.
Equal protection analysis is a example of such a constitutional
paradigm. A legislative classification distinguishing between two
groups of people triggers adjudication under the Equal Protection
Clause. The standard of review includes three levels of scrutiny:
strict, intermediate and rational basis scrutiny. Typically, the law
will stand or fall depending upon the level of scrutiny. The Court
then provides a remedy such as desegregation, busing, or compensa-
tory hiring depending upon the particular facts of the case.",
The theory of constitutional revolutions provides a comprehen-
sive account of constitutional adjudication.2" It opposes any unitary
conception of constitutional change or conceptions that deny the
creative role of judges in making constitutional law. While the the-
ory of constitutional revolutions distinguishes between the institu-
tional roles of courts and legislatures, it rejects any constraining di-
chotomy between making and applying law. The theory further re-
jects the notions that constitutional law is objective in any non-triv-
ial sense or that constitutional adjudication operates with neutral
principles. Thus, the theory of constitutional revolutions insists that
we have perpetuated an enormous myth about the operation of
constitutional change. While myths are not necessarily pernicious,
this one is because it prevents understanding of the actual workings
of our constitutional system, and instead, insists we fight battles
over legitimacy that none of the contestants can win. Although the
theory of constitutional revolutions does not reject institutional ar-
guments out of hand, its salient predilection is toward substantive,
moral and political arguments, designed either to win assent or to
understand why our substantive disagreements are unresolvable.225
223. Constitutional paradigms can be procedural, substantive, or both. For example,
the different levels of review in equal protection analysis include both substantive and
procedural elements. They are procedural because they provide an analytic device for
conceptualizing a case. But they also are substantive because they recognize that certain
kinds of governmental burdens constitutionally and morally require greater scrutiny than
others. For a more detailed discussion of constitutional paradigms, see Lipkin, The Anat-
omy of Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 70, at 734-36.
224. This theory is concerned primarily with revolutionary constitutional adjudica-
tion, but constitutional revolutions occur also in the executive and legislative branches of
government. Moreover, the theory of constitutional revolutions is concerned primarily
with constitutional revolutions, though revolutionary adjudication occurs in both the
common law and statutory law.
225. The American concern with fidelity to the Constitution is non-existent in Eng-
land. Instead, "debate in England centers on the right or wrong of a particular bill, not on
its fidelity to a presumptively authoritative text that stands above parliamentary activ-
ity." Levinson, supra note 1, at 156.
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5. Constitutional Interpretive Communities. Constitutional in-
terpretation occurs in an interpretive community that regards the
Constitution as the primary element in our constitutional scheme.
Case law is the second most important element in this scheme. Ac-
cording to this theory, judges determine what the Constitution and
constitutional practice imply for the resolution of a particular case.
When these elements are inconclusive, the courts must interpret
them through the wider political culture.
Constitutional interpretation includes analyzing constitutional
practice in terms of foundational constitutional decisions. A founda-
tional constitutional decision is a Supreme Court decision concern-
ing the meaning of a fundamental provision of the Constitution,
such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, or the Equal Protection
Clause. When interpreted, such a provision is foundational in the
sense that it supplies the meaning of the relevant constitutional
provision throughout the entire legal system. Together with the
Constitution, foundational constitutional decisions constitute the
key elements of constitutional practice. These decisions are also the
basis of constitutional background theories.
The constitutional interpretive community analyzes constitu-
tional practice against a background of interpretive theories. There
are two general categories-intrinsic and extrinsic-of constitu-
tional background theories. Intrinsic theories contain principles that
constitutional practice directly entails. Extrinsic theories are
theories that in addition to intrinsic factors appeal to considerations
not directly contained in the Constitution or case law. Constitutional
background theories are moral and political theories that are neces-
sary for understanding the Constitution and constitutional reason-
ing. These theories reflect the legal, cultural, and ethical level of
constitutional meaning discussed earlier.
6. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Theories. Three such constitutional
background theories are relevant to the theory of constitutional
revolutions. The "relativized constitutional background theory," is a
theory of actual constitutional practice. This first type of theory
systematizes and generalizes particular foundational constitutional
decisions in the American constitutional scheme. Consequently, if
the Equal Protection Clause rejects segregation, and no other
foundational provision permits segregation, then this constitutional
background theory similarly must reject segregation. Thus, the
relativized constitutional theory is a theory tied to particular
circumstances and a particular constitutional practice.
The other two background theories are extrinsic theories since
they include principles and factors not necessarily contained in
constitutional practice. The first such extrinsic theory is a critical
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cultural theory of American constitutionalism. This theory is more
accurately a narrative that contains a critical account of the struc-
tural principles of our constitutional culture.226 The critical cultural
theory must include the constitutional values contained in the
Constitution, constitutional practice as well as in the relativized
constitutional theory but also includes cultural values independent
of, yet closely associated with, intrinsic constitutional factors.
Consequently, the critical cultural theory is not equivalent to the
relativized theory. When one argues for a proposed constitutional
right, for example, health care, welfare, or education, one appeals to
a critical theory of American constitutional culture-of what this
culture entails. Such rights may or may not be contained explicitly
in the relativized theory.
The second extrinsic background theory is an abstract moral
and political theory. Although this theory ideally explains and justi-
fies the principles contained in constitutional practice, it is con-
cerned much more with justification than explanation. While the
relativized constitutional background theory, the critical cultural
theory, and the abstract moral and political theory each contain a
theory of mistakes, the abstract moral and political theory permits
greater latitude in condemning Supreme Court decisions as mistaken
than does either the critical cultural theory or the revitalized the-
ory.227 This should not be surprising, since the abstract theory is as
close to ideal theory as the theory of constitutional revolutions permits.
B. The Theory of Judicial Reasoning
As stated in the last section, the theory of constitutional revo-
lutions has two theoretical components. The first component is a
theory of constitutional moments, a theory of how courts transform
American constitutional law. The second component, a theory of ju-
dicial reasoning, describes how judges decide cases. In joining the
theory of constitutional moments and the theory of judicial reason-
ing, the theory of constitutional revolutions becomes a syncretic con-
ception of postmodern constitutionalism. Let us now sketch the the-
ory of judicial reasoning implicit in this conception.
1. Wide Reflective Equilibrium. Judicial reasoning is a species
of wide reflective equilibrium,2 8 a pragmatic process through which
226. A critical cultural theory seeks a coherent perspective about American culture
held by a reasonable person. When no single perspective is found, a critical cultural the-
ory seeks to identify the conflicting perspectives involved in our cultural wars.
227. A theory of adjudication includes a theory of mistakes which is a method for de-
termining when constitutional decisions are erroneous. DW01UIN, supra note 63, at 355-57.
228. This pragmatic methodology was popularized by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWIS,
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we reflect on our constitutional intuitions. 29 These intuitions are
rudimentary, atheoretical beliefs about constitutional propriety. Re-
flection enables one to achieve a less idiosyncratic perspective. This
perspective is more general and enables one to evaluate intuitions
and achieve the fallibilist goal that is the hallmark of pragmatic
constitutionalism. This pragmatic process helps to criticize and cor-
rect our constitutional intuitions. Some engage in these practices
intuitively; other people need to reflect on the process in order to
learn how to "engage in these practices intuitively." The goal here is
to create a new perspective for evaluating our intuitions which be-
comes our own, not to discover an "other worldly" perspective. Cer-
tainly, this new perspective is a perspective in the world. But it is
not just another perspective. It is a pragmatic perspective more
likely than others to result in defensible judgments.23 When one
achieves this perspective one can then consider various principles
and theories which provide a rationale for our intuitions.
Once one holds one's considered intuitions and one's theory in
wide reflective equilibrium, one can then use the theory to resolve
constitutional conflicts.2s1 This perspective helps achieve a balance
between one's constitutional intuitions and more generalized prin-
ciples or theories. Where no balance is possible, the perspective
helps explain why. One's considered intuitions and theories are
never fixed or closed. Rather, both can be stabilized only temporarily
in order to achieve equilibrium.
Wide reflective equilibrium provides a solution when one's in-
tuitions and theories collide. Wide reflective equilibrium can have
one of three dimensions: (1) intuitionist, (2) coherentist, or (3) for-
malist. Intuitionism embraces considered intuitions over theories in
times of conflict, while formalism prefers rich, deeply-layered theo-
ries over our intuitions. Coherentism seeks a balance between in-
tuitions and theories. Rather than reconcile these dimensions, or
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 48-50 (1970). But its origins go back to the work of Willard van
Orman Quine and Nelson Goodman if not as far back as Socrates.
229. I do not contrast the process of generating legal intuitions and reflecting upon
this process b ' saying the first process constitutes practice, while the second process con-
stitutes theory. In my view, both practice and theory are different kinds of social prac-
tices. This hardly means, however, that distinguishing between them is pointless.
230. One must be careful here not to beg a number of questions. I do not claim that
the description of this perspective is uncontestable; nor do I claim that this perspective
guarantees consensus. Rather, I suggest that certain perspectives are better than others
for generating our favored judgments.
231. For a more extensive discussion of wide reflective equilibrium, see Lipkin, The
Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 70, at 726 n.96; Lipkin, Beyond Skep-
ticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness, supra note 1, at 865-77; Lipkin, Inde-
terminacy, Justification and Truth, supra note 1, at 638-42; Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies and
Apes Without Tails, supra note 1, at 111-30.
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choose one over the others, the theory of judicial reasoning regards
them as part of a single process of practical reasoning. s2
2. Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Change. The
theory ofjudicial reasoning applies to constitutional change. When a
proposed change makes a minor change to constitutional practice, a
judge, like a good intuitionist, should prefer well-settled constitu-
tional conventions. Similarly, when a minor change is warranted in
normal adjudication, intuitionism has a minimal coherentist di-
mension and helps achieve the pragmatic result. In doing so, a judge
engages in normal adjudication. However, when a proposed change
helps resolve a constitutional crisis, a judge, like any formalist,
should embrace the change, knowing it may have sweeping ramifi-
cations. In this context the judge will choose revolutionary adjudi-
cation. Ordinarily, when a judge engages in post-revolutionary ad-
judication, she seeks a coherentist articulation of her intuitions in
light of the new constitutional paradigm. The theory of constitu-
tional moments and the theory of judicial reasoning, combine the
external perspective of how courts transform constitutional law with
the internal perspective of how judges reason s 3 Consequently, these
theories together constitute a syncretic conception of constitutional
transformation and adjudication.
C. The Theory of Constitutional Revolutions and Political Theory
The relationship between the theory of constitutional revolu-
tions and political philosophy is a complicated question that cannot
be examined adequately here. Nevertheless, a brief discussion is
necessary for the purposes of this Article.
232. Law expresses each of these dimensions in different circumstances. The intui-
tionist dimension typifies most adjudication. Stability, notice, and predictability
associated with intuitionism generate a presumption in favor of the legal status quo. This
presumption is required for the intelligibility and validity of our legal judgments. In the
standard case, this presumption requires accepting the most obvious interpretation of a
legal provision all things being equal. But since all things are rarely equal, something
more than intuitionism is required. Typically, a coherentist dimension helps fill in gaps in
normal adjudication as well as in post-revolutionary adjudication, and when the past fails
to resolve a novel problem, formalist change is required.
233. How would a judge write a judicial opinion according to the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions? Would she write a homily? A story? In my estimation, a revolutionary
judicial opinion has four salient parts. Part one should be a comprehensive statement of
the relevant principles of law. Part two should show why the answer that follows from
those legal principles is morally, politically, or practically wrong. Part three should be a
coherent statement of political philosophy in support of the most plausible response to the
crisis. Finally, part four should translate the political philosophical result into a workable
constitutional rule.
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The theory of constitutional revolutions is pragmatic.23 4 Prag-
matism drives the processes of constitutional change. This view rec-
ognizes that judges sometimes have positive reasons to adhere
closely to a constitutional paradigm, but other times, have little or
no reason to do so. On the other hand, pragmatism recognizes the
importance, and in the American context, the inevitability of consti-
tutional revolutions. The processes of change-of refining, perfect-
ing, and stabilizing the paradigm to reach normalization-efficiently
helps translate cultural, ethical, and political meaning into consti-
tutional law, and thereby contributes to the vigor and health of our
constitutional democracy.
The theory of constitutional revolutions exploits the strengths
of conventionalism, coherentism, pragmatism, and naturalism.235
Conventionalism corresponds most closely to normal adjudication.
Pragmatism and naturalism correspond to revolutionary adjudica-
tion proper; while coherentism corresponds most closely to post-
revolutionary adjudication.2 36 Exploiting traditional theories in this
manner gives the theory of constitutional revolutions its pragmatic
punch. Why would any constitutional democracy choose not to incor-
porate the strengths of each of these theories into a unified juris-
prudential account of constitutional practice? Even if our constitu-
tional practice were different, we would have an affirmative reason
to reform it according to the theory of constitutional revolutions.
The manner in which the theory of constitutional revolutions
integrates standard jurisprudential theories is by no means the only
reason for adopting it. The theory also is appealing because it re-
flects actual constitutional practice. Constitutional law is a product
of the Constitution and revolutionary interpretations of its text.
These interpretations reveal paradigms which then become refined,
perfected, and stabilized with the ultimate goal of quelling crisis and
reaching normalization. It is difficult to understand actual constitu-
tional practice without employing this theory.
These undulating patterns of constitutional practice are best
captured by a pragmatic judicial philosophy, one that favors con-
crete results over theory. A pragmatic judicial philosophy is de-
signed to overcome crisis. It eschews overtly ideological factors.
234. Elsewhere I have described this judicial philosophy as "superpragmatism."
Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 71, at
729. Superpragmatism maintains that adjudication is justified in terms of its effect on the
nation's future and leaves open the substantive nature of this effect. Id.
235. For stylistic reasons, the term "naturalism" is used throughout the Article
instead of "natural law."
236. Coherentism has two distinct functions in American constitutional law. Its
primary function is to refine, perfect, and stabilize a novel constitutional paradigm. Less
dramatic, however, is the coherentist function of filling in gaps in normal adjudication.
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Pragmatic judicial philosophy tolerates experimental solutions to
difficult questions. It avoids the quest for foundational constitu-
tional principles which definitively lay down univocal constitutional
methodologies. The theory of constitutional revolutions is closely al-
lied to progressive constitutional values such as equality, com-
munity, and liberty. An examination of human history suggests that
these values typically involve revolutionary change, while the status
quo usually is represented by authority, hierarchy, and domination.
Progressives usually seek to implement these values, while conser-
vatives typically try to defend the status quo. Further, progressives
must be vigilant in protecting the values of equality, community,
and liberty from erosion, and in ensuring that such values be prop-
erly realized. Consequently, the possibility of revolutionary consti-
tutional change is vital to this vigilance.
At one time or another, every constitutionalist has endorsed
such revolutionary adjudication.3 7 The theory of constitutional
237. Anyone supporting Brown, for example, supports revolutionary constitutional
change, although sometimes the reasoning in support of such change appears disingenu-
ous. Robert Bork, for example, rejects revolutionary adjudication, yet endorses Brown.
BORK, supra note 81, at 75. Indeed, in Bork's view, Brown was correct because the Court
picked one of the two intentions possessed by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Framers believed in equality, but did not believe that school desegregation was vio-
lative of equality. Since it would be an administrative nightmare for the Court to super-
vise "separate but equal" regimes in a variety of public facilities, the Brown Court was
correct to reject the constitutional permissibility of equal, but segregated schools. Bork
presents this argument without irony, although he is surely aware that the Supreme
Courts difficulty in integrating the schools was no less of an administrative nightmare
than judicial enforcement of equal, but segregated schools would have been. Administra-
tive nightmare aside, Bork never explains whether there exists a general answer to the
question of which intention prevails when the Framers have two incompatible intentions
relevant to a constitutional question. I believe that Dworkin's general answer to this
question fares no better than Bork's. DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 329-33. But see Lipkin,
Conventionalism, Pragmatism and Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 71, at 713-21.
Bork adds a second argument that crudely echoes Dworkin's. Bork argues that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment valued equality and segregation but
[slince equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifi-
ers did not understand that, both could not be honored. When that is seen, it is
obvious the Court must choose equality and prohibit state-imposed segregation.
The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into being was equality
before the law, and equality, not separation, was written into the text.
BORK, supra note 81, at 82. But the notion that equality and segregation are "mutually
inconsistent" is question begging, surprisingly, against "originalism." For an originalist
understanding of "equality" as it appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, we must consult
the Framers' understanding of "equality." Their understanding renders equality and seg-
regation compatible. The fact that the amendment contains the word equality, not segre-
gation, might be persuasive for a textualist, but not a true originalist. For an originalist,
textual evidence is one form of evidence of original intent, but it is in no way necessarily
dispositive.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
revolutions is antithetical only to a Burkean conception of change.238
A constitutional Burkean sees constitutional change as incremental
and occurring not so much from individual choice and utopian re-
form as from the multiplicity of choices made every day in social in-
teraction. Consequently, for the Burkean, the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions is anathema.
I do not want to suggest that conservatives cannot embrace the
theory of constitutional revolutions. Indeed, my contention that the
theory of constitutional revolutions is the theory of our constitu-
tional change precludes denying its role in conservative adjudica-
tion.2 9 Rather, there is a greater connection between the theory of
constitutional revolutions and progressive political theory. As a
thoroughly pragmatic theory, progressive political theory denies
that any value is necessarily sacrosanct.24° It therefore requires a
pragmatic theory of constitutional adjudication, one that does not
reject the pragmatic benefits associated with conventionalism, co-
herenterism, pragmatism, and naturalism. Thus, since the theory of
constitutional revolutions is the only theory that integrates these
jurisprudential paradigms in a unified manner, any pragmatic pro-
gressive political theory naturally is connected to the theory of
constitutional revolutions. Progressives committed to equality,
community, and liberty will seek a theory of constitutional adjudica-
tion that permits extending these values in order to vigilantly pro-
tect them.
According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, a judge
must determine how the history of the nation's political values bears
on the decision. This is always her own conception of these values.
Nevertheless, in this context, the object of the judge's inquiry must
238. ACKEIIAN, supra note 7, at 17-18.
239. According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, the difference between
judicial conservatives and judicial progressives is that for the former, normal adjudication
occupies a larger piece of the judicial landscape. The differences between conservatives
and progressives are made more intelligible when seen through the lens of the theory of
constitutional revolutions. No longer should one ask whether the Constitution's text, in-
tent, structure, history and logic are appropriate methods of interpretation. They are in
the appropriate circumstances. Instead, we must ask whether a case before the Court re-
quires normal, revolutionary, or post-revolutionary adjudication. In normal adjudication,
for example, text and intent are perfectly legitimate and exclusive methods of interpreta-
tion. In revolutionary adjudication, however, they are not exclusive, and typically not
relevant at all.
240. Pragmatism implies that no value is immune from criticism, and any value
may be abandoned in the appropriate circumstances. Of course, it may be inconceivable to
reject a value under certain descriptions. Murder, for example, is defined as unjustifiable,
unexcused homicide. No one can seriously endorse murder without committing a seman-
tic mistake. But that is a trivial result. The real test is whether certain forms of behavior
must be described always as murder. Pragmatism denies that linguistic descriptions are
necessarily related to certain forms of behavior and not others.
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be the nation's fundamental political values, not her own. Generally,
when the answer to this question is clear, the judge's pursuit of fun-
damental values is complete. When it is unclear, the judge must
consult her own fundamental values, not because her values are sac-
rosanct, but because her values are the nation's best values from her
perspective. We ask an impossible task of a judge when we forbid
her from appealing to the nation's best values from her perspective.
More importantly, we set the stage for judicial self-deception in the
name of what "the law" commands.
D. Defending the Theory of Constitutional Revolutions
This section critically evaluates important objections to the
theory of constitutional revolutions.24' Some objections can be han-
dled with relative ease. Other objections might require us to refor-
mulate the theory in a more plausible form.
1. Legislative and Adjudicative Dimensions of Law. First, the
pragmatic dimension of both the theory of constitutional revolutions
and progressive political theory may be criticized for conflating the
legislative and adjudicative dimensions of government. According to
this objection, the appropriate place for "revolutionary" change is the
legislature, not the courts. 2 Consequently, the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions founders by seeking to usurp the legislative
role.43
This objection fails to distinguish between two kinds of change:
change in policy and change in principle. A change in policy is a
change from one constitutionally permissible course of action to an-
other. A change in principle alters the meaning of an existing consti-
tutional provision, affording greater or lesser protection of constitu-
tional rights and liberties.2 According to the theory of constitu-
241. For a discussion of other objections, see Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional-
Revolutions, supra note 70, at 780-88.
242. Robert Bork is the most prominent advocate of this approach. See supra note
81.
243. The theory of constitutional revolutions recognizes the United States Supreme
Court to be a "super-legislature." If the Court evaluates the constitutionality of statutes,
what else can it be? After all, the Court ratifies legislative and executive acts. The dichot-
omy between legislation and adjudication is a modernist dichotomy that should be
dropped rather than embraced as a constraint on adjudication. Rejecting this dichotomy
does not entail denying differences between legislatures and courts, but simply recognizes
that these activities are not mutually exclusive. Imagine a governmental entity whose
sole function is to pass on the constitutionality of newly enacted legislation. To which
branch of the government, the legislative or the judiciary, does this entity definitively
belong? There is no general answer to the question of whether this entity is the "upper"
house of a legislature or a constitutional court. Any answer will be arbitrary.
244. I do not offer this distinction between policy and principle in a mechanical way.
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tional revolutions, courts change principles, not policies. Although
judicial alterations of constitutional principles might be held ille-
gitimate on other grounds, the theory of constitutional revolutions
cannot be faulted for abolishing the distinction between legislative
and adjudicative changes. The former are changes in policy while
the latter are changes in principle or governmental perogatives.245
Legislatures are concerned with addressing general problems,
which typically involve balancing competing interests. Courts are
more concerned with the individual's permanent rights and liberties
as well as the constitutional authority of federal and state govern-
ments. Consequently, courts might alter constitutional principles
without trespassing on legitimate legislative authority to make
changes in policy.
However, the critic might persist that no governmental branch
should alter constitutional principles, or replace one constitutional
principle with another not found in the Constitution. In one sense,
this objection is absolutely right. If the Court were to interpret a
provision of the Constitution to require or even permit theocracy,
monarchy, fascism, or communism, the Court would be overstepping
its bounds. No American Court has even come close to such in-
terpretations. Yet, every branch of government has altered, some-
times radically, some constitutional principles. The original consti-
tutional principle of limited government was altered through both
the Marshall Court and the New Deal Court decisions. The principle
of the original role of the presidency has been altered drastically in
the twentieth century. Other examples abound. The advent of the
administrative state as a fourth branch of governmental authority is
not in the original Constitution. So the objection is right that courts
should be unable to add concepts to the Constitution, concepts which
have no purchase in our constitutional and cultural theories of po-
litical life. But it does not follow that courts should be unable to al-
ter constitutional principles which are relevant to our constitutional
Whether a change is one in a policy or principle is itself an interpretive problem and in
some cases, will be contestable. My only point here is that a justice does not awake in the
morning, for example, declaring that it would be a good thing for people to have compre-
hensive, government funded health care, and so rules. Moreover, constitutional politics
are conflicts of important human values and fundamental commitments to different ways
of living. On pragmatic grounds concepts and principles must be revised or reinterpreted
with the passage of time and new circumstances. Otherwise, we may forego a better ver-
sion of that concept or principle or lose it entirely.
245. The present objection is tied conceptually to the objection that courts be
restrained, not activist. I have discussed this second objection elsewhere. Lipkin, The
Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 70, at 784-86. For now, let me add that
restraint in the face of constitutional crisis is no virtue and activism in pursuit of democ-
racy and fundamental rights is no vice.
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and cultural practice.246
A corollary of this objection is that the theory of constitutional
revolutions fails to preserve the distinction between law and politics.
When one understands law to involve principles and politics to in-
volve strategy and special interest, the theory of constitutional
revolutions preserves the distinction between law and politics. If law
means neutral principles and politics means substantive principles,
then the theory rejects this distinction. The theory recognizes no
neutral principles. Even if it did, neutral principles would not be
useful in constitutional law. The best of law translates the best of
politics into legal form. Indeed, the best of law and the best of
politics amount to the same thing, reflective responses about how to
structure the good society. 7
2. Descriptive and Normative Features of the Theory. A second
criticism of the theory of constitutional revolutions is that it is, at
best, only descriptively, not normatively accurate.248 If the theory is
only descriptively accurate, then it is an open question whether it
has any normative value. 9 This argument has been the centerpiece
of analytic ethics for much of this century.20 The argument is that
there exist two different levels of discourse, descriptive and norma-
tive, and that it is a logical mistake to infer a normative judgment
from a descriptive statement.
Upon closer inspection, there is nothing wrong with regarding
descriptive discourse (which after all at least contains yesterday's
norms) as presumptively (normatively) valid, unless a compelling
moral or political reason exists for disregarding it. The fact that it is
246. Remember, Ackerman argues that constitutional practice sanctions non-Article
V amendments to the Constitution. See ACKERIAN, supra note 7, at 54; see also Amar,
supra note 81, at 1044 (arguing that the Constitution may be amended in ways not spe-
cifically set forth in Article V, namely, "by direct appeal to, and ratification by... the
People of the United States").
247. This does not mean that no distinction exists between law and revolutionary
politics. In other words, revolutionary constitutional change within a legal system is dif-
ferent from revolutionary political change of that legal system.
248. See supra note 176-83 and accompanying text.
249. The open question argument, among other techniques, is used to challenge the
normative authority of any factual account of human value. See GEORGE E. MOORE,
PRINcr'IA ETHICA § 134 (1903). The open question argument says: Consider any natural-
istic or metaphysical property, like pleasure, as a definition of'good.' If good is defined as
pleasure, the sentence "Pleasure is good, but is it really good?" would not make sense.
However, since it does make sense, pleasure cannot be the definition of good. A related is-
sue is "Hume's dictum," namely that ought cannot be derived from is. DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMIAN NATURE 469 (1967). Consequently, the theory of constitutional
revolutions might describe what American constitutionalism is, but does not entail how it
ought to be.
250. See generally WILIAM FRANKENA, ETHICS (2d ed. 1973); HUME, supra note 249.
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descriptively correct should count strongly in its favor.25 1 Indeed, it
is a feature of pragmatic evaluation, as I understand it, to reject the
dichotomy between descriptive and normative discourse. In different
contexts, language functions in different ways. Permanently labeling
certain types of discourse as descriptive or normative based on their
logical or syntactical structures cannot be persuasive on pragmatic
grounds.252
The issue of the relationship between descriptive and norma-
tive discourse implicates a much broader issue of the proper method
of philosophical inquiry. There are, at least, two ways to approach
philosophically and theoretically interesting controversies. The first,
"the Platonic approach," denigrates practice with all its infirmities.
Instead, it continually asks the normative question: What is the
ideal nature of the practice? The second approach, "the Humean ap-
proach," seeks empirically to understand human society and its con-
ventions. The first approach valorizes the normative dimension; the
second approach embraces the descriptive and the explanatory di-
mensions of discourse.253 Neither approach is compelling. A third
view, "the Wittgensteinian approach" seeks to integrate the norma-
tive and the descriptive. Normative evaluation is possible, but not by
invoking transcendental principles.' Normative evaluation is a
human, cultural practice, used to present other practices in a favor-
able light.25 When a practice is significantly defective, we must
251. See Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 70, at 782-
84. This position does not entail a pernicious relativism; it simply maintains, on prag-
matic grounds, that the starting point for legal and moral evaluation must be one's own
community. Without transcendent ideals, the starting point must subsequently begin
with the legal and moral conceptual scheme into which one is born. No matter how much
we depart from this scheme, it is necessarily our starting point. Consequently, barring a
reason otherwise, our social practices are prima facie good. Of course, American history is
replete with practices that should be criticized and abandoned, such as racism and
sexism, among others.
252. For example, the statement "There's a Mack truck." is descriptive when one
wants to identify the vehicle, but exhortative when one wants to warn someone crossing
the street about an oncoming truck.
253. Indeed, the normative dimension of the Platonic approach does not denigrate
the descriptive dimension completely;, nor does the Humean approach entirely eliminate
the normative dimension.
254. This does not mean that we are all restricted to our own idiosyncratic or solip-
sistic perspectives. If we were, human communication would be impossible. In the appro-
priate circumstances, we can and should achieve a more general, self-critical perspective
from which to make decisions. But we must realize that the more general vantage point is
still a perspective in the world. In short, it is a view from somewhere. The Platonic ap-
proach, however, like so many philosophical conceptions of normativity, does not contrast
my idiosyncratic and self-critical perspectives. Rather, it contrasts both of these perspec-
tives with a perspective neither located in space and time, nor occupied by any actual hu-
man being. Pragmatism denies this later perspective.
255. Pragmatists reject the possibility of a non-circular, ultimate justification of so-
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change it; but when no compelling reason for abandoning a practice
exists, what is, is what ought to be.256 Rejecting this argument is
tantamount to embracing the possibility that all human practices
can be normatively defective, a view that borders on incoherence.
The Wittgensteinian approach suggests that normativity is in-
ternal to social practices. Normative questions can arise only within
a language. Consequently, we cannot ask normative questions about
an ultimate description of human society. Within that description,
we will discover normative arguments which have force within a
language-game, within a social practice. But to ask if the total de-
scription is normatively attractive is to ask an unanswerable ques-
tion. In these circumstances, we would do well to heed Wittgen-
stein's remarks: "The danger here.., is one of giving a justification
of our procedure where there is no such thing as a justification and
we ought simply to have said: that's how we do it."' 7
In the context of the theory of constitutional revolutions, over-
turning revolutionary practice ironically requires embracing the
theory of constitutional revolutions. If the theory accurately depicts
constitutional practice, then a compelling reason is needed for aban-
doning it. The theory also requires that one accept the spirit of the
theory of constitutional revolutions because only a theory of this sort
justifies abandoning constitutional practice.258 If the theory of consti-
tutional revolutions accurately describes practice, then abandoning
the practice calls for a constitutional revolution of monumental pro-
portions.259
A critic might charge that since actual constitutional practice is
normatively invalid, altering the practice may require revolution. In
cial practices. If one does not think the present practices of justification useful, one may
demonstrate how it might be improved. But no inescapable foundation exists grounding
the practice of justification.
256. Alternatively, the level of description captures, for the most part, past attempts
at justification, past attempts at normative world construction. Consequently, the de-
scriptive should stand normatively unless there is a reason for it to be reformed in a par-
ticular situation.
257. LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN, REMARKs ON THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS pt. III,
§ 74, at 74 (G.H. von Wright et al. eds., & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., MIT Press Paperback
1983) (1956).
258. Revolutionary adjudication is necessary to ensure that law is a vibrant dis-
course adaptable to various contexts through the force of its own spirit. Otherwise, law
becomes mechanical and encrusted, more suitable to tyrannical regimes than constitu-
tional democracies.
259. One could argue that calling for a rejection of the theory of constitutional
revolutions might be a call for a return to the "correct' jurisprudence. But in what sense
is it correct, if practice doesn't embody it? The theory of constitutional revolutions rejects
the notion that there could be a correct, "original jurisprudence," outside of actual prac-
tice. Pragmatism cannot tolerate divorcing correctness from actual practice in this man-
ner.
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this situation, such a revolution is limited simply to rectifying the
normative invalidity of actual practice. Once we return constitu-
tional adjudication to its conventionalist, coherentist, naturalist, or
pragmatic essence, we are done with revolution, and thus do not
tacitly embrace the theory of constitutional revolutions.
Two responses are in order here. First, the rejoinder begs the
question in favor of the normative dimension of practice. Why
should the normative take precedence over the descriptive?26 Sec-
ond, this criticism relies on metaphysical essentialism. Why does the
normative reflect the essential nature of a practice better than the
descriptive? Further, why bother about the dichotomy between de-
scriptive and normative discourse? Instead, let's go about our busi-
ness giving reasons for or against social practices and worry less
about the status-descriptive, normative, explanatory, or motiva-
tional-of these reasons.
Most conventionalist conceptions of constitutional law, such as
textualism and originalism are normative theories of constitutiona-
lism. But no one asks why the constitutional text or the Framers'
intentions should control constitutional interpretation. Although one
could argue that these conceptions are normatively based on other
legal and non-legal practices, why should these practices be im-
ported into constitutional law, especially when actual practice is
driven by something other than authorial meaning?
Second, it is unclear how use of the theory of constitutional
revolutions can be limited to only one occasion. If constitutional
practice can be returned to its essential nature by revolutionary
adjudication, it is unclear why the same cannot be done in the fu-
ture. In other words, engaging in revolutionary adjudication for re-
medial purposes legitimizes it. Finally, if the theory of constitutional
revolutions is descriptively accurate, we should look askance at sug-
gestions to alter the practice now. Indeed, if revolutionary practice
were to be abolished, American constitutional law would so radically
change that no serious attempt to do so would succeed.
3. Traditional Constitutional Methodologies and the Theory of
Constitutional Revolutions. What role do the traditional constitu-
tional methodologies have in the theory of constitutional revolu-
tions? Regarding textualism and originalism, certain constitutional
provisions are almost exclusively determined by the text or the
Framers' intentions. Although textualism and originalism play a
260. A pragmatic judicial philosophy rejects descriptive-normative dichotomies. The
problem with such dichotomies in justificatory contexts is that choosing one branch over
the other risks begging the question against one's opponent. The pragmatist's response is,
"Why bother?"
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significant role in normal adjudication, they play a much less sig-
nificant role in revolutionary adjudication. When no more attractive
principle is at stake, the constitutional text and the Framers' inten-
tions control constitutional interpretation. Structuralism also oper-
ates in normal adjudication, but some deployments of structuralism
might also exist in revolutionary and post-revolutionary adjudica-
tion. Nonoriginalism is clearly more appropriate to revolutionary
adjudication.
The constitutional text and the Framers' intentions determine
which political concepts constitute the appropriate objects of inter-
pretation. These and other constitutional conventions constitute
normal adjudication which functions as a default mode in constitu-
tional law. Unless there is a reason to change modes, the Constitu-
tion should be understood in terms of its default mode. Conceptu-
ally, there is always the possibility of switching, but practically, the
default mode of normal adjudication determines many constitutional
issues. However, we should not forget that American constitutiona-
lism has also repeatedly embraced revolutionary adjudication.
Indeed, a legal system would be radically deficient were revolution-
ary adjudication impossible.
4. The Theory of Constitutional Revolutions and the Rule of
Law. A telling criticism of the theory of constitutional revolutions is
that it fails to explain the rule of law. A constitutional system in
which judges are permitted, if not required, to engage in revolution-
ary adjudication fails to achieve the impartial and neutral admini-
stration of the law. It also fails to preserve notice, predictability, and
stability. According to this objection, courts cannot decide like cases
alike because judges always can engage in revolutionary adjudica-
tion and, therefore, overturn precedents.26 1 Deciding like cases alike
appears to be an elementary requirement that any adequate consti-
tutional theory must satisfy. Hence, since the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions cannot satisfy this requirement, it must be re-
jected as an adequate constitutional theory.
The conception of the rule of law as consistency is ambiguous.
It might refer to some elementary conception of consistency. Or it
might refer to a deeper sense of consistency which would insist that
each person be treated with equal dignity and compassion, even if
that means violating elementary consistency in a revolutionary case.
In normal adjudication, the rule of law is satisfied by elementary
consistency. In revolutionary adjudication, however, the rule of law
is satisfied better by this deeper sense of consistency than unitary
261. This objection also should apply to any theory that permits reversing
precedent.
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theories that adhere to elementary consistency. For example, Brown
fails to satisfy the rule of law as elementary consistency, but suc-
ceeds in satisfying the rule of law in the deeper sense of consistency.
The Court treated Ms. Brown with equal dignity and compassion by
not treating her with elementary consistency. Consequently, unlike
unitary conceptions, the theory of constitutional revolutions pro-
vides a more comprehensive approach to the rule of law, one that
permits both elementary consistency in normal conditions and deep
consistency in revolutionary circumstances.262
A corollary to this objection suggests that the theory of consti-
tutional revolutions abandons reliance as an important legal value.
According to this objection, law is designed to satisfy people's legiti-
mate expectations and enable them to rely on the law in structuring
their lives. Revolutionary adjudication is antithetical to reliance
and, therefore, inadequate. But no one believes that reliance is abso-
lutely dispositive in all cases. Especially in constitutional law, the
value of reliance, though important, is not fundamental. In consti-
tutional law, we do not want people to rely on unconstitutional
statutes, or erroneous interpretations of the Constitution, or even
currently accepted principles that are unjust. Instead, conservatives
and progressives alike want the Court to correct mistakes of this
sort. This is the reason stare decisis does not have the same
significance in constitutional cases as it does in the common law.
Overcoming constitutional crises is more important than reliance.263
5. How Do Judges Identify Revolutionary Adjudication? One
might object to the theory of constitutional revolutions on the
ground that it fails to provide judges with a procedure for identifying
the need for revolutionary adjudication. According to this objection,
if the appropriate adjudication always is contestable, then the the-
ory of constitutional revolutions has limited value.
However, the theory of constitutional revolution provides a
means of identifying the need for revolutionary adjudication. A
judge can recognize the need for revolutionary adjudication when
confronting a constitutional crisis. One type of constitutional crisis
occurs when the Constitution and existing constitutional practice
fail to resolve a social or political conflict. Systemic, prolonged con-
262. In revolutionary circumstances, deep consistency does not always occur, and
when it does, it usually is contestable. Brown's antidiscrimination principle, for example,
arguably is consistent with American constitutional ideals and aspirations not with actual
statutes or judicial decisions. These ideals and aspirations typically are contestable, and
therefore the question whether Brown is deeply consistent with them is largely indeter-
minate.
263. Moreover, the theory of constitutional revolutions takes reliance seriously in
normal adjudication.
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troversy is sufficient evidence of crisis. Crises come in different sizes
and shapes. A social or political controversy involving foundational
political provisions can precipitate a crisis. Consequently, if a
constitutional provision, such as the Due Process Clause is impli-
cated by proposed legislation, and systemic, prolonged controversy
occurs over how the provision should apply to the statute, then a
constitutional crisis exists. The Court then must engage in revo-
lutionary adjudication; it must decide the issue despite having only
limited explicit guidance from the Constitution itself or from
constitutional practice." 5 After refining, perfecting, and stabilizing a
revolution, normal adjudication returns to this area of law.2 6
A second type of constitutional crisis occurs when a conflict ex-
ists between different provisions of the Constitution, or when one or
more judicial decisions conflict with other decisions or the Constitu-
tion itself. Usually, in these cases, there also must be some sort of
extrinsic problem forcing the resolution of the constitutional crisis. A
third type of constitutional crisis exists when a constitutional para-
digm is practically indeterminate.261
Post-revolutionary adjudication occurs when a revolutionary
decision is rendered and the scope and content of the decision is not
obvious, or when additional social and political factors must be
taken into account to determine the precise meaning of the revolu-
tionary paradigm. In such cases, the revolutionary paradigm must
be refined, perfected, and stabilized. There is no mechanical proce-
dure for completing post-revolutionary adjudication. Depending
upon a justice's political theory, the relevant paradigm will be ex-
panded or restricted. When all justices agree, erroneously or not,
that the revolutionary paradigm has been taken as far as it can or
264. The theory of constitutional revolutions might include a theory of judicial
deference to the legislature. However, the larger the scope of such a theory, the less com-
patible it is with the theory of constitutional revolutions.
265. Sometimes deciding that a constitutional provision does not implicate a statute
is just as revolutionary as deciding that it does.
266. Griswold and its progeny are paradigmatic examples of this phenomenon.
267. In my view, a constitutional paradigm is always conceptually indeterminate; in
the appropriate circumstances, it can take on a meaning significantly different from its
normal or default meaning. However, some paradigms are also practically indeterminate.
For instance, many provisions of the Constitution, such as the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, are
conceptually and practically indeterminate. On the other hand, the requirement that a
president be thirty-five years of age, is conceptually indeterminate, but practically de-
terminate. One can imagine circumstances in which the presidential age requirement
could be interpreted as "sufficient maturity," but because these circumstances probably
will never occur, one can treat the age requirement as if it were conceptually determi-
nate. For a discussion of constitutional indeterminacy, see Lipkin, Indeterminacy, Justifi-
cation and Truth in Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 599-619.
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should be taken, the paradigm will be settled and stabilized.2"
As a postmodern constitutional theory, the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions does not pretend to be systematic or algorithmic;
nor does it pretend to guarantee a consensus as to controversial
constitutional issues. However, the theory does provide a concep-
tualization-an aesthetic, a postmodern vision of American const-
itutionalism. This conceptualization enables us to understand the
perennial competing constitutional positions better in order to
achieve consensus when possible, and better understand our
disagreements when consensus is not likely.
6. The Banality of the Theory. A final sweeping objection is that
the theory of constitutional revolutions is banal because it merely
describes what we must do anyway.2 9 According to the banality ob-
jection, the theory of constitutional revolutions requires that some-
times we make conservative decisions, sometimes progressive, and
sometimes we make decisions which attempt to make law coherent.
Only if there exists a choice in the matter could this platitude prove
illuminating. But since the theory of constitutional revolutions accu-
rately describes constitutional change, we have reason enough to ig-
nore the theory. The theory adds nothing of value to the practice.
Consequently, it is illusory to think that revolutionary constitutional
practice can be abandoned; the theory is an inevitable feature of
human inquiry, and therefore, it is pointless to offer it as a compet-
ing theory which practitioners may or may not adopt.
The banality objection must be evaluated carefully. If the ob-
jection suggests that constitutional practice cannot function accord-
ing to one paradigm alone, it merely reiterates the position of the
theory of constitutional revolutions. But that doesn't mean practi-
tioners cannot believe that they can adhere to one paradigm alone;
and this belief may cause them to distort constitutional practice. It
is doubtful that any legal practice can exclusively reflect only one
jurisprudential conception, but the belief that it can entails using
normal adjudication to decide some cases that should be decided by
revolutionary adjudication, such as those involving a constitutional
268. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Although the distinction between normal adjudication and revolutionary adjudica-
tion cannot be drawn mechanically, it is a useful analytic device for understanding
American constitutional transformations. A constitutional law professor should try
thinking of most lead cases in a case book as revolutionary cases, and subsequent cases in
that section, including the note cases, as the product of post-revolutionary adjudication.
This taxonomic distinction alone, I submit, illuminates the development of constitutional
law for most students.
269. This is a version of an argument that Stanley Fish has made prominent. See
generally STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATuRALLY (1989).
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crisis. Consequently, though the theory of constitutional revolutions
describes how American constitutionalism functions, its value lies in
encouraging self-conscious adherence to the practice described.
When a judge views American constitutionalism through the lens of
the theory of constitutional revolutions, she may perfect the revolu-
tionary dimension of our practice more effectively than if she were to
adopt an alternative theory.7 Hence, it is not pointless to endorse
the theory of constitutional revolutions. Although we cannot avoid
revolutionary adjudication, we can do it much better when we do it
self-consciously.
E. How Constitutional Law Can Be Postmodern
Constitutional law can be postmodern when it accounts for the
complexity of constitutional paradigms and values. This complexity
is best expressed by the theory of constitutional revolutions since
the theory captures the dualist basis of constitutional adjudication
from its inception. Thus, postmodern constitutionalism is designed
to accommodate the proliferation of competing constitutional para-
digms.27' Postmodern constitutionalism is a form of inquiry that
permits each practitioner to push forward with her own vision, while
welcoming others with competing visions. It encourages the very
sort of "discord" or "tower of Babel" that some commentators decry.
Our constitutional culture is embarking on a new age in which cer-
tainty and necessity will cease being taken seriously, though the
rhetoric of certainty and necessity, as well as other formalistic ra-
tionalistic devices, might persist in some quarters. This new age will
take its myths less seriously than prior ages, and will insist that
everything is initially an equally plausible myth.
We must not fail to enter this era of pluralism out of fear that
humanity will not survive if confronted with diversity. Though no
external guarantor exists to protect us, constitutional culture will
not end if judges and practitioners no longer find the question of
legitimacy interesting. The courts will not self-destruct if no one ar-
gues or writes books on the so-called "correct way" to read the Con-
270. One might argue that the theory of constitutional revolutions is correct only
from an external perspective, and, therefore, permits, even requires, judges and other
judicial actors to retain their traditional rhetoric. Thus, revolutionary adjudication can
continue, even though justices think that they are doing something else, even retaining
traditional conventions, concerning text or original intent. But the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions is not merely a description of constitutional practice. Instead, it is an
interpretive characterization of how constitutional law develops. As such, it is a non se-
quitur to insist that its goals can be met as well by retaining traditional terminology as by
embracing the theory's alternative descriptions.
271. I have in mind movements such as critical legal studies, critical race theory,
critical feminism, law and literature, law and economics, and so forth.
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stitution,272 or on combatting the countermajoritarian problem. In-
stead, both will continue, finding substantive controversies and per-
haps substantive compromise to be the most important issues in
postmodern constitutionalism.
CONCLUSION
The theory of constitutional revolutions can explain the devel-
opment of American constitutional law. It also can instruct a judge
on how to evaluate the competing claims of precedent and constitu-
tional change. Further, the theory of constitutional revolutions,
though not limited to progressive political theory, is more compat-
ible with such theory than with conservative political theory. As
such, the theory of constitutional revolutions provides an analytic
device for explaining and justifying Supreme Court decisions. This
analytic device also shows how judges of all political ideologies may
use the same constitutional methodology and still arrive at very dif-
ferent substantive conclusions. When judges have different sub-
stantive values, the theory of constitutional revolutions explains
why the same judicial methodology yields different constitutional
conclusions.
The theory of constitutional revolutions exhorts us to end the
internecine bickering over proper constitutional methodology. In-
stead, substantive battles should be waged without permitting
methodology to restrict or expand the possible answers. Given the
state of American constitutionalism, constitutional battles inevita-
bly will reflect the syncretic conception of constitutional change in-
corporated into the theory of constitutional revolutions.
Judges should cease the interminable disputes over methodol-
ogy which no one can win anyway, and instead fashion a public dis-
course reflecting the substantive values expressed in American co-
272. I am convinced that Robert Bork is an example of the perennial modernist.
Bork still believes that a "Ojudicial philosophy is either correct or incorrect" with nothing
more to say, as if such a belief settles some important issue, or has relevance to our prac-
tical deliberations over constitutional matters. Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Mar.
26, 1993). It is difficult to understand why Bork persists in advancing this position when
he is the first to insist that we cannot know or prove which substantive values are correct.
Even if Bork's distinction between correct and incorrect judicial philosophies is concep-
tually sound, how can he believe that one can know or prove with any reliability when a
judicial philosophy is correct or when a constitutional methodology is incorrect? Lastly,
what can it mean in postmodern constitutionalism for a judicial philosophy to be correct
or incorrect. Postmodern pragmatic constitutionalism advocates abandoning such notions
and, instead, advocates the delineation of a rich suggestive picture of American
constitutionalism that includes competing paradigms. The postmodern constitutionalist
seeks to transcend the modernist framework, fixated on truth and method, and instead
seek critical consensus and respectful compromise; and failing that, a delineation of the
obstacles keeping these noble postmodern virtues beyond our reach.
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nstitutionalism. Judges also should appreciate the fact that when
this public discourse fails to resolve a constitutional issue, as it most
certainly will in some cases, then at that point they must exercise
creative judicial insight and decide the case according to their best
conception of the ideals of American constitutional law. The theory
of constitutional revolutions maintains that such revolutionary de-
cisions are a fundamental feature of American constitutionalism and
that judges do more harm than good when they insist otherwise.
This essay's central purpose has been to dispel a myth that
constitutional interpretation is or should be restricted to a narrow
range of constitutional conventions. Both traditional constitutional
theory and Ackerman's interpretive history of constitutional mo-
ments perpetuate this myth in different ways. Instead, postmodern
constitutionalism must seek new vistas, new ways of providing in-
sight into the creation of constitutional meaning. The theory of
constitutional revolutions is one such attempt of providing a consti-
tutional aesthetic-a way of feeling critically comfortable with con-
stitutional theory. Postmodern constitutionalism need not be a
chaotic free-for-all. Instead, it can be an opportunity for integrating
disparate values in order to confront the problems American const-
itutionalism will face in the next millennium. 73
273. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 173.
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